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NATO AT 40

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UNITED STATES SENATE

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LETTER OF SUBMITTAL

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC, May 1, 1989.

The HON. CLAIBORNE PELL,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This year marks the 40th anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty. This anniversary presents an opportunity for celebrating the great success of this alliance—the keystone of U.S. post-war international security policy. But it is also a time when many of the assumptions which have shaped both U.S. and NATO policies are being questioned.

At this time of challenge and opportunity for the alliance, I asked the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress to submit to the Subcommittee on European Affairs a survey of alliance accomplishments and issues, accompanied by a comprehensive bibliography of literature on the alliance. This compendium is a timely and dispassionate review of the many questions concerning NATO's future. It should afford scholars, officials, and interested citizens an opportunity to contemplate the crosscutting currents in relations between the United States and its NATO allies and between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

The Western allies must shape NATO's future in the context of a great variety of transitions now occurring in international relations. Not only are some basic factors changing within the Soviet Union and inside the Warsaw Pact, but the West European members of the European Community are moving toward their goal of creating a unified market by the end of 1992.

With these many changes in motion, NATO cannot stand still. The alliance needs to move toward a new transatlantic bargain creating a more cohesive European role in NATO while seeking development of a more cooperative European security system with the Warsaw Pact countries.

This is not a time of crisis in the alliance. The trends that we see are the consequence of successful U.S. and Western policies. It is rather a time of opportunity to which American policy must rise. This effort by the Congressional Research Service provides invaluable information and analysis that should be factored into U.S. consideration of its future policy options. In the hope that this report will contribute to the current discussion of future East-West and alliance relations, I respectfully submit it for publication.

Sincerely,

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,
Chairman, Subcommittee on European Affairs.

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
Washington, DC, April 26, 1989.

Hon. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,
Chairman, Subcommittee on European Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

Dear Mr. Chairman: I am pleased to be able to transmit to you a collection of articles on NATO issues on the occasion of NATO's 40th anniversary and a bibliography prepared as a companion piece to this survey. These materials respond to your request for such a package to be published by the Subcommittee on European Affairs in commemoration of the Alliance's anniversary.

The forum was prepared by a team of Congressional Research Service analysts coordinated by Stanley R. Sloan, Senior Specialist in International Security Policy. The bibliography was prepared by Sherry B. Shapiro, Bibliographic Specialist in Foreign Affairs and National Defense.

We believe that the analyses and information contained in this package celebrate the history of the North Atlantic Treaty while addressing the issues that lie ahead. We hope that it will be of value in the subcommittee's continuing work on Western alliance issues.

Sincerely,

JOSEPH E. ROSS, *Director.*



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NATO AT 40

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES [1]

International security policy in the United States since World War II has been based on a system of collective security. The United Nations charter deemed collective security arrangements legitimate and desirable stabilizing elements of post-war international relations. When the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington on April 4, 1949, the collective security concept became the central factor shaping U.S. defense policy.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that was constructed on the treaty's foundation represents perhaps the most successful accomplishment of U.S. post-war diplomacy. NATO has been the principal vehicle both for balancing the power of the Soviet Union and for developing coordinated Western approaches to East-West relations. Its strength was based not just on the need to deal with the Soviet threat but also on the goal of protecting and advancing the democratic values shared by the members of the Alliance.

A Success Story

NATO has probably endured well beyond the expectations of its founders. Few, if any, of the diplomats and politicians who shaped the Alliance would have predicted that their creation would be so resilient. Few could have anticipated that the East-West confrontation that gave rise to the Alliance would persist virtually unchanged for so long and that the relationships among Western countries that they devised in the first several years of the Alliance would be so enduring.

In fact, of course, the Alliance survived by changing. NATO adjusted to the passage of European powers from the colonial to post-colonial eras. The allies reacted to emerging U.S.-Soviet nuclear parity by shifting NATO's military doctrine from the threat of massive nuclear retaliation to the promise of a flexible response capability. NATO responded to France's decision to quit the integrated military command by leaving the back door open for informal military cooperation with France. The allies reacted to the first apparent retreat from the cold war in the 1960s by broadening NATO's objectives to include the search for détente as well as the maintenance of defenses to deter Warsaw Pact military aggression or political intimidation. NATO has survived despite a long history of bilateral disagreements among its members, including the

[1] Stanley R. Sloan is a CRS senior specialist in international security policy and coordinator of this forum on NATO.

deeply rooted enmity between Greece and Turkey and widely divergent allied approaches to security issues outside the NATO area.

Toward the Future

Now, against the backdrop of NATO's substantial success, the Alliance is facing a period of transition. Perhaps for the first time in NATO's history there appears to be a chance for major positive changes in East-West relations. The Soviet Union has never opened the door so wide to potential opportunities for reducing the East-West military confrontation and alleviating the political tensions that are at the root of that confrontation. At the same time, NATO is facing the challenge of adjusting to changed economic and political relationships within the Alliance. These changes present an opportunity and a need to reach a new transatlantic bargain.

Neither of these challenges, on their own, would be easy for an alliance of 16 sovereign members to manage. Yet, despite the disagreeable aspects of confrontation in the East-West relationship and of heavy reliance on U.S. leadership and military forces in NATO, the United States and its allies have found workable approaches for dealing successfully with these realities.

The allies cannot be certain that old assumptions have been replaced by new realities. Has the Soviet tiger really changed its stripes? If so, is the magic of Mikhail Gorbachev's leadership sustainable? Or will he fail to produce the requisite rewards for the Soviet people and be replaced by new and less amicable adversaries?

Because each NATO ally has its own unique history, political requirements, economic problems, and potentials, a wide range of approaches to such questions has emerged in Western consultations. NATO operates on consensus-building, a process in which the United States plays a prominent but by no means dictatorial role. The process is made even more complex by the fact that national parliaments and public opinion play an important role by setting the parameters guiding the NATO governments.

Within this dynamic framework NATO in the next few years will attempt to produce a coherent, effective response to the new opportunities presented by Soviet policy. The allies will have to adjust defense plans, arms control approaches, and public diplomacy to reflect an appreciation of the balance between continuity and change in the East-West relationship. Governments must ensure that basic security requirements are met and that both defense and arms control policies promote national security interests.

At the same time, strong pressures in the United States call for cuts in the expense of U.S. overseas commitments while increased European self-confidence produces more independent West European security approaches. In an optimistic scenario for the Alliance, these pressures could transform NATO into an organization in which twin pillars flanking the Atlantic support the Western security relationship. But there are dangers as well. The pressures could produce frictions and disagreements that could unravel Alliance ties which have served the countries so well for 40 years.

The magnitude of change under way in West-West relations has been highlighted by the European Community's goal of achieving a

fully unified market in 1992. This historic step in the process of European integration can be seen as further fruit of the post-war U.S. policy of supporting European recovery and reconstruction. It also can be seen as a potential threat to U.S. trade and economic interests in Western Europe. If the 1992 plan makes Western Europe politically and militarily more self-sufficient as well as economically stronger, the NATO Alliance should benefit in the long run. Much good will and attentive diplomacy may be required, however, if the inevitable transatlantic frictions that emerge in this transition are not to disrupt the Western alliance.

Challenges and Opportunities

This forum on NATO looks ahead to the challenges and opportunities produced by the current dynamism of East-West and West-West relations:

- How can NATO most effectively respond to the new Soviet challenge and balance the possibilities for promised gains against potential risks? How daring can the West afford to be?
- Will NATO be forced to reassess its military strategy, or is that strategy sufficiently flexible to accommodate the doctrinal and force structure changes that could result from arms control negotiations?
- What part should nuclear weapons play in NATO's strategy? If the role of nuclear weapons should be reduced, which nuclear systems should remain based in Europe and which ones can be removed either unilaterally or through arms control?
- Will the European allies be able to construct a real European pillar in NATO to help shift some of the burdens of the Alliance from American shoulders? What problems will the United States encounter with the emergence of a more assertive West European voice in decision making that inevitably would accompany a more cohesive European contribution to NATO?
- How can the allies keep trade, economic concerns, and burden sharing frictions from undermining the Alliance? What should be done to ensure that the European Community's 1992 objective produces net gains for NATO as a whole?

These and other questions set an ambitious agenda for NATO in the next decade. NATO's history can be seen as a blend of continuity and change. As the Alliance marks its 40th anniversary, the challenge for the next decade will be to ensure that the vital goals of the Alliance are preserved while the allies seek positive adjustments in transatlantic relations and a more cooperative and stable East-West relationship.

SOME MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING NATO'S HISTORY [1]

June 1947—U.S. Secretary of State George C. Marshall proposed European Recovery Program for the economic rehabilitation of Europe (later became known as the Marshall Plan).

March 1948—Brussels Treaty mutual defense pact signed by Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg.

June 1948—U.S. Senate adopted Vandenberg Resolution, which cleared many of the legal roadblocks to American participation in an Atlantic Alliance.

April 1949—The North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington by governments of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

September 1950—U.S. President Truman announced that the United States would send a substantial number of U.S. ground forces to Europe.

October 1950—French Prime Minister René Pleven proposed creation of a European unified army, including German contingents, within the framework of NATO.

February 1952—Greece and Turkey joined NATO.

February 1952—North Atlantic Council meeting in Lisbon established ambitious conventional force goals for NATO countries and supported development of a European defense community.

August 1954—French National Assembly failed to ratify the European Defense Community treaty, terminating the project.

October 1954—The Western allies reached the Paris Agreements recognizing the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) as a sovereign state and establishing the Western European Union among the original Brussels Treaty powers plus Italy and the FRG.

December 1954—The North Atlantic Council supported the U.S. doctrine of "massive [nuclear] retaliation."

May 1955—Federal Republic of Germany became a member of NATO.

January 1959—European Economic Community was established.

August 1961—The Berlin Wall separating East and West Berlin was constructed.

September 1965—French President Charles de Gaulle announced France's intent to withdraw from NATO's integrated military structure.

March 1967—New NATO headquarters became operational in Brussels, Belgium after being moved from Paris.

December 1967—North Atlantic Council approved the "Harmel Report" on the Future Tasks of the Alliance specifying NATO's

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[1] Michael T. Tierney, foreign affairs analyst, CRS Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division.

multiple goals of defense, deterrence, and seeking détente with the East. The allies also approved the "flexible response" doctrine as the replacement for massive retaliation.

October 1973—Conference on Mutual Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) opened in Vienna.

August 1975—Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was signed.

December 1979—NATO decided to deploy intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) missiles in Western Europe while seeking limitations on the same systems.

December 1981—Spain became NATO's sixteenth member.

September 1986—The Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) resulted in the multilateral "Stockholm accord," which expanded the confidence-building measures included in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act.

December 1987—The United States and the Soviet Union signed the INF Treaty banning all ground-launched intermediate-range (500 km to 5,500 km) missiles from U.S. and Soviet arsenals.

June 1988—INF Treaty entered into force.

February 1989—The MBFR negotiations concluded without result.

March 1989—Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and follow-on CDE talks opened in Vienna.

THE EVOLVING SOVIET CHALLENGE [1]

Soviet policy under Gorbachev presents new challenges to the Western alliance, different from any seen in the past 40 years. On the one hand, Moscow's new approach may reduce the threat to NATO, allow for mutual arms reductions, and create new opportunities for East-West cooperation. On the other hand, Western public and political perceptions of a reduced Soviet threat may significantly outpace the reality, with dangerous consequences.

NATO's new predicament results from an overall shift in Soviet domestic and foreign policy, arguably necessitated by the political and economic success of the Western alliance. Moscow has found itself increasingly unable to keep pace with growth in Western economies while maintaining its military position vis-à-vis NATO. Recognizing the deteriorating state of the Soviet economy and its long-term consequences for the Soviet position as a great power, Gorbachev's program seems to be focused on modernizing and energizing the Soviet economy. To that end he is seeking to introduce sweeping economic and political reforms.

Gorbachev's strategy could require a shifting of Soviet resources from the military to other sectors of the economy, at least in the short run. This is politically difficult and risky. The Soviet Union is adjusting its security and foreign policy in an apparent effort to reduce international tensions and selectively retrench from costly Soviet commitments abroad.

The United States and Western Europe figure prominently in Gorbachev's strategy. To implement his domestic program, Gorbachev apparently believes he must reduce the military competition with NATO. Gorbachev's economic modernization program also requires access to Western technology and know-how, as well as Western markets for increasing Soviet hard currency exports. He understands that easing tensions is a prerequisite for large-scale economic cooperation with the West.

The New Soviet Policy

The Soviet Union has undertaken a series of steps toward cooperation with Western Europe and NATO. Moscow has announced changes in its defense doctrine designed to ease Western concerns over Soviet intentions. "Military sufficiency" and "defensive defense" have become the new declared (but internally still debated) principles guiding the Soviet military posture. The Soviet Union also has announced major unilateral cuts of forces, tanks, and equipment over the next few years. Its Warsaw Pact allies have followed suit with cuts of their own.

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[1] Francis T. Miko is a specialist in international relations with the CRS Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division.

The Soviet Union has shown new flexibility on arms control by taking several initiatives and offering surprising concessions to some long-standing Western demands. This helped to bring about a U.S.-Soviet INF treaty (December 1987), the Stockholm Agreement on confidence building measures (CDE in October 1986), and has led to the start of new parallel talks on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CAFE) and confidence building. The new Soviet flexibility has been most striking in the area of verification, where Soviet officials are now signaling support for highly intrusive measures.

Beyond the security arena, Gorbachev has launched a campaign to change the Soviet image with the West and achieve closer Soviet-Western European ties under the slogan of "building a common European home," with emphasis on the "Europeanness" of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev does not exclude the United States from his concept of the "common European home." Instead, he explicitly acknowledges that the United States is also a European power.

Perhaps the Soviet Union has drawn the lesson from past experiences that overt attempts to split Europe from North America are counterproductive. Such efforts have served in the past to unite the West and make West Europeans more apprehensive about bilateral ties with Moscow. The Soviets may calculate that, in the absence of a perceived Soviet threat, the natural trend over time may be toward a gradually diminishing U.S. role, leaving the Soviets as the de facto major European power.

Soviet leaders have made accommodations to Western concerns on human rights. They have also allowed the East European countries greater maneuvering room to establish their own expanded links with the West. They have been willing to compromise on a number of issues to bring about a new East-West agreement on security and cooperation in Europe (CSCE) at Vienna, and have established a series of further meetings, including a Moscow human rights conference in 1991. The Soviet Union has also moved to strengthen multilateral East-West contacts by initiating negotiations between the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and the European Community.

Implications for NATO

Western experts are divided on the implications of Soviet policy for the Atlantic alliance. Some skeptics see Gorbachev's strategy as nothing more than the sophisticated renewal of a long-term attempt to split the alliance and eventually achieve hegemony over the continent. Others see the changes in Soviet policy as reducing the Soviet threat and ushering in a qualitatively new and more constructive chapter in East-West relations. In fact, the potential costs and benefits of Gorbachev's policies are not likely to prove mutually exclusive.

Potential Benefits. In the short term, at least, Gorbachev's policy creates significant opportunities for the West. The prospects are improved for achieving NATO arms control objectives, reducing imbalances in conventional forces, substantially diminishing the Soviet Union's capability to launch a surprise attack, lowering

force levels on both sides, and negotiating a more stable and secure relationship with the East.

For the first time, a number of experts see a realistic hope of ending the division of Europe and the cold war. They see the growing East European diversity and expanding relations with the West as positive trends. They are encouraged by the fact that the Soviet Union no longer excludes the United States from its concept of the "common European home."

The Gorbachev stance toward Western Europe creates new possibilities for East-West cooperation, not only in the economic sphere, but on environmental and other problems of mutual concern. Such cooperation has been a specific goal in the broader context of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union. The Chernobyl nuclear accident in the Ukraine underscored the fact that some of these issues know no boundaries. The ongoing CSCE process provides a forum for further cooperation.

Finally, many Western observers hope that the Soviet reform program at home, combined with Moscow's increasing interdependence with the West, will bring about fundamental and permanent changes in the Soviet system over time that will make it a more constructive and reliable partner for the West.

Problems for NATO. As the Alliance seeks to adjust to the new Soviet posture in Europe, a chief problem it faces is the lack of certainty about the ultimate aims or prospects of the Gorbachev program. Some analysts still view Gorbachev's policy not as a real change in Soviet intentions, but as a skillful and dangerous strategy to divide the West, lull NATO into complacency, and gain unilateral advantages for the Soviet Union. A growing number of Western experts reject this view and see Gorbachev's stance toward NATO as but one piece in an overall strategy that carries too many risks and far-reaching repercussions for the Soviet Union to be credibly seen as a foreign policy ploy. But regardless of Gorbachev's ultimate aims, his ability to carry out his policies successfully at home or abroad is still in doubt. If he fails, the failure could help rebuild NATO consensus, but at the cost of renewed tensions with the Soviets.

In an immediate sense, Gorbachev creates problems for NATO Alliance management, regardless of his intent or long-term impact. His policies have sharply diminished Western public perceptions of a Soviet threat. Even though Soviet military capabilities have not yet been reduced in any significant way (in some areas they have actually been strengthened in the Gorbachev era) and the announced Soviet cuts will not eliminate all disparities even when completed, pressure is building in the West to respond to Soviet initiatives with corresponding cuts in Western forces. At a time of serious budget constraints in all NATO countries, Western governments may find it increasingly difficult to gain political support for what they see as necessary defense improvements. Chances for meaningful arms control agreements, some fear, could be reduced if the Alliance fails politically to meet its defense needs. The allies may also find it increasingly difficult to maintain a coordinated approach to East-West relations in the current political atmosphere, as is demonstrated by their divergent attitudes on East-West trade and technology transfer. The Warsaw Pact states already show

growing diversity in their approaches to the West. With the blurring of lines and limits, it is not clear where these trends will lead.

SELECTED COMMON NATO ACRONYMS

ACE	Allied Command Europe
APAG	Allied Political Advisory Group
ATA	Atlantic Treaty Association
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System
CAFE (or CFE)	Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CBM	Confidence-Building Measure
CDE	Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe
CDI	Conventional Defense Improvement (Program)
CMF	Conceptual Military Framework
CNAD	Conference of National Armaments Directors
CSBM	Confidence and Security Building Measure
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
DPC	Defense Planning Committee
EURO-GROUP	Informal group of European defense ministers
FOFA	Follow-on Forces Attack
FOTL	Follow-on to the LANCE (nuclear short-range missile)
IEPG	Independent European Programme Group
IMS	International Military Staff
INF	Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
MBFR	Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions
MC	Military Committee
NAA	North Atlantic Assembly
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPG	Nuclear Planning Group
OTAN	French acronym for NATO
PERM REP	Permanent Representative (to the North Atlantic Council)
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe
SNF	Short-range Nuclear Forces
TNF	Theater Nuclear Forces
WEU	Western European Union
WP	Warsaw Pact

NATO FORCES AND STRATEGY: POST-INF ISSUES [1]

The NATO heads of state in March 1988 affirmed that NATO's security, as well as hopes for political change in Europe, was directly challenged by the numerical superiority of Soviet conventional forces. Faced with the continued imbalance in NATO/Warsaw Pact forces and, at the same time, a diminished West European perception of the Soviet threat reinforced by recent Warsaw Pact announcements of conventional force cuts, the Alliance has been called upon to resolve key questions on the future of its security: What balance between conventional and nuclear force modernization is needed to deter and defend against Warsaw Pact forces? What is the proper relationship between force modernization and arms control at both the nuclear and conventional levels? And perhaps most important, what future Western strategy can meet the criteria of being both acceptable to NATO publics while preserving the political and military strength and cohesion that have guaranteed peace in Europe for more than 40 years?

The Debate over Conventional versus Nuclear Forces

Some analysts proclaim that NATO's strategy needs to be altered radically to meet new political and military challenges. Others argue that, although NATO must continue to adjust its policies, its strategy is basically sound, and indeed has evolved over time to account for changes in the international environment. For example, few NATO students dispute that the removal of INF systems from Europe will place greater emphasis on conventional defenses. NATO's increased reliance on conventional weapons, however, predates the INF Treaty. The decision to replace NATO's military doctrine of the 1950s, "massive retaliation"—which threatened large-scale nuclear counterattack against the Soviet Union in response to any form of Warsaw Pact aggression—with the strategy of "flexible response" stressed the importance of conventional capabilities.

Flexible Response

Flexible response, NATO's declared military doctrine since 1967, is based on the application of the minimum level of force needed to repel an aggressor. The doctrine was and remains ambiguous concerning whether, when, or how NATO would use nuclear weapons to respond to an attack. Under this strategy, deterrence is ensured as long as the would-be attacker believes the Alliance will escalate the conflict to whatever level of force is required to prevent defeat, including the possible first use of nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, flexible response, in the context of then-emerging U.S.-Soviet stra-

[1] Charlotte P. Preece is a specialist in international policy and assistant chief of the CRS Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division.

tegic nuclear parity, placed greater weight on nuclear weapons based in Europe and conventional forces to deter and defend against potential Warsaw Pact aggression.

The strategy and forces debate did not end with the acceptance of flexible response. In 1977, West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt voiced concern during the U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) about the consequences of limiting strategic nuclear forces during a period of impasse in conventional arms control negotiations. As a result of the perceived nuclear parity symbolized by SALT, some Europeans began to call into question America's willingness and ability to execute flexible response.

The 1979 NATO decision to deploy new intermediate-range nuclear systems in Western Europe, while simultaneously pursuing arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union to limit such forces, was made in large part to reassure West Europeans that the link between America's conventional presence and strategic nuclear forces was credible. NATO began deploying new intermediate-range nuclear forces in five European countries in 1983, after the Soviet Union refused a zero-based option that would have required removal of their SS-20 missiles. In December 1987—after NATO had deployed well over two-thirds of its INF missiles—the Soviets accepted the U.S.-proposed "zero-option" while adding to it elimination of shorter-range INF missiles—the "double zero." The INF Treaty that resulted from this accord calls for the destruction of all American and Soviet nuclear and conventional land-based missiles with ranges between 500 km and 5,500 km.

Developing a Future Strategy

The implementation of the INF Treaty, which removes one link in the flexible response chain, has again prodded the Alliance to rethink the role of nuclear weapons and the relationship between nuclear and conventional forces and arms control in Alliance strategy. Alliance history has shown the importance of the relationship between nuclear and conventional components of force structure for deterrence and defense. It has also demonstrated that although nuclear and conventional forces are interlinked, they are not necessarily interchangeable. Even with vastly improved conventional forces, it is debatable whether conventional forces alone can serve to deter aggression to the extent that sophisticated nuclear weapons and delivery systems have made possible. Furthermore, with zero- or near-zero-growth defense budgets a likely reality on both sides of the Atlantic, it is difficult to foresee how the Alliance can afford more costly conventional defense improvements to offset the central role that theater nuclear forces have played in Alliance strategy.

Alliance decision-makers currently cite the requirement to improve both conventional and nuclear capabilities while pursuing conventional arms control talks aimed at achieving NATO/Warsaw Pact stability at reduced levels. The following four articles review the current debate and discuss Alliance options for NATO conventional force posture, the NATO/Warsaw Pact balance, conventional arms control, and NATO nuclear issues.

CONVENTIONAL FORCE MODERNIZATION [1]

In the wake of the INF Treaty, interest in the state of NATO's conventional forces bur- geoned. The impending removal of a major portion of NATO's European-based nuclear forces led many to believe that conventional forces would have to shoulder a greater share of the deterrent burden. While most generally agree that NATO must maintain modern and robust conventional forces, the current international political and economic environment presents a number of challenges to NATO planners.

Among these challenges are changes in the perception of the Warsaw Pact threat to Europe, the advent of new negotiations to reduce conventional forces in Europe, a heightened U.S. concern over burden-sharing within the NATO Alliance, and increasingly constrained defense spending in virtually all NATO countries.

Warsaw Pact Force Reductions

The Warsaw Pact's announced unilateral force reductions and its newly declared "defensive" military doctrine have had a notable impact on Western public opinion. Replacing memories of Soviet expansionism and military intimidation are perceptions of a Soviet Union seeking to reduce its reliance on and investment in military forces. The Warsaw Pact force reductions will be carried out over a period of two years, and may not be subject to agreed verification procedures. They also represent reductions in deployed forces but not necessarily significant reductions of military equipment. Nevertheless, NATO leaders must present their requests for continued conventional force modernization against the backdrop of a Warsaw Pact that seems to be standing down from confrontation.

New Conventional Forces Negotiations

Simultaneously, the conventional arms control climate has entered a new phase. As NATO turns 40, the onset of new negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CAFE) has dissipated some of the pessimism that surrounded past efforts to reduce the military confrontation in Europe. Although negotiations are expected to be lengthy and complex, prospects for some level of agreement appear brighter than ever before.

Consequently, as NATO planners develop equipment modernization programs, they must take into consideration the arms control objectives of the Alliance and their potential impact upon the NATO force structure in Europe. They may also have to contend with public opinion that questions the need for substantial investment in new conventional weapon systems that in a few years may

[1] Steven R. Bowman is an analyst in national defense with the CRS Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division.

be dismantled, destroyed, or mothballed upon conclusion of a conventional arms control agreement.

Some NATO military leaders are already concerned about adopting too sanguine an attitude toward the future of the NATO-Warsaw Pact relationship. General John Galvin, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, warns: "We must not be lured by the siren call of Soviet benign intent. We must judge their intentions primarily by their capabilities."

Burden-Sharing Within the Alliance

Regardless of the potential for eventual success in reducing conventional armed forces in Europe, NATO continues to grapple today with the perennial controversy over burden-sharing: allocating costs of maintaining the forces in place. If the modernization of NATO forces is to continue apace, NATO planners will have to contend with heightened congressional interest in reducing the share of the costs borne by the United States. While it has proven extraordinarily difficult to place a precise "dollar-value" on the full contributions of each Alliance member, the specific costs of modernizing equipment are accessible and consequently subject to more intense scrutiny.

NATO's Modernization Efforts

A number of avenues are being explored for ways to continue modernization, but with a more equitable distribution of the direct financial burden. One suggestion directly related to conventional force modernization has been to assign NATO member nations primary responsibility for specific types of forces. For example, some analysts have suggested that responsibility for forward deployment of heavy armor and mechanized divisions could fall primarily to the European allies, while a top U.S. priority could be air and naval forces that are more easily deployable across the Atlantic.

Another approach receiving increased attention is joint development and production of major weapon systems. Assistant Under Secretary of Defense Francis Cevasco has estimated that cooperative research and development programs with NATO allies have increased twenty-fold since 1980. Most recently, for example, the U.S. Army is considering joint development of the multibillion dollar LHX light helicopter program with France, the Netherlands, Italy, and the United Kingdom. The LHX program manager, Maj. Gen. Ronald Anderson, estimates that cooperative development could reduce U.S. costs by 10 percent. NATO coproduction agreements have proven successful with weapon systems as diverse as the Stinger portable antiaircraft missile and the Multiple Launch Rocket System. Cooperative programs could offer not only potential cost savings, but also the opportunity to achieve greater standardization and interoperability of military equipment throughout the Alliance.

Defense Spending: Budgetary Considerations

Perhaps one the most significant challenges confronting NATO's modernization effort is the downward trend of U.S. defense spend-

ing. President Bush's FY90 defense budget calls for no real growth above inflation, and projects only 1 to 2 percent growth above inflation through FY92. Some observers believe these projections are unrealistically generous for defense and that efforts to curb the Federal deficit could actually lead to defense budget reductions of from $60 billion to $100 billion (from a base of $1.26 trillion) over the next four years. (To put this in perspective, the entire French 1989 defense budget totals approximately $29 billion, while British 1988 defense expenditures amounted to $32 billion.)

While U.S. units stationed in Europe, or earmarked for rapid deployment, continue to receive first consideration for new equipment, budget reductions will nevertheless slow the rate of modernization. Programs slated for production cutbacks as a result of budget constraints over the next four years include the M-1 Abrams tank, the M-2 Bradley fighting vehicle, the Patriot air defense missile system, the Forward Area Air Defense System (FAADS), and the F-16 fighter aircraft. Budget reductions will also force difficult choices in research and development programs, such as the LHX helicopter and the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), intended to equip U.S. and NATO forces into the next century.

Although there is little doubt that NATO's conventional forces will continue to modernize, it appears that the economic and political climate will dictate a slower pace than in recent years, with more selective funding, possibly an increase in cooperative programs, and closer coordination of modernization priorities with arms control developments.

NEW CONVENTIONAL ARMS NEGOTIATIONS [1]

Diplomats from all 16 NATO and the 7 Warsaw Pact countries took their seats in Vienna, Austria, on March 9, 1989, to begin new negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CAFE). The participants began efforts to reduce forces in the area from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains in the Soviet Union. The talks convened some 16 years after an earlier generation of negotiators representing the same alliances had first met in Austria to negotiate Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR). The MBFR talks, which concentrated on defense manpower in central Europe, were ended in February 1989 without agreement—to give way to the new, more broadly focused negotiations.

Also on March 9, representatives of the 35 NATO, Warsaw Pact, and neutral and nonaligned participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) began the next phase of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE). The CDE participants will attempt to expand on the agreements on notification and observation of military activities reached initially in the CSCE Helsinki Final Act and substantially expanded in the 1986 Stockholm accord. Further development of these measures would complement any reduction agreement reached in the CAFE negotiations.

Gorbachev Initiative

The new talks have been given a strong push by Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's December 1988 speech to the United Nations General Assembly in New York in which he promised to make substantial unilateral reductions in Soviet armed forces. Gorbachev said that by the end of 1990 the Soviet Union would reduce its armed forces by 500,000 men and withdraw six tank divisions from East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary and disband them. In addition, Gorbachev promised:

- Withdrawal of assault landing troops and other particularly offense-oriented forces from Eastern Europe
- Reduction of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe by 50,000 men and 5,000 tanks
- Restructuring of forces remaining in Eastern Europe toward a "clearly defensive" orientation
- Cuts in Soviet forces from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains by a total of 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery systems, and 800 combat aircraft
- "Significant" reduction in Soviet forces stationed in Mongolia.

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Early in 1989, Gorbachev and other Soviet officials provided additional details concerning planned cuts in Soviet military efforts. East Germany and other Warsaw Pact countries have followed the Soviet Union's lead, promising unilateral reductions in their military efforts.

Western Goals

The NATO approach to the CAFE talks is "to establish a situation in Europe in which force postures as well as the numbers and deployments of weapon systems no longer make surprise attack and large-scale offensive action a feasible option." The Western negotiating position, initially revealed in December 1988, also seeks to reduce in particular the presence and power of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe.

The West's initial position calls for reductions in Warsaw Pact and NATO tanks, armored troop carriers, and artillery down to 5 to 10 percent below current NATO levels. The approach is designed to accommodate the French desire to avoid a "bloc-to-bloc" approach by setting overall limits on total holdings of armaments in Europe by NATO and Warsaw Pact countries; for example, the total of NATO plus Warsaw Pact tanks could not exceed 40,000. Within these limits, no single country could deploy more than 30 percent of the total. In the case of tanks, therefore, no country would be entitled to more than about 12,000. The proposal includes specific limits on stationed forces and sublimits to prevent concentrations of forces in any particular part of Europe.

The NATO members have promised to propose "stabilizing measures of transparency, notification and constraint applied to the deployment, movement and levels of readiness of conventional armed forces," and would require a "rigorous and reliable regime for monitoring and verification."

Warsaw Pact Proposal

On March 6, 1989, Soviet Foreign Minister Edward Shevardnadze revealed the Warsaw Pact's approach to the negotiations. Shevardnadze proposed a three-stage process of reductions and restructuring of military forces in Europe.

- In the first stage, NATO and the Warsaw Pact would reduce their troops and conventional armaments, including tactical fighter aircraft, tanks, combat helicopters, armored personnel carriers, artillery, multiple rocket launchers and mortars, to new levels 10 to 15 percent below the lowest levels currently held by either side.
- In a second stage, troops and weapon systems would be cut 25 percent.
- In a third stage, the military forces of each side would be "given a strictly defensive character, and agreements would be reached on ceilings limiting all other categories of arms."

Shevardnadze expressed willingness on the part of the Warsaw Pact to negotiate far-reaching cooperative verification measures including inspections without the right of refusal, aerial inspections, and verification at key military communications points such as rail

yards and road intersections. Shevardnadze said, "There is no verification measure which we would not be ready to consider and accept on a reciprocal basis."

Shevardnadze pointedly raised several issues on which there are strong differences with the West, arguing the importance of naval forces to the military balance in Europe, the need to eliminate tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, and the high priority that should be given to aircraft reductions. Naval forces are not included in the CAFE mandate. The West opposes elimination of tactical nuclear weapons and wants aircraft limitations dealt with at a later stage in the negotiations.

Prospects

The Warsaw Pact opening position includes a number of general points of agreement with the West, including the goal of eliminating asymmetries in military forces in Europe, the priority to be given to forces and weapon systems that are particularly essential for offensive operations, and the need for thorough verification measures. The scope of the first stage of the Warsaw Pact approach appears to be close enough to NATO's position to allow serious negotiations to proceed.

Many Western analysts believe, however, that the wide-ranging nature and broad scope of the Warsaw Pact proposal will require the West to add some new elements to their position, including a proposal for much more substantial reductions and restructuring of forces after parity has been reached.

A number of difficult issues will eventually require resolution in order to achieve a reduction accord, particularly concerning which weapon systems should be included, whether reductions should be taken in the form of military units, and exactly which verification provisions will be required.

The first difficult obstacle, however, may be the data problem that blocked the MBFR negotiations. Both sides have expressed their intent to keep the data issue from blocking progress in the CAFE negotiations. Nonetheless, the initial data estimates published by the two sides before the negotiations suggests that they define and count forces differently. Further, while the unilateral Soviet reductions will be welcomed by the West, the negotiators will as a consequence be dealing with a changing picture as the forces are withdrawn. In any case, success in these negotiations will require substantial and sustained political interest at the highest levels on both sides.

ESTIMATES OF NATO AND WARSAW PACT CONVENTIONAL FORCES "ATLANTIC TO THE URALS" [1]

Equipment and Personnel	NATO Force Estimates		Warsaw Pact Force Estimates	
	NATO	Warsaw Pact	NATO	Warsaw Pact
Tanks	16,424	51,500	30,690	59,470
Armored fighting vehicles [2]	4,153	22,400	46,900	70,330
Other armored vehicles	35,351	71,000	[3]	[3]
Artillery [4]	14,458	43,400	57,060	71,560
Antitank weapons [5]	18,240	44,200	18,070	11,465
Air defense systems	10,309	24,400	N.A.	N.A.
Helicopters [6]	2,419	3,700	5,270	2,785
Vehicle-launched bridges	454	2,550	N.A.	N.A.
Personnel [7]	2,213,593	3,090,000	3,660,200	3,573,100

Sources: "Conventional Forces in Europe: The Facts North Atlantic Treaty Organization" (Brussels, 1988); and Statements of the Ministers of Defense of the Warsaw Treaty Member States, January 1989.

N.A. Not available.

[1] NATO counts only equipment in full or partially manned units; Warsaw Pact counts all equipment in storage also.

[2] NATO divides all armored vehicles into two categories; Warsaw Pact counts only infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, and aggregates them into one category.

[3] Included above in armored fighting vehicles counts of Warsaw Pact estimates.

[4] NATO counts only artillery and mortars above 100 mm; Warsaw Pact counts artillery above 75 mm and mortars above 50 mm.

[5] NATO counts all antitank guided missiles, antitank guns, recoilless rifles; Warsaw Pact counts only antitank missiles.

[6] NATO counts attack helicopters with antitank missiles/machine guns and assault/transport helicopters; Warsaw Pact counts all helicopters, including naval.

[7] NATO counts all active duty land force personnel, including air defense, command, and support personnel; Warsaw Pact counts land, air force, and naval personnel, including air defense, command, support, and civil/territorial defense personnel.

This table was prepared by Steven R. Bowman.

NATO NUCLEAR POSTURE AFTER THE INF TREATY [1]

Implementation of the U.S.-Soviet treaty eliminating intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) missiles leaves NATO with a more limited set of options for sustaining its flexible response doctrine. Short-range nuclear artillery, dual-capable attack aircraft, and the aging LANCE missile will be the primary remaining U.S. nuclear systems in Europe when all INF missiles have been removed.

The United States has been reducing the number of artillery shells and improving the range, safety, security, and command and control of some of the remaining nuclear artillery shells in Europe. The Reagan Administration pushed hard for an allied commitment to replace the LANCE with a new missile system, hoping to use that commitment to convince the Congress to fund the replacement. But a final decision on such a replacement is politically controversial in Europe, particularly in the Federal Republic of Germany.

Political Strategic Concerns

A number of conflicting political and strategic considerations have motivated U.S. and allied behavior on the modernization issue. Although European as well as American public opinion strongly supported the INF Treaty, some observers judged that elimination of the missiles would undermine the credibility of flexible response. Others argued, however, that the United States still committed a small but strategically significant portion of its relatively invulnerable sea-launched ballistic missile force for use by NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, and that this force plus British and French nuclear strike forces and U.S. nuclear weapons based in the United States preserved a strategic striking potential for NATO. They also argued that a substantial U.S. troop presence in Europe helped link European defense to U.S. strategic nuclear capabilities.

In addition, the independent British and French strategic forces, which have not been included either in the INF negotiations or in U.S.-Soviet strategic arms talks, are being modernized and expanded. By the late 1990s, the British force will have grown from the present 64 sea-based warheads to about 512 warheads. By 1995, the French force of some 222 warheads (176 sea-based) could have over 600 warheads, of which 576 would be sea-based, and could expand to over 1,000 warheads by the year 2000. The British strategic forces are pledged for NATO use should war come.

From the perspective of many West Germans, however, the most salient post-INF fact is that most of the remaining European-based U.S. nuclear systems would, if ever needed, likely be used on West

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or East German soil. Members of Chancellor Helmut Kohl's Christian Democratic Union (CDU) as well as opposition Social Democrats and far left Green Party members expressed concern about Germany's "singular" exposure to nuclear risks.

Many U.S., British, and French officials and observers worried that the antinuclear sentiments might lead to a "triple zero" eliminating short-range nuclear missiles, and this would put NATO on a "slippery slope" toward denuclearization.

In large part because of West German concerns about the trends in nuclear weapons relationships, the Alliance decided to develop a "comprehensive concept" to govern its nuclear deployment and arms control policies. That allied study has not yet been completed.

Any chance for an early NATO decision calling for deployment of a new short-range nuclear missile was likely destroyed, however, by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's December 7 announcement at the United Nations of unilateral cuts in Soviet conventional military forces followed early in 1989 by East European promises of unilateral force cuts. Against the backdrop of these Eastern initiatives and strong West German public opposition to deployment of a LANCE replacement, Chancellor Kohl disclosed early in 1989 that he would like to postpone a final decision at least until after the West German national elections anticipated in 1990.

Nuclear Strategy and Conventional Arms Control

NATO officials believe that the allies have no option but to maintain battlefield nuclear capabilities to ensure deterrence as long as NATO forces are outnumbered in critical respects by those of the Warsaw Pact. Those capabilities presumably should include the potential for striking sufficiently deep behind Warsaw Pact front lines to deter massing of tanks for a breakthrough assault on NATO. Nuclear artillery shells serve this purpose to a limited extent, but military experts increasingly question the utility of nuclear artillery, particularly because its range is so limited (generally under 30 kilometers, or 18 miles). The growing consensus is that NATO should continue to reduce its reliance on such short-range nuclear systems.

If the new Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CAFE) succeed in removing major Pact advantages in tanks, artillery, and armored troop carriers, NATO's nuclear requirements would be reduced in some measure. But even a "balanced" and "stable" conventional force relationship between NATO and the Warsaw Pact would not necessarily remove the value of a nuclear component in NATO's strategy. Although this point is contended strongly by antinuclear forces, most European and American defense analysts believe that nuclear weapons bring a special strength to deterrence that cannot be matched by conventional forces alone.

NATO Nuclear Forces Requirements

NATO may well find it necessary to maintain nuclear capabilities for the foreseeable future, but it does not necessarily require the mix and number of forces currently deployed. U.S. and allied military authorities have concluded that the Alliance requires a

land-based nuclear missile with a range longer that that of the LANCE but under the INF Treaty ceiling of 300 miles. This conclusion, however, is not shared by all experts and officials, and there is sufficiently strong West German public opposition to deployment of a new land-based missile to warrant reconsideration of the options. Some of the questions that might be asked include:

- Is 1995 absolutely the last year that the LANCE system could safely and efficiently be kept operational, as NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, General John Galvin, has argued?
- Does NATO require a new missile with longer range than the LANCE, or could LANCE missiles be given a new electronics package to go with other updated components without changing their range or other military characteristics?
- Should the missile system that replaces LANCE be deployed, as the U.S. Department of Defense now plans, on a Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) launcher, which is also used widely in a conventional role? Using the MLRS platform as the new system's launcher would add great flexibility to the system because of the commonality between the nuclear and nonnuclear launch systems, and would allow the nuclear missiles to be more easily dispersed among conventional MLRS systems. But this use of the MLRS might impinge on conventional defense improvements by taking launch platforms away from conventional missions and dedicating support and other forces to nuclear roles that otherwise could be used to strengthen conventional defense. The mix between very similar conventional and nuclear launch systems would also make any arms control limitations on short-range nuclear missiles much more difficult to verify.
- What are the relative merits of alternative nuclear deployment options? For example, the United States plans to deploy a tactical Short-Range Attack Missile (SRAM-T) in the early 1990s. The SRAM-T, with a post-launch range of approximately 400 kilometers, could be carried by the F-111, F-15E, and F-16 A/C tactical aircraft. Could this nuclear tactical air-to-surface missile, now intended to be deployed in addition to the LANCE replacement, be used to perform the LANCE mission, allowing NATO to forgo deployment of a new land-based nuclear missile?

Political and Arms Control Factors

The nuclear modernization issue involves far more than decisions about weapons system trade-offs. The political cohesion of the Alliance and its public support in key Alliance countries is critically involved. Questions that might be asked in this regard include:

- What are the military and political costs of not deploying a new land-based missile system versus the costs, particularly in terms of Alliance political cohesion, of deploying a new system?
- Should NATO consider an arms control approach that either seeks to eliminate all short-range U.S. and Soviet nuclear missiles (the "triple zero") or calls for equal ceilings on such systems?

- **Should the Congress seek to influence administration decisions regarding the political and arms control aspects of the issue as well as the weapons systems choices and funding?**

ESTIMATES OF NATO AND WARSAW PACT SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES, "ATLANTIC TO THE URALS" [1]

Type of Missile	Number	Country
NATO		
Pluton	32	France
Lance	95	United States (36), West Germany (26), United Kingdom (14), Italy (6), Netherlands (8), Belgium (5)
Warsaw Pact		
SCUD B	506	Soviet Union
SCUD A/B	161	Bulgaria (48), Czechoslovakia (27), East Germany (27), Hungary (9), Poland (32), Romania (18)
FROG, SS-21	756	Soviet Union (534), Bulgaria (40), Czechoslovakia (38), East Germany (34), Hungary (24), Poland (56), Romania (30)

Sources: SIPRI Yearbook: World Armaments and Disarmaments (Oxford University Press, 1988); and Military Balance 1988–1989, Institute for International Strategic Studies (London, 1988).

[1] Estimates are for launchers deployed. Each launcher may be capable of multiple firings. Estimates for missiles/warheads are as follows. NATO—Lance, 1,282, of which 692 are deployed in Europe. Pluton, 70; Warsaw Pact—SCUD B, more than 500 (no data available for SCUD A); FROG: 200, SS-21: 1,100. No geographical distribution for the Warsaw Pact is available. It is assumed that, with the exception of the French Pluton missiles, nuclear warheads in each alliance remain under the control of the United States or the Soviet Union.

This table was prepared by Steven R. Bowman.

POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF THE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN NATO COUNTRIES [1]

Over the past 40 years, political-military ties among members of NATO have been fundamentally based on the perception of a serious threat to Western Europe from the Soviet Union. It was the strong belief in such a threat that initially led to the establishment of NATO. The U.S. policy of containment was based on the view that developing a strong military force and enhancing the ability to project it would deter prospective Soviet aggression or subversion.

Limiting Soviet Expansion through Collective Security

To support NATO's concept of collective security, most NATO countries welcomed the establishment of military bases and the deployment of American military forces on their soil. At the height of the cold war, the threat of Soviet subversion and expansion was credible to most allies and friends of the United States who were recovering from the devastation wrought by the Second World War. Thus, the willingness of the United States to commit its military, economic, and political power, to contain Soviet influence and expansion was seen as a positive good by most Western nations—certainly in NATO Europe. NATO members also generally agreed that providing bases to America was an effective and appropriate way to support the concept of collective security.

The absence of a war between the two superpowers since 1945, the limitation of East-West conflicts to localized insurgencies or "proxy wars" in Third World countries, and developments in the Eastern bloc since the 1980s have led some NATO allies to question fundamental assumptions that have been at the heart of the cold war. The relative lessening of tensions between East and West European nations, together with the emergence of new generations of leaders and political movements, has placed a greater focus on the dangers of the nuclear arms race. The debates stimulated by these changes have led important constituencies in some NATO nations to believe that the most serious threat to peace now is the continuing military competition between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Changing Perceptions of Need for U.S. Bases

The consequence of these debates, in part, has been to focus greater attention on U.S. military bases and military forces located in various NATO nations. Although American bases and military forces were once perceived almost universally as indispensable to

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the national security interests of the various host nations, they are now viewed in some cases as a mixed blessing at best. Their continued presence has made them an easy and popular target of controversy for domestic political elements—especially leftist political parties or leftist factions of parties.

In sum, the perspectives of various host nations regarding U.S. bases and military presence have gone through important changes within the past 40 years. The fundamental consensus on the nature of the cold war does not exist today between the U.S. and some NATO allies as it did in the 1950s. U.S. foreign policy interests and priorities are not always fully shared by America's Alliance partners. Further, the risk is ever present that U.S. military power—tangibly represented by the presence of bases and troops—might be used in ways inimical to the perceived interests of any host nation in a non-Soviet contingency. Thus American bases and military forces can become politically inconvenient guests at any time.

Today NATO members that host American bases are keenly concerned that they not be drawn into U.S. military disputes with other nations that are not directly related to their own interests. In NATO, military missions by allied nations are generally described as occurring within or outside the "NATO area"—the territorial boundaries set out in the North Atlantic Treaty. So long as U.S. military missions are conducted in direct support of NATO missions and are within the NATO area, they have not been very controversial with host governments. But "out-of-area" operations by the United States that might involve allied bases have been a key source of concern to U.S. allies. Such operations seem more likely to support U.S. policy goals and not necessarily those shared with the countries providing the bases.

Nuclear Weapons

Questions related to nuclear weapons, their storage, transit at U.S. overseas bases, and the possibility that nuclear-strike missions might be deployed from such bases have greatly increased in recent years. The basic issue of nuclear weapons and their prospective use is both highly emotional and politically potent in most NATO countries. Some of the most powerful political interest groups in NATO states, for example, are those that advocate policies aimed at radically reducing or eliminating nuclear weapons and forces. These groups were the vanguard of the formidable (but unsuccessful) movement to block deployment of NATO's INF (Intermediate Nuclear Force) missiles in the early 1980s. Their existence has led to concerns within certain host nations regarding the presence of nuclear weapons on U.S. naval ships and aircraft, and has led to efforts within some allied nations to prohibit nuclear weapons storage on their territory. Some antinuclear movements further seek to ban transit of nuclear-capable aircraft through their airspace.

U.S. Concerns and Burden Sharing

The changes in perspective and approach by some NATO allies have come at a particularly sensitive time. While the United States still desires to maintain a credible and tangible forward deployment of military forces in NATO Europe, serious U.S. budgetary

constraints make it hard for America to accomplish all it might wish at home and abroad and have created a new impetus for the Congress to insist on a greater sharing of the burden of collective defense by U.S. allies around the globe. Increasingly the U.S. Congress has included in the concept of "burden-sharing" access to bases in allied countries and the absorption by allies of much of the cost associated with maintaining or relocating U.S. overseas bases—especially in instances in which a base has simply become politically inconvenient for a current host government. The Congress has further become frustrated with efforts by some less wealthy NATO allies to exact the highest price possible in foreign aid from the United States in order to maintain rights to overseas bases—bases that the United States feels serve the collective security interests of the free world, not just those of the United States.

U.S. budgetary difficulties may lead American policymakers to insist that rights to base access and use become a standard burden-sharing measure. The United States seems certain to insist that NATO, as an entity, assume a greater share of the costs of maintaining U.S. military bases and forces overseas. The United States will likely continue to urge wealthier allies in NATO to provide foreign assistance to less wealthy allied nations that provide base access and base facilities to U.S. military forces. If relocation of U.S. military forces from existing bases proves necessary, the United States will likely want the greater share of such costs to be borne by allies who benefit from the forward basing of American military forces.

Despite these potential difficulties, both the United States and most NATO governments continue to believe that the forward deployment of U.S. military forces at bases in NATO countries serves U.S. national security interests, those of its NATO allies, and the cause of international peace and stability. The current and future challenge will be to find a way to reconcile changed perceptions of the nature of East-West relations with the need to respond to the continuing military threat posed by the Soviet Union.

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EUROPEAN ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES [1]

Changing perceptions on both sides of the Atlantic of the Soviet threat are a principal cause of divergences among member states over future policy. Gorbachev's initiatives in the arms control arena and his overtures for a Europe less divided by economic and political rivalries have led to a call from some publics and some leaders in allied states for reductions in Western defense efforts, particularly cuts in nuclear weapons on the continent. As these changes are occurring, the United States continues to urge its allies to increase their share of NATO's defense burden and to support a nuclear force that provides a credible deterrent to a Warsaw Pact attack. Beneath these currents lies a Western Europe grown more politically assertive as a result of steadily strengthening economies and of emerging generations of leadership who question the dominant U.S. role in shaping NATO policy.

The U.S. Role

Since the formation of NATO, the United States has supported the allies' efforts first to rebuild their economies, and then to play an enlarged security role through construction of a strong "European pillar" for the Alliance. In the 1950s the United States vigorously supported European efforts to move toward economic union in the European Economic Community (EEC). The United States also supported early unsuccessful efforts to establish a European Defense Community (EDC) and subsequently the more modest Western European Union (WEU) as ways of strengthening the European role in the Alliance.

The European Pillar

In the past decade the Congress has sought to strengthen the European pillar and to alleviate the U.S. economic burden in assuring a strong NATO defense posture. The specific shape of such a pillar remains undefined. The allies' confidence in the U.S. nuclear guarantee has eroded somewhat. Does such a trend mean that France and Great Britain, each possessing nuclear forces, will one day step forward and provide the core of the nuclear deterrent in Western Europe? Will European military officers play a greater role in the most senior command positions at NATO headquarters? Will European efforts to capture more of the armaments market mean that the allies will one day direct important revisions of NATO military strategy and of the research and development of weapon systems that will provide the tools to implement that strategy? These ques-

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tions are unanswered, but are in the early stages of debate in the Alliance today.

Political and Economic Issues

The emerging question of who shall produce and supply weapon systems for NATO—and possibly much of the world—is an indication that Alliance issues sometimes move beyond primarily security considerations and into the political and economic arena. The Congress is concerned that U.S. and NATO security be enhanced by sophisticated, modern weaponry, but it is also concerned about U.S. competitiveness in world markets. Some members are therefore wary of the "Europe of 1992" that could promise a more competitive European Community of transnational companies and a highly educated and productive work force. Other Members have welcomed European efforts at joint weapons production as an element of the allies' willingness to assume a greater share of the defense burden.

Burden Sharing and Weapon Systems

Congressional burden-sharing initiatives have sought to encourage the allies to increase real annual growth rates of defense spending and to improve the quality of the Alliance's equipment in the field. Senator Sam Nunn has led the effort to design a process by which the United States and its allies first determine defense needs for weapons or other equipment, then agree upon jointly funded projects to produce the necessary systems. In the long run, such joint development could conserve resources through economies of scale, enhance defense capabilities through a standardization of equipment to be used by different national forces, and improve military planning by jointly determining needs throughout the entirety of NATO territory rather than relying on possibly redundant or fragmented national efforts to achieve a coherent defense.

The European allies in the early 1970s formed a loosely organized institution to coordinate the production and acquisition of military equipment. Member states describe this institution, the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG), as a "European Common Market for armaments sales." Representatives of some member states contend that the process of supplying weapon systems for NATO has been a boon primarily to U.S. defense industries. The IEPG is intended in part to strengthen the development of a (European-U.S.) "two-way street" in arms production and sales.

The allies contend that they must assure the profitability of their defense industries if they are to maintain a competitive stance in sophisticated defense technologies. Though Congress and a succession of U.S. administrations have called for a greater commitment of West European resources in the production of defense equipment, some members of Congress now also express concern that sectors of the U.S. defense industry will be threatened by highly competitive European counterparts.

The international economic implications of this aspect of the European cooperative defense effort are uncertain. A commission es-

tablished by President Reagan reported in 1988 that the past decade had seen too many U.S. resources invested in military R&D—technology that in the commission's view often has proven to have little wider application in more commercially marketable "civilian" goods on a global scale. Some Members of Congress, with an eye on the U.S. trade deficit, have called for consideration of sharp reductions in Federal spending on military R&D, and a greater targeting of Federal funds on technology having appeal in world markets. Congress will likely debate whether such a shift could adversely affect the ability of U.S. defense technology companies to compete internationally.

Intra-European Defense Cooperation

Another element of European defense cooperation also presents important issues for Congress. Recent attempts to revitalize the Western Europe Union (WEU) and Franco-German joint defense undertakings are two significant examples of allied efforts to assure West European security. The decision in 1987 of WEU members to send surface craft to protect their commercial shipping in the Persian Gulf is cited by some observers as willingness by the allies to assume a defense burden critical to NATO interests, although not directly covered by the NATO Treaty.

Similarly, the decision in 1987 by France and West Germany to establish a joint Defense Council and a joint brigade has been praised by U.S. officials as an example of allied efforts to enhance NATO's defense. The Defense Council is attempting to coordinate elements of the two nations' arms production and military strategy, and the joint brigade will try to strengthen a key strategic sector in the southeastern Federal Republic of Germany. France, a member of NATO political organs but not of the Alliance's integrated command structure, has demonstrated in recent years its intention to contribute to the defense of NATO Europe despite its independent military posture.

Decisions for the United States

Some observers, however, believe that increased defense responsibility by the Europeans will ultimately mean a diminution of U.S. influence in the Alliance. The United States has used its leadership of NATO to parry Soviet efforts to intimidate Western Europe and to pressure the Soviets to bargain more seriously in arms control forums by presenting them with a united front. U.S. leadership of the Alliance has meant that Washington enjoys leverage in steering the policies of allies in such areas as trade away from paths inimical to U.S. interests. A greater sharing of the defense burden by the allies could result over time in a diminished U.S. ability to protect its own national interests.

The burden-sharing debate has evolved to the point that the United States may find necessary a more careful management of its initiatives in Western Europe in the economic as well as the security sphere. Increasingly, the Congress may find that both NATO and the European Community, though not linked institutionally, will be the source of West European initiatives designed to advance their interests in relations with the United States.

Gorbachev's apparent growing success in influencing West Europeans in the debates over arms control and defense expenditures poses a more immediate, though no less difficult, challenge for U.S. policymakers. Congressional efforts to assure simultaneously an equitable sharing of the allied defense burden and the preservation of NATO security may require increasingly multifaceted initiatives in different forums in order to balance U.S. economic, political, and security interests in Europe.

THE NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY

Since signature of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, the Congress has been deeply involved in Alliance issues, beginning with the Senate's advice and consent to ratification of the Treaty. Each year since then the Congress has been called on to authorize and appropriate funds in support of the U.S. military commitment to NATO, and numerous congressional committees have exercised oversight of U.S. participation in NATO through hearings and studies.

Members of Congress also participate in NATO issues through involvement in the North Atlantic Assembly (NAA), the interparliamentary assembly of NATO member countries. The NAA provides a forum in which West European and North American parliamentarians meet regularly in committee and plenary sessions to analyze, discuss, and voice their opinions on Alliance issues. The Assembly is not formally a part of NATO, but it acts as a link between NATO and member parliamentarians. Assembly reports and recommendations are sent to NATO. NATO officials, including the Secretary General and the Supreme Allied Commander, regularly appear before Assembly groups.

In 1988 a special Assembly committee on "NATO in the 1990s" released a major report on the future of the Alliance (published by the North Atlantic Assembly, Brussels, Belgium). The nonpartisan committee was chaired by Senator William Roth, Jr.; and its membership included Senator Sam Nunn and Representatives Doug Bereuter and Bill Richardson. At the end of 1988 a joint State and Defense Department report to the Congress commended the "NATO in the 1990s" project as "a successful endeavor" that contributed "directly to the quality and timeliness of the various political debates in the national capitals of our allies" on NATO issues.

NATO OUT-OF-AREA PROBLEMS AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM [1]

The North Atlantic Treaty was originally intended as a mutual defense agreement for the signatory countries. Although the terms of the treaty have not changed, NATO has gradually broadened its mandate to include a political dimension and has increased its area of interest to include problems that originate in other regions of the world. This change did not come easily, but only as a result of a continuing debate among the members about whether NATO should get involved at all in such "out of area" matters.

In the early years of the Alliance the United States, concerned that the European members were heavily involved with problems occurring in their colonial holdings, insisted that such problems outside the NATO perimeter were not part of the NATO responsibility. Later it was the Europeans who worried that the United States in its role as a superpower might drag the rest of NATO into distant conflicts in which they shared no vital interests. Historically, as well as in recent years, the Middle East has proven most difficult for the Alliance in this regard, as issues in that region have impinged directly on the frequently diverging interests and perceptions of NATO members.

An Evolving Policy

Despite such differences, NATO has managed to cope with out-of-area problems over the years while neither seriously alienating its members nor substantially altering its basic institutions. Once a problem is identified as a common interest or otherwise affecting the entire Alliance, it has usually been possible to agree on a mutual objective and allow for at least complementary, if not collective, actions. Most recently, a number of NATO countries, following the U.S. lead, sent warships to the Persian Gulf to help protect shipping lanes during the Iran-Iraq war. Participating states emphasized that this was not a NATO action under U.S. leadership, but rather a joint European initiative under the loose coordination of the Western European Union. Thus it appears that the Europeans in some instances will respond with military initiatives outside the NATO area if they are not formally coordinated in NATO.

This has been facilitated by the fact that the NATO Treaty is nonspecific in terms of institutions and procedures; instead, it relies on consultation to solve differences among the partners. As a consequence, Alliance policy has evolved slowly and pragmatically,

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usually based on a loose consensus like that described above for the Persian Gulf crisis.

Current NATO out-of-area policy is the result of decisions reached over the years in the context of specific episodes, including the French involvement in Indochina in the early 1950s, the Suez crisis in 1956, U.S. involvement in Indochina in the late 1960s, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. A May 1984 NATO communique declared: "The allies recognize that events outside the Treaty area may affect their common interests as members of the Alliance. ... Those in a position to facilitate the deployment of forces outside the treaty area may do so on the basis of national decision." During specific periods of crisis, important NATO policy documents, such as the December 1956 "Committee of Three" report and the 1967 Harmel Report, have emphasized the importance of consultation on political issues, including those arising outside NATO's area.

Differing Views on Terrorism

Even though international terrorism does not exactly fit the definition of an out-of-area problem, the past several U.S. administrations and Congresses apparently believed that there were enough similarities to consider terrorism a threat to the Alliance and that terrorism warranted allied cooperation to control it. They thus called for other NATO countries to support that cooperation.

West European governments have resisted U.S. efforts to form a common front, arguing that terrorism is largely a domestic problem and that they preferred to cope with it with their own police and other national resources. It is significant that the Europeans have very different interests from the United States in the economically important Third World regions where most terrorism problems have originated.

European governments are also afraid that the United States would soon dominate any collective effort against terrorism and thus limit the maneuvering room of the others. The allies believe that the United States has been too quick to resort to the use of military force before exhausting all other options and that it has not always consulted adequately with the other members—a serious oversight in NATO process and procedure. The same countries are usually reluctant to share sensitive information with the United States because U.S. agencies have a reputation for leaking such information to the public—a particularly difficult problem in a sensitive area like terrorism.

European Community Initiatives

The question, then, is whether NATO is the right place for the United States to argue its case for cooperation against international terrorism. West European governments are closing ranks against terrorism, but they apparently prefer to use European Community (EC) organizations as a vehicle for whatever level of cooperation they deem necessary. The police in EC member countries, for example, have been cooperating to a degree hardly thought possible just a few years ago. They freely exchange intelligence information about terrorism, and Western European courts

have been prosecuting terrorists despite continued threats from terrorist parent organizations. Another illustration is an agreement between Spain and France to extradite terrorists who previously used one country or the other as a safe haven while committing terrorist crimes across their common border. The threat of extradition has apparently been instrumental in reducing the number of terrorist attacks in both Spain and France and opening the door to settlement talks between the governments and the dissident organizations.

Another EC initiative was the creation of the Trevi group in 1977 to coordinate multinational police and paramilitary actions against terrorism. Members of the Trevi group are the Ministers of Interior from the 12 EC counties (the Minister of Justice in the case of Belgium) who are in charge of the national police and antiterrorism programs in their respective countries.

The main shortcoming with using the EC organization is that the United States cannot participate directly, although the United States has been invited on an informal basis to attend the Trevi group meetings. Washington would prefer much closer cooperation in the form of multinational agreements imposing embargoes, diplomatic pressures, stiffer laws against terrorists, and less restrictive extradition agreements.

What Can NATO Do?

The United States is probably correct in using its NATO connection to pursue closer cooperation with the other members by attempting to convince them that terrorism is one more out-of-area problem posing a threat to the Alliance as a whole, but recognizing that coordinated actions are more likely to result from ad hoc bilateral arrangements than from highly visible and sensitive NATO projects.

A MORE UNIFIED EUROPE AND THE ALLIANCE [1]

Driven by the "1992" plan of the European Community (EC) for the creation of a truly unified market, U.S. relations with its European allies are entering a historic crossroads. While attention to date has focused primarily on the implications for U.S. economic interests of the steady movement toward the elimination of nearly all intra-EC trade barriers, the stakes for other Alliance relations also are enormous.

The economic integration of Europe can be seen as one step on a very long road toward greater political integration. Yet the difficulties of achieving greater political unity are not to be underestimated. The United Kingdom, for example, is staunchly against such a movement, and many other countries are concerned that greater political unity will threaten their cultural identities.

The 1992 plan, in fact, is not only a plan to complete the economic integration of the EC, but represents a new vision of a self-assured and more assertive Europe. How far and how fast Europe transforms itself in the years ahead could fundamentally influence and perhaps reshape U.S.-European relations. A more unified Europe could create both opportunities for and threats to long-standing political and military and economic relationships in the Alliance.

Economic Integration

The EC's plan to complete the integration of markets of its 12 member states into one large unified market by the end of 1992 is ambitious and far-reaching. To accomplish this objective, the EC has already adopted over 100 of the nearly 300 laws and regulations that will be needed to create this single market. The regulations eliminate the major physical, technical, and fiscal obstacles to trade among EC members. Once completed, citizens and goods from EC member states should be able to move as freely from London to Rome as does traffic between Boston and Los Angeles.

The United States has a crucial commercial stake in the EC market. With a population in excess of 320 million, the EC is potentially the largest market in the world in terms of purchasing power and is the top trading partner of the United States. Approximately 25 percent of U.S. exports go to the EC, and about 40 percent of total U.S. foreign direct investments are in the EC. The integration process should make the EC an even larger, richer, and more dynamic market.

A more prosperous Europe will create additional commercial opportunities for American exporters and investors. At the same

[1] Raymond J. Ahearn is a specialist in trade relations with the CRS Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division.

time, some U.S. policymakers have expressed apprehension that these potential benefits could be limited by EC measures that would discriminate against non-EC countries or be accompanied by new external trade barriers. These concerns have led several high-level U.S. officials to propose that the United States have a formal role in the development of EC regulations to make its concerns known before regulations possibly adverse to U.S. commercial interests would be implemented. (The United States, of course, is a member of NATO but not of the EC.) Of the twelve member states of the EC, all except Ireland are NATO members. The other non-EC members of NATO are Canada, Iceland, Norway, and Turkey.

Political integration

While the United States will not be faced with a politically unified Europe any time soon, the economic integration process itself is gradually shifting power from the member states to EC institutions. Momentum for completing the internal market was facilitated by adoption of the Single Europe Act (SEA) in 1986. The SEA eliminated the ability of a single member state to block EC actions affecting the completion of the internal market. The SEA also enhanced the power of the EC Parliament and committed the EC to achieving actions in other areas (for example, monetary reform and the environment) that go well beyond actions necessary to complete the internal market.

The SEA formally brought the European Political Cooperation (EPC) under the EC treaties. The EPC, which was informally established in 1969–70, is the framework in which EC members coordinate their individual foreign policies and seek to develop a joint EC policy whenever possible. Throughout the EPC process, the foreign policy bureaucracies of member states have forged closer personal and working relationships. This has led to a limited development of parallel foreign policy positions among member states even when a community-wide consensus has proved elusive.

The 1992 plan also requires intensified political cooperation in myriad other ways. A Europe without internal frontiers will necessitate tighter external border controls. A common EC policy will have to be developed on issues with national security overtones such as immigration, drugs, terrorism, and firearms. Some leaders, including French President François Mitterrand and West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, have discussed the eventual need for a security policy for EC states. At the symbolic level, the EC is attempting to foster a single European identity by adopting an EC flag, anthem, and passport.

In short, a more politically integrated Europe will have broader capabilities as an independent, world geopolitical and economic force. European unification thus will present both opportunities and challenges for U.S.-Alliance relations.

Opportunities

A unified Europe could offer substantial opportunities for strengthening existing trends toward a more cohesive European pillar in the NATO Alliance. Through improvements in its economic and political strength, Europe may become more secure, confi-

dent, and willing to do more for its own defense. This could be manifested initially through more effective use of existing resources and greater intra-EC cooperation in defense production. A more prosperous Europe may also be able to afford more for its own defense.

Some observers believe that a more unified Europe may translate into a more decisive and less contentious trading partner, and thus help to arrest a deterioration in transatlantic trade relations. Disputes over commodities ranging from beef to airplanes have created something approaching a zero-sum atmosphere in which American gains are commonly perceived as Europe's losses and vice versa.

Challenges

A unified Europe could also pose significant challenges to Alliance relations. To the extent that European unification is motivated by an overwhelming desire to outcompete and outshine the United States, the tendency for policies to be developed that discriminate against the United States could be heightened. Conflict could initially emerge from the development of an EC-wide defense industry within the integrated market. An important question is whether the internal political dynamics of a single market will produce greater pressures to exclude purchases of U.S. military equipment.

An ultimate challenge relates to the possibility that any emerging European national identity and national purpose will not fit into the common political conception of the Alliance. A European identity based on its own political purpose and its own prestige, and nurtured as an end in itself could create stresses in Alliance unity. If East European and Soviet developments continue to blur post-1945 East-West divisions and erode Western security concerns, such stresses may intensify. Such a development at the extreme could translate into changes in European reliance on NATO as the focal point for defense policies and strategy, and reconsideration of the Alliance.

The outcome of Europe's economic and political unification process and its effects on the NATO Alliance are largely uncertain. The challenge for U.S. policy will be to encourage trends that strengthen the role of Western Europe in the Alliance while protecting vital American political, economic, and security interests.

NATO, CoCom, AND EXPORT CONTROLS [1]

The U.S. Government coordinates its national security export controls with its major Western allies through the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom). CoCom is not a part of NATO, but it includes all NATO members except Iceland. (One nonmember of NATO, Japan, is also a participant in CoCom.) Although NATO promotes the transfer of military technologies within the Alliance and is concerned with the effects of technological trends on the military balance, it is not directly involved in controlling exports of civilian technologies with potential military applications.

The U.S. and other governments in CoCom have frequently differed in their assessments of the dangers of exporting dual-use technologies to the Soviet Union and its allies. In CoCom negotiations the U.S. Government has generally urged other governments to broaden the categories of goods subject to controls and to improve their enforcement of export controls. Other members, while supporting controls on items that could contribute directly and significantly to Soviet military power, have resisted controls on lower-level technologies and, by U.S. standards, have not put sufficient resources into enforcement.

Concerns that other CoCom members have not adequately controlled exports of militarily significant technologies have sometimes led to unilateral U.S. measures. The U.S. Government has controlled some exports that other CoCom countries do not; it has required licenses for some exports to other CoCom countries; and it has required licenses for reexports within CoCom of goods and technologies of U.S. origin. Some observers in both the United States and other CoCom countries think that such measures have imposed significant barriers to West-West trade and technology transfer. Such barriers, they maintain, sometimes generate conflicts among the allies and thwart NATO efforts to promote technological exchange among member countries.

The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (P.L. 100–418, enacted August 23, 1988) includes provisions that are intended both to tighten controls on exports of militarily significant exports to potential adversaries and to move toward a CoCom-wide, license-free zone. The Act strengthens enforcement of U.S. export control laws and subjects foreigners who are guilty of serious violations of CoCom regulations to U.S. legal sanctions. It also requires the executive branch to reduce barriers to trade and technology transfer among CoCom countries.

Although the requirements of the 1988 Act and changes introduced late in the Reagan Administration may ameliorate some dif-

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[1] George D. Holliday, specialist in international trade and finance, and Glennon J. Harrison, analyst in international trade and finance, CRS Economics Division.

ferences among NATO countries, significant issues remain. Many allied governments remain convinced that the U.S. Government is trying to control too many goods and technologies. Some governments, for example, have reportedly pressed the Bush Administration to end special CoCom controls (the so-called no exceptions policy) imposed on exports to the Soviet Union in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Most other members of CoCom have also objected to U.S. legal sanctions, authorized by the 1988 Act, against persons in other CoCom countries who violate multilateral export control rules. The Bush Administration has not detailed how it will translate the 1988 statutory changes into a policy that liberalizes intra-CoCom trade.

PUBLIC OPINION POLLS ON NATO [1]

Below are shown the results of three public opinion poll questions on NATO. These and other public opinion poll results are available to the Congress either in the POLL file on the Library of Congress SCORPIO system or from the Public Opinion Poll Collection in the CRS Government Division. For assistance or training regarding the POLL file, call 707-6447.

U.S. Awareness about the Purpose of NATO

"What is the general purpose of NATO?"

	Percent
Military alliance	16
Maintain world peace	16
Get countries together	9
Defense against communism	6
Don't know/no answer	34

U.S. Opinion about NATO

"Do you think our continued participation in NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, is very important, somewhat important, or not very important?"

	Percent
Very important	55
Somewhat important	31
Not very important	6
Don't know	7

These poll results for U.S. public opinion were obtained from Americans Talk Security, no. 12, January 1989, pp. 81-82. The survey results were completed under the direction of Market Opinion Research and are based on interviews with a national sample of 1,000 adults contacted December 10-13, 1988.

The Essentiality of NATO—West European Opinion

"Some people say that NATO is still essential to our country's security ('the security of the West' in Ireland). Others say that it is no longer essential. Which of these views is closer to your own?"

[1] Rosita M. Thomas, analyst in American national government,and Rinn-Sup Shinn, research assistant, CRS Government Division.

Country	Western European Response (Percentage) [1]		
	NATO is Still Essential	NATO is No Longer Essential	Don't Know
Belgium	66	22	12
Denmark	70	23	7
Ireland	50	22	23
France	58	22	20
West Germany	76	13	12
Greece	36	35	29
Italy	53	31	16
Netherlands	64	25	11
Portugal	44	21	35
Spain	19	53	28
Great Britian	72	17	11

Source: United States Information Agency, January 26, 1989. According to USIA, the results of the survey are "based on USIA questions asked in 11 EC-member countries during October 1988, as part of the European Omnibus Survey sponsored by the European Community. In each country, approximately 1,000 face-to-face interviews were conduced among a nationally representative sample of adults, 18 years of age and older. Of Europe's NATO member nations, Luxembourg, Iceland, Norway, and Turkey were not included in the survey."

[1] Figures are rounded.

NATO AT 40: BIBLIOGRAPHIC RESOURCES [1]

INTRODUCTION

This bibliography parallels the focus of the articles in the April/May 1989 issue of the CRS Review, entitled NATO at 40. It covers such issues as the history of and future directions for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, conventional and nuclear force issues, burden sharing among the NATO allies, economic relationships between allies, meeting the Soviet challenge, and out-of-area concerns for the Alliance. There is some overlap between various sections of the bibliography, but citations are included only in the section which best reflects their primary focus.

This bibliography is not intended to be a comprehensive listing of works in this field, but instead, focuses on literature during the previous five years. Earlier works are included as background for the topic. The majority of citations in this bibliography were selected from the CRS Public Policy Literature Database (PPLT), which was created and is maintained in the Library Services Division of the Congressional Research Service. Additional citations were selected from the Library of Congress Computerized Catalog of Books (LCCC). Such sources as the Public Affairs International Index (PAIS) were searched to assure broad coverage of the topic.

The author wishes to thank her colleagues in the Congressional Research Service for their assistance in the preparation of this bibliography. Special thanks are extended to Kristin M. Vajs, Head, Subject Specialization Section, Library Services Division, and Stanley R. Sloan, Senior Specialist in International Security Policy, Research Coordination Office, for their review of this product. Thanks are extended to John M. White, Library Services Division, without whose efforts this bibliography would not have been produced.

[1] Prepared by Sherry B. Shapiro, Bibliographic Specialist, Foreign Affairs and National Defense, Library Services Division.

I. NATO'S FIRST 40 YEARS: PRELUDE TO CHANGE?

Abshire, David M.

NATO at the moral crossroads. Washington quarterly, v. 7, summer 1984: 3–12.

"Public consensus supporting the alliance must be broadened. Part of this broadening involves addressing the moral issues and choices related to NATO policies that are now being publicly debated."

Acheson, Dean.

The pattern of responsibility. Edited by McGeorge Bundy from the record of Secretary of State Dean Acheson. New York, A.M. Kelley, 1972, c1951. 309 p. (Houghton Mifflin reprint editions) (E744.A217 1972)

Includes discussions on the formation of Atlantic Alliance, the debate on troops to Europe and other issues related to Acheson's tenure as Secretary of State.

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Present at the Creation; my years in the State Department. New York, Norton, 1969. 798 p. (E744.A2174)

Includes discussions on early North Atlantic Council meetings.

Alliances: latent war communities in the contemporary world. New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970. 384 p. (Cases in international politics) (JX4005.B4)

Partial contents.—NATO strategy and flexible response, by C. H. Amme, Jr.—NATO and OAS, by E. Vandevanter, Jr.—The role of the United States in NATO, by W. T. R. Fox and A. B. Fox.

Armacost, Michael H.

NATO and the challenges ahead. Atlantic Community quarterly, v. 22, fall 1984: 204–211.

Then Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs discusses America's role in NATO. Examine three issues: first, the security of Europe following the successful commencement of intermediate-range nuclear missile deployments; second, the outlook for East-West and U.S.-Soviet relations following Foreign Minister Gromyko's meetings with President Reagan and Secretary of State Schultz; and third, the importance to NATO security of maintenance of a favorable balance of forces in other geographic regions."

Atlantic Council of the United States.

The successor generation. Washington, 1981. 45 p.

Partial contents.—The nature of the problem.—The extent of the problem.—The purpose of the program.—The Atlantic Council's approach.

U.S. international leadership for the 21st century: building a national foreign affairs constituency; joint working group of the Atlantic Council of the United States and the Citizens Network for Foreign Affairs. Washington, The Council, 1987. 55 p. (Policy paper) (JX1417.J65 1987)

Bareth, Dominique-Francois.

Young people and NATO: a new trend? NATO review, v. 35, Apr. 1987: 28–32.

Suggests that what we are witnessing is a "reversal in past trends: young people have adopted a different outlook and set of standards, putting more emphasis on traditional values. . . . It should also be noted that NATO has recently evolved a much more active information policy towards young people, based on the current phenomenon. The joint effect of these two elements can obviously not ensure a lasting shift in trends to the Alliance's benefit, unless they are backed up by the various bodies responsible for helping young people to be aware of Atlantic issues."

Barlow, Jeffrey G.

NATO: restoring American leadership. Washington, Heritage Foundation, 1981. 18 p. (Backgrounder no. 132)

Analyzes Jimmy Carter's relationship with the NATO allies and outlines a plan of action which the Reagan administration should pursue with the Alliance.

Barnet, Richard J.

After 20 years, by Richard J. Barnet and Marcus G. Raskin. New York, Random House, 1965. 243 p. (D1065.U5B27)

Examines "how and why the United States undertook its unprecedented commitments in the postwar period . . . [and] consider[s] the price we have paid for such policies and [examines] whether in the coming perio l even that price will be too burdensome."

The Alliance: America, Europe, Japan, makers of the postwar world. New York, Simon and Schuster, c1983. 511 p.

"This book is the story of a small circle of politicians, diplomats, industrialists, bankers, and generals on three continents who created and shaped the postwar world by building an alliance of North America, Europe, and Japan. This association of industrialized capitalist nations which has already endured longer than the Holy Alliance of the last century, has been the vehicle by which the defeated nations of World War II, Germany and Japan, were transformed from America's enemies into protectorates and ultimately into formidable commercial rivals."

Beer, Francis A.

Integration and disintegration in NATO; processes of alliance cohesion and prospects for Atlantic Community. [Columbus] Ohio State University Press [1969] 330 p. (UA646.3.B39)

Partial contents.—Political consultation in NATO.—NATO military forces: integration.—NATO military forces: leadership, functionalism, and spill-over.—NATO armaments.—NATO infrastructure.—NATO science.—NATO: past and future.

Beesley, Fred W., Jr.

The Law of the Flag, the Law of Extradition, the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, and their application to members of the United States Army National Guard. Vanderbilt journal of transnational law, v. 15, winter 1982: 179–225.

Bell, Coral.

The Reagan Administration and the American alliance-structure. Australian outlook, v. 41, Dec. 1987: 151–155.

The article examines America's alliance relationship in Europe (NATO), the alliance crisis within ANZUS and the trans-Pacific alliance with Japan.

Bilge, A. Suat.

Turkey's long quest for security ends with first enlargement of the alliance. NATO review, v. 31, no. 3–4, 1983: 3641.

"An account of the events which prompted Turkey to seek membership and of the difficulties which had to be overcome before this first enlargement of the Alliance could be achieved in February 1952."

Bolkestein, F.

The Alliance in disarray? A Dutch view. Atlantic Community quarterly, v. 19, summer 1981: 143–151.

A Dutch member of Parliament surveys the Soviet threat to NATO, analyzes relations among NATO countries, and stresses the need for consultation and leadership within NATO.

Bowie, Robert R.

The Atlantic Alliance. Daedalus, v. 110, winter 1981: 53–69.

Reviews the history of tensions within the Atlantic Alliance. Considers how present tensions differ from those in the past. Predicts future challenges to the Alliance and assesses adaptions needed to surmount them.

Buchan, Alastair.

The future of NATO. New York, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1967. 61 p. (JX1907.A8, no. 565)

Calleo, David P.

American domestic priorities and the demands of alliance. Political science quarterly, v. 98, spring 1983: 1–15.

"David P. Calleo examines the degree to which America's domestic political priorities interfere with its foreign obligations, particularly its alliances with Western Europe." He suggests

that "the current deep troubles of American foreign policy should not be blamed on the domestic constraints of democracy, nor upon an upsurge of traditional populist neoisolationism. If the American public is unschooled in world politics, its leaders have never presented a suitable curriculum."

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Beyond American hegemony: the future of the Western Alliance. New York, Basic Books, c1987. 288 p. (UA646.3.C24 1987)

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NATO's middle course. Foreign policy, no. 69, winter 1987–88: 135–147.

NATO will celebrate its 40th anniversary in 1989. "There exists on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean a strong sense that NATO's structure has grown obsolete. Radical NATO reform seems particularly appealing. . . . The real issue is not whether NATO should change but how. Logically, proposals for reform fall into three broad categories: burden sharing, devolution, and disengagement. The differences among them are critical for NATO and for U.S. foreign policy in general."

Carlberg, Ron.

Behind the transatlantic dialogue. NATO's sixteen nations, v. 29, Sept.–Oct. 1984: 42–43, 45–46, 49–50.

Examines cooperation in the procurement of arms for the NATO alliance.

Carrington, Peter.

NATO: politics and defense. Atlantic Community quarterly, v. 22, fall 1984: 195–199.

Secretary General of NATO discusses the alliance, its objectives and goals.

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Reflecting on things past: the memoirs of Peter Lord Carrington. New York, Harper & Row, 1989, c1988. (DA591.C36A3 1989)

This work will be available later in 1989.

Chalfont, Arthur Gwyn Jones, Baron.

The cracks in the Alliance. United States Naval Institute proceedings, Dec. 1984: 36–43.

"There is, in fact, no real choice for Western Europe. The inescapable necessity for the whole of NATO is to bend the efforts of foreign policy to repairing the cracks appearing in the Alliance and to recognize that there are long-term strategic concerns that override short- and medium-term conflicts of economic interests, because they are not matters simply of stability and prosperity but of survival."

Clarke, John L.

Is the NATO Alliance structure appropriate for the 1980s? Military review, v. 59, Apr. 1979: 25–34.

"Originally established to prevent a Russo-Communist takeover in Europe, it has accomplished the purpose for which it was intended. But, after three decades of change, which has made the USSR a challenge to our interests globally, Americans are still locked in to an alliance that is strictly one-sided. We guarantee support to Europe, but without reciprocal pledges from other nations in the event a non-European issue is at stake."

Cleveland, Harlan.

NATO: the transatlantic bargain. New York, Harper & Row [1970] 204 p. (UA646.3.C54 1970)

Focuses on the bargaining and consultations necessary for the formation of the Alliance.

Cohen, Eliot A.

The long-term crisis of the Alliance. Foreign affairs, v. 61, winter 1982–83: 325–343.

The author maintains that the Western Alliance is "imperiled by structural contradictions and adverse long-term trends."

Coker, Christopher.

The future of the Atlantic Alliance. London, Macmillan, Royal United Services Institute, 1984. 241 p. (UA646.3.C63 1984)

Partial contents.—The Atlantic Alliance: its development and potential.—NATO defences and the Warsaw Pact threat.—The Lilliputian Senate: the failure of European cooperation.—Alliance management: defence costs and equipment.—Out of area operations.—Perceptions of the Atlantic Alliance.—NATO: the next decade, by Bernard W. Rogers.—Security by negotiation, by Hedley Bull.—NATO's forward defence: new strategy, by D. R. Cotter and N. F. Wikner.—The Southern Flank and out of area operations, by James M. Thompson.

Corterier, Peter.

The ATA Atlantic Treaty Association and a new approach to NATO information. NATO review, v. 34, Apr. 1986: 15–21.

"In this article Dr. Corterier, [then] a Social Democratic member of the Bundestag and a former Minister of State in the German Foreign Ministry, argues that NATO publics are not being sufficiently informed about Alliance policies. He considers the implications of this situation, ways in which it could be improved and, in particular, the role played by the ATA and its national member committees."

Dahrendorf, Ralf. Sorensen, Theodore C.

A widening Atlantic? Domestic change & foreign policy. Andrew J. Pierre, editor. New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 1986. 107 p. (Europe/ America, 4) (D1065.U5D26 1986)

Partial contents.—The Europeanization of Europe, by Ralf Dahrenforf.—A changing America, by Theodore C. Sorensen.

Dean, Jonathan.

Can NATO survive (relative) success. NATO review, v. 34, Dec. 1986: 14-21.

Former U.S. diplomat discusses the present state of the relationship between Europe and the United States from an American perspective.

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Watershed in Europe: dismantling the East-West military confrontation. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, c1987 [i.e. 1986] 286 p. (UA646.D42 1987)

Contents.—The end of the Western defense consensus.—The East-West military confrontation: war in Europe.—Shifting the emphasis to conventional deterrence: a critical evaluation.—Beyond the watershed in Europe.—Arms control in Europe: a disordered puzzle.—INF: the crisis of extended deterrence.—The MBFR marathon.—The conference on disarmament in Europe: a lasting institution.—The limited promise of arms control in Europe.—Political change and East-West solutions.—The inner-German relationship: can it change the political map of Europe?—Dismantling the NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation.

DePorte, A. W.

The Atlantic Alliance at 35. New York, Foreign Policy Association, 1984. 64 p. (Headline series no. 268)

Contents.—The balance sheet.—The security of the North Atlantic area.—Grand strategy?—The Third World.—Economic relations.—The future.

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NATO of the future: less is more. Fletcher forum, v. 7, winter 1983: 1-16.

DePorte provides a "restatement of the case for the Atlantic Alliance, arguing that its primary goals are being met and that the Alliance need not be threatened by occasional (and inevitable) disputes over non-central issues. Following a discussion of the various perceptions of what the Alliance should accomplish and how it has in fact responded, the author suggests that the Alliance will continue to perform very well if it is released from the burden of unwarranted expectations."

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The North Atlantic alliance: external threats and internal stress. Naval War College review, v. 37, Nov.-Dec. 1984: 71-79.

"The Atlantic alliance has been a classical defensive alliance, but with several important differences. The members' perception of the Soviet threat and the success of their response to it, in continually changing circumstances, have been unprecedentedly durable. At the same time their relations with respect to both alliance and nonalliance policies have been remarkably turbulent."

DeRose, Francois.

NATO's perils—and opportunities. Strategic review, v. 11, fall 1983: 19–26.

"The opportunity for NATO lies in harnessing its present . . . technological advantage to an enhanced conventional posture that can deny to the Soviets the principal incentive for initiating a war: namely, the prospect of a quick and decisive victory. . . . This opportunity calls for a European initiative."

Dodd, Norman L.

NATO in disarray. Army quarterly and defence journal, v. 3, July 1981: 288–297.

"The NATO Alliance is in disarray. There are two principal reasons for this; the first is that the Soviet Union has outmanoeuvred . . . [NATO nations] both psychologically and geographically; and the second is the growing strength of the Soviet inspired anti-nuclear lobby in Europe, and the consequent increasingly pacifist outlook of many of the voters."

Draper, Theodore.

The Western misalliance. Washington quarterly, v. 4, winter 1981: 13–69.

"The crisis of the 'alliance' is an old story. What is new about the present crisis is the turnabout in the relationship between the United States and its allies. The crisis in the past was mainly about the reliability of the American commitment to come to the aid of Western Europe. The crisis in the present is about the reliability of an assumed commitment by Western Europe to come to the aid of the United States."

Dunn, Keith A.

NATO's enduring value. Foreign policy, no. 71, summer 1988: 156–175.

"A thorough review of economic, geopolitical, cultural, and ancestral factors indicates that there is no reason now or in the foreseeable future why NATO Europe should lose its priority in U.S. national security strategy."

Else, Daniel H.

America's history: its future and the NATO alliance. RUSI [Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies], v. 131, Dec. 1986: 51–56.

"The importance of NATO to American security is examined, and the changes to NATO and to the United States itself over the last four decades are discussed. Finally, the paper looks at how America's future will likely affect the make-up of its premier alliance."

Ending the Alliance: opposing views. Journal of contemporary studies, v. 6, summer 1983: 5–31, 33–46.

Contents.—Ending the Alliance, by C. Layne.—Reply: the illusions of "Realpolitik," by L. Schultz.

Exit from NATO. National review, v. 38, Dec. 19, 1986: 32-37, 40.

Contents.—Losing ground in Europe, by Tom Bethell.—The Fulda gap is not on the Laffer curve, by Richard Brookhiser.

Fedder, Edwin H.

NATO: the dynamics of alliance in the postwar world. New York, Dodd, Mead, 1973. 155 p. (JX1393.N67F4)

Partial contents.—The United States and NATO.—Threat and response: the occasion for alliance.—Conditions of conflict in the Alliance.—Policy making in the alliance.—NATO and American foreign policy.

Fighting allies: tensions within the Atlantic Alliance. Edited by Walter Goldstein. London, Washington, Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1986. 235 p. (UA646.3.F54 1986)

Partial contents.—Can the Atlantic system be transformed, by Walter Goldstein.—Sharing the defense burden in NATO, by Paul F. Diehl.—Theatre nuclear forces and the NATO alliance, by Steve Smith.—Changing the conventional defense of NATO, by Steve Smith.—French defence and foreign policy and the Mitterand Presidency, by Guy De Carmoy.—West Germany contends with the Alliance crisis, by David Kramer and Glenn Yago.—The smaller countries face major problems too, by Sharon Squassoni.—Secular changes in the Atlantic Alliance, by Robert J. Lieber.—American public opinion and alliance consensus, by Werner J. Feld.—The allies fighting within the Atlantic system, by Walter Goldstein.

Flume, Wolfgang.

Military assistance within the Alliance. NATO's sixteen nations, v. 29, Sept.-Oct. 1984: 54, 57, 59-60, 62-63.

"The military aid programmes to the economically lesser developed countries in the Alliance—Greece, Portugal, Turkey, and to some extent Spain—is given individually by some NATO nations, and not by others. It is sporadic, uncoordinated and one-sided. Wolfgang Flume has an original proposal: to make it an Alliance programme contributed to by all member nations."

Folly, Martin H.

Breaking the vicious circle: Britain, the United States, and the genesis of the North Atlantic Treaty. Diplomatic history, v. 12, winter 1988: 59-77.

Details events surrounding the creation of NATO.

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Britain and the issue of Italian membership of NATO, 1948-49. Review of international studies, v. 13, July 1987: 177-196.

"The roots of British opposition to Italian inclusion in NATO were strategic, and derived from the disparity between resources and requirements."

Foster, Gregory D.

Public opinion and the Alliance: a strategy framework. Strategic review, v. 15, winter 1987: 52-66.

"The cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance is challenged by increasing . . . manifesting differences in policy perspective—e.g., over the broad issue of 'burden-sharing' . . . widened by rising American ethnocentrism on the one hand and a reemergent pan-European mystique on the other. The urgent redressive strategy must be a coordinated public diplomacy aimed squarely at the publics of the Alliance rather than the elites, and keyed to the criteria of cumulative consensus-building."

Fox, William T. R. Fox, Annette B.

NATO and the range of American choice. New York, Columbia University Press, 1967. 352 p. (UA646.5.U5F6)

"Sponsored by the Institute of War and Peace Studies of Columbia University."

This work examines how "the United States has developed its policies for and in NATO."

Freedman, Lawrence.

Managing alliances. Foreign policy, no. 71, summer 1988: 65–85.

NATO "alliance was built and sustained on a clear and present danger from the East, but this threat no longer seems so pressing. ...This situation could encourage an uncritical attitude toward arms control; at worst it could undermine NATO's existence. Gorbachev does not claim either that his country faces an imminent danger of attack from NATO. . . . The concrete proposals for a credible alternative set of security arrangements have yet to be developed."

Garcia, Robert.

The Atlantic Alliance and the successor generation. NATO review, v. 34, Apr. 1986: 22–27.

Congressman discusses the role of the Atlantic Alliance and considers the need for continued support of the alliance.

Gentles, R. G.

The Rogers Plan: a new direction for NATO? Canadian defense quarterly, v. 13, autumn 1983: 15, 18, 20, 22–23.

"The Rogers Plan holds the promise of giving the Alliance a credible conventional deterrent that will appreciably lessen the likelihood of nuclear war. It deserves active support in Canada."

Germany debates defense: the NATO Alliance at the crossroads. Edited by Rudolf Steinke and Michael Vale. Armonk, N.Y., published in collaboration with the Committee for a Nuclear-Free Europe [by] M.E. Sharpe, c1983. 208 p. (UA710.G4613 1983)

"This anthology provides . . . [an] overview of the security debate in the Federal Republic of Germany."

Partial contents.—The Soviet threat—is it real?—The 'German question' and European security.—Alternatives.

Graham, Daniel O.

A new strategy for the West: NATO after detente. [Washington] Heritage Foundation, c1977. 72 p. (UA646.3.G7)

Addresses two of the "great problems facing the NATO nations. First, Western Europe has been slow to recognize that NATO is, in fact, a global alliance requiring greater cooperation around the world, and second, NATO has been slow to respond to the growing Soviet threat in Europe despite widespread agreement on military and political measures which should be taken."

Grand strategy for the Western Alliance. Edited by Robert E. Hunter. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1984. 72 p. (JX1393.N67G72 1984)

Contains speeches drawn from a conference on "The Future of NATO and Global Security" held in Brussels in January 1984, sponsored by the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Partial contents.—Issues before the Atlantic Alliance, by H. Kissinger.—Leadership in the Alliance, by H. Schmidt.—An American perspective, by J. Schlesinger.—The economic perspective, by E. Davignon.

Gray, Colin S.

NATO: time to call it a day? National interest, no. 10, winter 1987–88: 13–26.

"Examines the assumptions on which NATO has been based, and the changes it is likely to face. If NATO alliance fails to reform, it is likely to find itself the victim of a rapid change that it neither endorsed, nor could easily survive."

Green, Fitzhugh.

The environmental evolution of NATO, 1949–1986. Atlantic Community quarterly, v. 24, winter 1986–87: 332–337.

"It has been recognized since the birth of the NATO alliance in 1949 that there is more to defense than military preparedness. . . . In the postwar period, therefore, national security has come increasingly to be defined in political, economic, and social terms as well."

Hadley, Arthur T.

Middle-aged, out of shape. Boston globe magazine, Oct. 19, 1980: 10–11, 30–32, 34, 38–39, 42, 46.

Describes recent NATO military training exercises, focusing on the difficulties of the American forces with personnel and equipment. Assesses the viability of the NATO alliance after 30 years.

Hanning, Hugh.

NATO, our guarantee of peace. London, Washington, Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1986. 56 p. (JX1393.N67H36 1986)

Traces the history of the Atlantic Alliance from 1949 to the present day.

Hardt, D. Brent.

Symbolism and substance: Henry Kissinger and the year of Europe. Fletcher forum, v. 9, winter 1985: 167–192.

The author "explores Kissinger's views on alliance unity as exemplified in his Year of Europe. . . . After examining Kissinger's grand design for alliance unity from both a European and an American perspective, Mr. Hardt points out the difficulty in translating a symbolic vision of unity into a substantive program for achieving that unity."

Hardy, Tony Le.

Communications in NATO: establishing the missing links. International defense review, v. 16, no. 12, 1983: 1733–1737.

"This article traces the evolution of NATO communications from the mid-1960s to the present. It highlights the problems and difficulties encountered with the implementation of the NATO Integrated Communications System (NICS), the achievements to be realized this year, and the plan for the future."

Harrison, Michael M.

Our Atlantic quagmire. Washington quarterly, v. 5, summer 1982: 67–73.

"Mounting divergence in the European allies' definition of their world role and their priorities has led to Atlantic disarray and marks the end of the postwar system."

Haseler, Stephen.

NATO and neutralism, by Stephen Haseler and Werner Kaltefleiter. [Washington, Heritage Foundation, c1981] 27 p. (Heritage lectures, 8)

Contents.—Strains within the alliance, by S. Haseler.—Europe: an open window?, by W. Kaltefleiter.

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Walking out on NATO. Policy review, no. 40, spring 1987: 62–66.

"NATO, however, must now begin preparing for a threat that might well put its future in jeopardy: the strong possibility that Britain will cease to be an important member of the western alliance."

Healey, Denis.

How the Allies should behave. Fortune, v. 102, Aug. 11, 1980: 152–156, 158, 160.

Britain's former Chancellor of the Exchequer suggests that the NATO alliance is not in disarray. Contends that the allies don't need to respond as one to all of each other's problems.

Heisbourg, Francois.

Can the Atlantic alliance last out the century? International affairs (London), v. 63, summer 1987: 413–423.

"After analysing some of the relevant developments in the United States and the Soviet Union, this article will therefore make a number of suggestions about what the Europeans can

do to preserve a sufficient degree of cohesion among the allies."

Henderson, Nichlas, Sir.

The birth of NATO. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1983. 130 p. (UA646.3.H35 1983)

Sir Nicholas Henderson wrote this account of events in 1949 when he was working in the British Embassy in Washington as part of the "seven-power working party that drafted the [North Atlantic] Treaty." This work provides a "detailed case study, from the inside, of the mechanics of international diplomacy—the interplay of argument, personality, and outside events that surround such critical negotiations."

Hendrickson, David C.

NATO defense: no need for basic change. Parameters, v. 17, summer 1987: 76–85.

Examines proposals for changing the NATO alliance.

Henrikson, Alan K.

The creation of the North Atlantic alliance, 1948–1952. Naval War College review, v. 32, May–June 1980: 4–39.

"This paper looks at the founding of NATO, the treaty, the organizational structure, and the military forces—what conditions required and fostered NATO and why what resulted, rather than something else, did result. It also invites a consideration of two not opposite questions—whether the defense of Europe should be more 'Europeanized'; whether NATO should be geographically and functionally broadened."

Hoffmann, Stanley.

The Western Alliance: drift or harmony? International security, v. 6, fall 1981: 105–125.

"Examines causes underlying differences among NATO allies' reactions to the unfavorable evolution of the military balance in Europe, the collapse of Soviet-American detente, and the increasing vulnerability of NATO members to events in other areas of the world, especially to the Middle East and Persian Gulf. Suggests ways to restore harmony among Alliance members.

Hofmann, Wilfried.

Whence the threat? The successor generation and the equidistance syndrome. NATO review, v. 35, June 1987: 8–13.

Former Director of Information for NATO examines the status and future of the Alliance. "NATO's future . . . crucially depends on whether we can rekindle in the minds of each successor generation those spiritual forces which preceded materialism and value-agnosticism and made the Western heritage great."

Houllez, Marcel.

The Atlantic: a broadening ocean. Studia diplomatica, v. 36, no. 4–5, 1983: 337–413.

"General and specific causes of divergences between the United States and Western Europe in the field of East-West relations and European security."

Hughes, Thomas L.

Up from Reaganism. Foreign policy, no. 44, fall 1981: 3–22.

Surveys President Reagan's approach to relations with leaders of other NATO countries, stressing diversity among NATO leaders and the importance of the NATO allies to the U.S. Reviews U.S. foreign policies, and suggests that the U.S. work with its allies in responding to issues throughout the world.

Hyland, William G.

The Atlantic crisis. Daedalus, v. 110, winter 1981: 41–51.

Reviews strains in relations between the U.S. and its European NATO allies resulting from divergences over policies toward the Middle East, Afghanistan, and Iran, as well as from differing attitudes toward military deployments in Europe, European security needs, and arms control negotiations.

Inglehart, Ronald.

Generational change and the future of the Atlantic Alliance. PS, v. 17, summer 1984: 525–535.

Jaroch, Roger M.

NATO: past, present and future. Marine Corps gazette, v. 64, June 1980: 29–40.

Discusses the origins of NATO and the provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty. Describes the structure and organization of NATO, focusing on the Alliance's military structure. Briefly assesses Alliance military strategy and reviews Marine Corps issues that are related to NATO.

Jordan, Robert S.

NATO: has anything really changed?—an American perspective. World today, v. 44, Oct. 1988: 180–182.

"The Alliance's original threefold nature remains unchanged, and this is its simplicity in the face of otherwise confusing complexity. It is a vehicle through which the Anglo-American connection linked with the continent can be maintained."

Kaplan, Lawrence S.

NATO and the United States: the enduring alliance. Boston, Twayne Publishers, 1988. 237 p. (UA646.5.U5K37 1988)

Examines the relationship "between the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization," from an historical perspective.

Kennedy, Paul M.

The rise and fall of the great powers: economic challenge and military conflict from 1500 to 2000. New York, Random House, c1987. 677 p. (D210.K46 1987)

Concludes that the history of the great powers shows "a very significant correlation over the longer term between productive

and revenue-raising capacities on the one hand and military strength on the other." Sees the postwar bipolar world power structure shifting to a multipolar structure as Japan, China, and a unified Western Europe join the ranks of the great powers.

Killick, John.

Is Nato relevant to the 1980s? World today, v. 36, Jan. 1980: 4–10.

Kirkpatrick, Jeane.

The Atlantic Alliance and the American national interest. Dept. of State bulletin, v. 84, July 1984: 70–73.

In this April 30, 1984 address before the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, Ambassador Kirkpatrick discusses the changed circumstances which confront the 35 year old Alliance and concludes that the American Government has every intention of continuing the struggle for security "side by side with our European friends."

Kissinger, Henry.

A plan to reshape NATO. Time, v. 123, Mar. 5, 1984: 20–24.

"After 35 years of preserving peace in Western Europe, the Atlantic Alliance confronts new military, political and social realities. In this article a former Secretary of State proposes dramatic—and in his view, vital—steps to help the alliance meet the challenges ahead."

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The troubled partnership; a reappraisal of the Atlantic alliance. New York, Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by McGraw-Hill [1965] 266 p. (D845.K5)

"Based on 3 lectures delivered at the Council on Foreign Relations in March 1964."

Knorr, Klaus Eugen.

The Atlantic alliance: a reappraisal. [New York, Foreign Policy Association] 1974. 63 p. (Headline series, no. 221) (E744.H43, no. 221; D1065.U5)

Contents.—Alliance in disarray?—Economic problems.—Problems of military security.—Problems of diplomacy.—Crisis of identity.—What policies for the U.S.?—Talking it over.

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NATO: past, present, prospect. [New York, Foreign Policy Association] 1969. 63 p. (Headline series no. 198) E744.H43, no. 198; UA646.3.K52

Kohan, John.

The alliance: trying to heal the rift. Time, v. 121, May 9, 1983: 40–43, 46, 51.

Krauss, Melvyn B.

How NATO weakens the West. New York, Simon and Schuster, c1986. 271 p. (UA646.3.K72 1986)

Examines security issues, costs, and other aspects of the U.S. relationship with the NATO allies.

Kristol, Irving.

NATO: do we still need it?, by Kristol Irving and Eugene V. Rostow. Freedom at issue, no. 95, Mar.-Apr. 1987: 5-11.

The Case against, by Irving Kristol.—The Case for, by Eugene V. Rostow.

———

What's wrong with NATO?, by Kristol Irving. New York times magazine, Sept. 25, 1983: 64-71.

"The author says a reconstruction is necessary to save the moribund Atlantic alliance."

Kukanov, M.

NATO—threat to world peace [by] M. Kukanov. [Translated from the Russian by David Fidlon] Moscow, Progress Publishers [1971] 147 p. (JX1393.N58K8313)

Soviet publication examines such issues as NATO's military organization, NATO's attitude toward the Third World, the withdrawal of France from NATO, and other issues.

Langer, Peter H.

Transatlantic discord and NATO's crisis of cohesion. Washington, Permagon-Brassley's International Defense Publishers, 1986. 94 p. (JX1393.N67L27 1986)

"A publication of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., Cambridge, Massachusetts and Washington, D.C."

Layne, Christopher.

Atlanticism without NATO. Foreign policy, no. 67, summer 1987: 22-45.

"America's response to NATO's deepening crisis hinges on a judgment of the seriousness of the alliance's problems. Reform will not force any meaningful change in alliance relations, and NATO's troubles will continue to fester. If things are as bad as the reformers say, then reform is not enough and a radical restructuring of the Atlantic relationship in essential."

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Continental Divide: time to disengage in Europe. National interest, no. 12, fall 1988: 13-27.

Argues "that Washington should take the initiative in seeking mutual superpower disengagement in Europe. Given the policies now being pursued by Mikhail Gorbachev . . . such a disengagement may be achievable. Even if events prove that it is not, the advocacy of disengagement by the United States will still be sound policy, for it will put Moscow to the test and deprive it of unearned diplomatic advantage in Western Europe." Asserts that such an approach would also place the decision to use nuclear weapons for European defense "where it belongs: with the West Europeans."

Ending the Alliance. Journal of contemporary studies, v. 6, summer 1983: 5–46.

"The paradigm that has guided American policy since 1945—the Alliance commitment—does not respond to the conditions facing America in the 1980s and beyond. Formulation of a new grand strategic paradigm is imperative. . . . One option that must be considered is terminating the American commitment to the Western Alliance and adopting instead a policy of strategic independence (not isolation)," argues the author.

Leffler, Melvyn P.

Strategy, diplomacy, and the Cold War: the United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945–1952. Journal of American history, v. 71, Mar. 1985: 807–825.

The Limits of the Alliance. Harvard international review, v. 9, Nov.-Dec. 1986: 6–7, 9–12, 14–16, 18–27, 30–45, 47.

Partial contents.—The Alliance and extra-European challenges, by David Allen.—The future of the Alliance and German-American relations, by Helmut Kohl.—European and American objectives in the Third World, by W. Scott Thompson and Philip A. Heywood.—The Alliance and the Arab-Israeli conflict, by Daniel Oduber Quiros.—The prospects of NATO and US-European relations, by Wilfried Martens.

Luns, Joseph M. A. H.

Taking a parting look at NATO. Atlantic Community quarterly, v. 22, summer 1984: 99–105.

NATO's retiring secretary general "sums up and comments upon" the organization during his 13 years of leadership, from 1971 to 1984.

Lyon, Peyton V.

NATO as a diplomatic instrument. [Toronto] Atlantic Council of Canada [c1970] 38 p. (JX1393.N67L9)

MacGuigan, Mark.

Political consultations and the Alliance. NATO review, v. 29, Aug. 1981: 1–3.

Examines the objectives of political consultation among NATO countries and between NATO members and non-NATO states. Surveys the role consultation can play in the 1980s.

McCloy, John J.

The Atlantic Alliance: its origin and its future. New York, Distributed by Columbia University Press [1969] 83 p. (UA646.3.M23)

Benjamin F. Fairness memorial lectures, 1968.

Addresses such issues as the historical perspective on the current state of the Alliance; challenges to the Alliance, and factors affecting the future needs of the Alliance.

McGeehan, Robert.

The Atlantic Alliance and the Reagan Administration. World today, v. 37, July–Aug. 1981: 254–262.

Mertes, Alois.

What should be done to change NATO. Atlantic Community quarterly, v. 22, summer 1984: 122–129.

The author, Minister of State, Bonn Foreign Office, critiques Henry Kissinger's "Plan to reshape NATO," (Time, Mar. 5, 1984).

Miller, James E.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Washington, U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1987. 5 p. (Department of State publication 9511. Office of the Historian historical issues)

Traces the origin of NATO, the alliance structure, issues in nuclear arms control, detente, and other issues concerning NATO.

Moore, John E.

NATO: at 35, again suffering from growing pains. Sea power, v. 27, Apr. 15, 1984: 68–70, 72, 77–79.

Examines "the elements which drew together the original twelve signatories only a little over 4 1/2 years after the end of the most destructive war ever known. A brief inspection of the situation which confronted them must, therefore, be of some value if today's problems are to be seen in their proper context."

Morony, Thomas.

Allies are different. Atlantic Community quarterly, v. 24, summer 1986: 125–131.

Considers reasons for tensions in the alliance: "NATO is an alliance of 16 free, independent, and democratic countries. . . . In fact, and paradoxically, NATO is at its most uncomfortable precisely when its effectiveness as a deterrent is at its best."

NATO after thirty years. Edited by Lawrence S. Kaplan and Robert W. Clawson. Wilmington, Del., Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1981. 262 p. (UA646.3.N227)

Twelve contributions presented at a conference entitled "NATO after Thirty Years," held at the Center for NATO Studies at Kent State University on April 16–17, 1981.

Partial contents.—NATO in history.—NATO: the second generation, by Lawrence S. Kaplan.—The United States and NATO, 1953–69, by Norman A. Graebner.—NATO and the larger European states, by Colin Gordon.—The Alliance policies of the smaller NATO countries, by Nikolaj Peterson.—NATO in the world.—The Warsaw Pact, USSR, and NATO: perceptions from the East, by Robert W. Clawson and Glee E. Wilson.—NATO and the United Nations in American foreign policy: building a framework for power, by Thomas M. Campbell, Jr.—NATO in arms.—NATO standardization: an organi-

zational analysis, by James R. Carlton.—NATO and arms control, by Luc Crollen.—The military role of NATO, by Thomas H. Etzold.

NATO and American security. Edited by Klaus Knorr. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1984, c1959. 342 p. (UA646.5.U5N38 1984)

This report is "based on papers presented at two successive conferences on the problems of NATO strategy, held at Princeton in 1958" and published by Princeton University Press.

NATO and the Mediterranean. Edited by Lawrence S. Kaplan, Robert W. Clawson, and Raimondo Luraghi. Wilmington, Del., Scholarly Resources, 1985. 263 p. (UA646.5.M4N38 1985)

Partial contents.—NATO and the Mediterranean powers in historical perspective, by Lawrence S. Kaplan and Robert W. Clawson.—The Soviet Union in the Mediterranean, by Thomas H. Etzold.—NATO's southern flank.—The Iberian connection.—U.S. security and Italy: the extension of NATO to the Mediterranean, 1945–49, by E. Timothy Smith.—The Italian role in NATO, by Raimondo Luraghi.—The Balkan powers.

NATO and the policy of containment. Edited by Lawrence S. Kaplan. Boston, Heath [1968] 114 p. (UA646.3.K36)

NATO at 30: a symposium on the future of the alliance. Washington, Atlantic Council of the United States, 1979. 38 p. (JX1393.N67R84 1979)

Partial contents.—The importance of NATO to the United States, by Kenneth Rush.—NATO's 30 years: strength in unity, by Joseph M. A. H. Luns.—NATO: the challenges ahead, by Robert Strausz-Hupe.

NATO in the 1980s: challenges and responses. Edited by Linda P. Brady and Joyce P. Kaufman. New York, Praeger, 1985. 274 p.

Examines the military, economic, and political challenges that face the Alliance in the 1980s and . . . propose[s] some potential responses to those challenges."

NATO in the 1990s. Edited by Stanley S. Sloan. Washington, Pergamon-Brassey's, 1989. (JX1393.N67N36 1989)

This work will be available early in 1989.

NATO in the 1990s. In Defense planning for the 1990s and the changing international environment. Edited by William A. Buckingham, Jr. Washington, National Defense University Press, for sale by the Supt. of Docs., G.P.O., 1984. p. 77–156. (UA23.N248 1984)

Partial contents.—The Atlantic Alliance: looking ahead, by Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.—The future of the American NATO commitment, by George H. Quester.

NATO: reshaping the Alliance—economics, politics portend shifts. Aviation week & space technology, v. 120, May 21, 1984: 50–51, 53, 55, 57, 59, 61, 63.

"Factors at play within the organization are contributing to reexamination strategy, doctrine, and force structure.

NATO: the first thirty years. In Hixson, John and Benjamin Franklin Cooling. Combined operations in peace and war. Rev. ed. Carlisle Barracks, Pa., U.S. Army Military History Institute, 1982. p. 276–348.

This work focuses on "problems experienced at the operational and tactical levels."

NATO, the next 30 years. Washington quarterly, v. 2, autumn 1979: 3–53.

Four major contributions presented at a conference "organized by CSIS and co-sponsored by the Atlantic Institute for International Affairs and the Atlantic Treaty Organization, held at the Palais d'Eqmont in Brussels on September 1–3."

Contents.—The future of NATO, by H. Kissinger.—Social change and the defense of the West, by M. Howard.—American foreign policy: the changing political universe, by S. Huntington.—Does NATO exist? by I. Kristol.

NATO, the next thirty years: the changing political, economic, and military setting. Edited by Kenneth A. Myers. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press; London, Croom Helm, 1980. 469 p. (JX1393.N67N37 1980)

NATO: time for a change. END: Journal of European nuclear disarmament, no. 13, Dec. 1984–Jan. 1985: 15–23.

"Christie, a retired Norwegian general, explains why he thinks the time has come for a reassessment of NATO's structure and doctrine."

NATO today: the alliance in evolution; a report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. Washington, G.P.O., 1982. 102 p. (UA646.3.N2465 1982)

At head of title: 97th Congress, 2nd session. Committee print, Item 1039–A, 1039–B.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, facts and figures. 10th ed., revised. Brussels, NATO Information Service, 1984. 384 p. (UA646.3.N65 1984)

Partial contents.—Origins and evolution of the Alliance.—The structure of NATO.—Political affairs.—Defense planning and policy.—Defence support.—Infrastructure, logistics, and council operations.—Scientific and environmental affairs.—Special committees, agencies and organisations.—Non-governmental activities.

North Atlantic Assembly.

NATO in the 1990s; special report of the North Atlantic Assembly. [S.l.] The Assembly, 1988. 39 p.

Partial contents.—NATO's rationale.—NATO's internal relationships: continuity.—NATO's international relationships: the need for change.—Sharing of risks and burdens.—A new political mandate for the Alliance.—Building blocks for a West European pillar in the Alliance.—NATO's social fabric, public opinion and political consensus.— NATO's strategic concept.

Nunn, Sam.

NATO: saving the alliance. Washington quarterly, v. 5, summer 1982: 19–29.

"There is a growing consensus that less reliance should be placed on use of nuclear weapons in response to a conventional Warsaw Pact attack, but there is a widespread feeling that a viable non-nuclear defense is not attainable. This paradox, coupled with political and economic differences within the alliance, is causing frustration in the United States and is threatening the very fabric of the alliance itself."

Park, William.

Defending the West: a history of NATO. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1986. 242 p. (UA646.3.P277 1986)

Partial contents.—NATO and the nuclear age: the simultaneous birth.—NATO born, Germany reborn.—The roots of NATO strategy: an unconventional beginning.—Obviating the necessity: Europe enters the nuclear age.—Nuclear controversies.—NATO since the early 1960s: implementing flexible response.—Flexible response: Washington changes direction.—Extending deterrence.—The nuclear battlefield.—Below the nuclear threshold.

Pattie, Geoffrey E.

Public opinion and alliance security. Strategic review, v. 10, spring 1982: 71–79.

"Some of the strident anti-nuclear and anti-American sounds in the Alliance, particularly as they are manifested in the various 'peace' movements, are the echoes of a massive and cynical Soviet propaganda offensive. Yet, at the center of this increasingly critical problem is a conspicuous failure by NATO and its member governments to convey to the publics a convincing picture of the Alliance's deterrent strategy, with emphasis on the role of that strategy's nuclear components."

Perle, Richard.

NATO at 35: strong & resilient. Defense/85, Jan. 1985: 16–21.

"Important issues face the alliance, but they are not divisive & should not obscure our fundamental commitment to Europe & NATO."

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Reflections on the evolution of the alliance. Armed Forces journal international, v. 124, Mar. 1987: 30–32, 36.

Assistant Secretary of Defense presents his views on the NATO alliance.

Petersen, Nikolaj.

Bargaining power among potential allies: negotiating the North Atlantic Treaty, 1948–49. Review of international studies, v. 12, July 1986: 187–203.

"The article has two principal objectives: first to elaborate on the contents of the 'bargaining power' concept, and secondly to probe its usefulness in an empirical analysis of what can be termed a non-antagonistic or cooperative negotiation context, namely the negotiations over the North Atlantic Treaty between the United States, Canada, Britain, France and the Benelux countries in 1948–49."

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Who pulled whom and how much? Britain, the United States and the making of the North Atlantic Treaty. Millennium, v. 11, June 1982: 93–114.

Suggests that the North Atlantic Treaty was "the creation of an initial coalition based on perceived common interests between an important, and eventually dominant group in the State Department and the British Government, which was later joined by other segments of the U.S. policy-making system and by other governments."

Phillips, Robert L.

Is there an ethic to NATO? Ethics and international affairs, v. 1, 1987: 211–219.

"The thesis of this paper is that for the greater part of its history, NATO has essentially been a military device with the single purpose of defending one value, namely, the territorial integrity of its members. . . . The Western alliance does rest upon values considerably larger than territorial integrity and self-determination. . . . There is clearly a set of core values that connect Western life culturally and historically."

Podhoretz, Norman.

Appeasement by any other name. Commentary, v. 76, July 1983: 25–38.

The Public and the Atlantic defense. Edited by Gregory Flynn and Hans Rattinger. London and Canberra, Rowman & Allanheld, c1985. 398 p. (UA646.3.P78 1985)

Inventories "mass opinions on national security in the nations of the Atlantic Alliance."

Ravenal, Earl C.

NATO: the tides of discontent. Berkeley, Institute of International Studies, University of California, c1985. 94 p. (Policy papers in international affairs; no. 23) (UA646.3.R378 1985)

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The price and perils of NATO. In Beyond the status quo: policy proposals for America. Edited by David Boaz and Edward H. Crane. Washington, Cato Institute, c1985. p. 111–143.

"The factors of cost and risk are inevitable components of any assessment of America's role in the defense of Europe, and

they are the most formidable reasons that could be presented for American withdrawal from Europe. It may be unpleasant to inquire about the problems of NATO from an American viewpoint; and it may seem crass to weigh those problems primarily on the grounds of cost to Americans. Yet cost (underlying the political pique voiced by conservative Americans at the Europeans, and traded off against the risk involved in holding our nuclear umbrella over our European allies) will decide the future of NATO. And that future will be disposed primarily within the American political, economic, and social process."

Reagan's leadership and the Atlantic alliance: views from Europe and America. Edited by Walter Goldstein. Washington, Pergamon-Brassey, c1986. 209 p. (E876.R422 1986)

"Developed with the support of the Standing Conference of Atlantic Organizations," papers presented at the 13th Annual Meeting of the Standing Conference of Atlantic Organizations, Wingspread House, Racine, Wisc., July 1985, sponsored by the Johnson Foundation and the Information Directorate of NATO."

Reed, John A., Jr.

Germany and NATO. Washington, National Defense University Press, for sale by the Supt. of Docs., G.P.O., 1987. 265 p.

Contents.—Road to NATO.—Germany in NATO.—Germany and NATO defense policy.—Evolution of NATO.—German security in NATO—domestic considerations.—Toward the future.

Reid, Escott.

Forty years of NATO. International perspectives, v. 17, Sept.–Oct. 1988: 3–5.

"In 1947 all or virtually all experts on foreign affairs would have dismissed as unrealistic a proposal to create a military alliance of the North Atlantic countries—the inertia, skepticism, doubts, hesitations, fears and opposition were too great to be overcome."

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Strengthening the North Atlantic Alliance. International perspectives, Nov.–Dec. 1985: 3–6.

The author claims that "misconceptions about the obligations of members of the North Atlantic Alliance under the Washington treaty of 1949 are so widespread that they greatly weaken the Alliance. The existence of some obligations is ignored. Obligations are invented which are contrary to obligations set forth in the treaty."

Rocca, James V.

Reflections on the future of NATO in an era of diverging social, military, economic and political attitudes. Osterreichische Zeitschrift fur Aussenpolitik, v. 22, no. 3, 1982: 178–199.

"Present difficulties within the Alliance seem to be of the type which could bring about the demise of that cornerstone of

Western defense strategy, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization itself."

Rumpf, Helmut.

Ideological homogeneity in alliances. Aussenpolitik, v. 33, no. 2, 1982: 166–177.

Discusses the League of Nations and the United Nations. Considers the principle of political and ideological homogeneity with reference to the Organization of American States, the Council of Europe, the Western European Union, NATO, and the Warsaw Pact.

Rusinow, Dennison I.

Reflections on cold wars: the 1983 Oslo Atlantic defense symposium. Hanover, N.H., Universities Field Staff International, 1983. 9 p. (UFSI reports, 1983/no. 15, Europe/general)

"In August 1983 the Norwegian National Defense College sponsored a symposium to discuss the effects on Western defense policies of the events and influences of the period from 1947 through 1953. The symposium was able to draw on newly accessible materials and the memories of some of the participants in the creation of NATO, but the lessons of 'Cold War I,' like most of the lessons of history, turn out to be generally ambiguous."

Salatiello, Luigi.

Are changes needed in NATO's leadership structure? NATO review, v. 32, Aug. 1984: 22–25.

Provides a detailed analysis of the proposal by Henry Kissinger that the post of NATO Secretary General be held by an American and that of Supreme Allied Commander Europe by a European general.

Schmidt, Helmut.

Saving the Western Alliance. New York review of books, v. 31, May31, 1984: 25–27.

Commentary by former West German Chancellor on Kissinger's "Plan to reshape NATO" and an argument for a reform of political, economic and military strategy for the Alliance.

Schwarz, Jurgen.

Structural development of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Munich, Hochschule der Bundeswehr, 1982. 94 p. (Texte zum Studium der internationalen Beziehungen, 3)

Contents.—Origin and consolidation.—Structures and functions.—Crisis developments.—Transatlantic differences.—Conclusions.—References.— Appendices.

Serfaty, Simon.

Atlantic fantasies. Washington quarterly, v. 5, summer 1982: 74–81.

Briefly reviews the history of NATO. Surveys the political problems which contribute to the erosion of the alliance and considers U.S. policies toward its NATO allies.

Should the U.S. stay in NATO? Harper's magazine, v. 268, Apr. 1984: 31–38, 59–61.

Transcript of a discussion held at the Lehrman Institute in New York City, moderated by Robert W. Tucker. Participants were Robert Bartley, Henry R. Breck, Edmund G. Brown, Jr., General Andrew J. Goodpaster, Irving Kristol, Earl C. Ravenal, John Roper, Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., and Karsten D. Voigt.

Sloan, Stanley R.

Challenges to NATO's consensus: West European attitudes and U.S. policy; report prepared for the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, by the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Washington, G.P.O., 1987. 82 p. (UA646.3.S578 1987)

At head of title: 100th Congress, 1st session. Committee print.

"U.S. leadership of NATO is a key feature of our national security posture. The successful pursuit of U.S. security policy goals depends in many cases on the ability of U.S. policies to attract support among our NATO allies. This report examines the implications for U.S. policy of trends in West European attitudes toward NATO policies and military doctrines. It does not examine the military merits of the concepts and strategies at issue."

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Crisis in NATO: a problem of leadership? NATO review, v. 30, Aug. 1982: 13–19.

Examines factors underlying NATO's current crisis, including differences between U.S. and Western European attitudes, global roles, military capabilities, economic concerns, and national perspectives. Discusses the role of public opinion in NATO countries and considers misperceptions of the U.S. in Europe.

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Crisis in the Atlantic Alliance: origins and implications. Prepared for the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, by Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Washington, G.P.O., 1982. 40 p. (UA646.3.S58 1982)

At head of title: 97th Congress, 2nd session. Committee print.

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NATO after Reykjavik. National defense, v. 71, May–June 1987: 65–66, 71–72.

"Four aspects of Reykjavik, . . . caught the attention of the allies. ...The first was the near breakthrough on INF. The second was the U.S. proposal for eliminating all ballistic nuclear missiles within a decade. The third was the final and persistent impasse over strategic defenses. The fourth was the fact that such far-reaching discussions and proposals had not been

foreshadowed in U.S. consultations with the allies prior to the summit."

NATO's future: toward a new transatlantic bargain. Washington, National Defense University Press, for sale by the Supt. of Docs., G.P.O., 1985. 243 p. (UA646.3.S584 1985)

"Considers how the transatlantic bargain has evolved in the last 30 years and then examines the current status of the alliance, discussing NATO's nuclear dilemma, the sources of U.S.-European differences over how to deal with the Soviet Union, and political and economic frictions among the Western allies."

Snyder, Jed C.

Strengthening the NATO alliance: toward a strategy for the 1980s. Naval War College review, v. 34, Mar.-Apr. 1981: 18-37.

"NATO has begun this decade with little change in the force postures and strategic concepts that it developed in its early years, three decades ago. World conditions, however, have not remained static. Political, military, economic conditions—all present broadened demands; all demand recognition. This paper offers some thoughts and suggestions."

Sokolsky, Joel J.

NATO: taking Canada more seriously. RUSI [Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies], v. 127, Dec. 1982: 41-47.

Examines Canada's unique place in NATO against the background of the overall strategic posture most suitable to Canadian capabilities and most supportive of allied needs.

Steel, Ronald.

Ending the American protectorate of Europe. Harper's magazine, v. 265, Jan.-Feb. 1987: 10-11, 13-14.

Strategic defense and the western alliance. Edited by Dan Quayle, Robert E. Hunter, C. Elliott Farmer. Washington, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, c1986. 92 p. (Significant issues series, v. 8, no. 6)

Partial contents.—A European perspective on the SDI, by Sir Michael Howard.—The implication of active defense of NATO for Soviet military strategy, by William E. Odom.—European ballistic missile defense—reducing the danger of war, by David Blair and Brian Chow.—Soviet ballistic missile defense and the Atlantic Alliance, by David S. Yost.—The need for ATBM in Europe, by Dan Quayle.

Strategic defense and the western alliance. Edited by Sanford Lakoff, Randy Willoughby. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, c1987. 218 p. (UG743.S75 1987)

Thies, Wallace J.

What future for the Atlantic Alliance? Parameters: journal of the US Army War College, v. 16, summer 1986: 26-35.

"There is of course no guarantee that the Atlantic Alliance will hold together, but on the whole a collapse seems unlikely. The strains that have appeared in recent years reflect long-standing concerns rather than novel or unprecedented developments."

Thomas, William V.

America's allied relations. [Washington, Congressional Quarterly] 1980. 527-540 p. (Editorial research reports, 1980, v. 11, no. 3)

Contents.—Division in the West.—Three decades of NATO.—Outlook for cooperation.

Thompson, E.P.

A letter to America. Nation, v. 232, Jan. 24, 1981: whole issue.

Partial contents.—America's Europe: a Hobbit among Gandalfs.—'Modernizing' NATO: the mendacity game.—Little theater wars: expendable Europe.

Thomson, James A.

NATO, agenda for the next four years. Santa Monica, Calif., Rand Corp., 1982. 164 p. (A series in international security and arms control) (UA646.3.T47 1982)

"R-2836-FF"

Issues addressed at this workshop include: problems and prospects for allied cooperation outside the NATO area; NATO strategy; defense budgets; management of intra-NATO relations; SALT and NATO.

Timmons, Richard F.

Lessons from the past for NATO. Parameters, v. 14, autumn 1984: 3-11.

"The German experience on the Eastern Front in World War II continues to be a fertile field for ideas regarding our situation in Europe. We need not slavishly emulate the Wehrmacht, but we ignore their experiences at our peril. . . . The Wehrmacht experience, properly considered, has substantial value and is worthy of serious review by all NATO partners."

Treverton, Gregory F.

Making the alliance work: the United States and Western Europe. Basingstoke, Hampshire, Macmillan, 1985. 211 p. (UA646.3.T74 1985b)

Examines four major issues in alliance relations, including the nuclear question, policy towards the Soviet Union in Europe, security issues beyond Europe, and the interaction between economics and security.

Trezise, Philip H.

The Atlantic connection: prospects, problems, and policies. Washington, Brookings Institution [1975] 100 p.

The Troubled alliance: Atlantic relations in the 1980s. Edited by Lawrence Freedman. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1983. 170 p. (UA646.3.T76 1983)

Partial contents.—Early American views of NATO: then and now, by David P. Calleo.—Perceptions of the United States in Europe, 1945–83, by David Watt.—American looks at Europe, by Catherine McArdle Kelleher.—Interdependence: problem of solution, by John Pinder.—Can Europe live with its defence?, by Josef Joffe.

Tucker, Robert W.

The Atlantic Alliance and its critics. Commentary, v. 73, May 1982: 63–72.

After discussing the rising tide of criticism of the Atlantic Alliance, the author concludes that "Europe remains as committed to detente as it is to the Alliance. So long as this is true, the corrosive effects on the Alliance must continue. The predicament this great reality poses today could be resolved by a Western Europe determined to assume an ever greater responsibility for its own security."

Turner, Stansfield.

A new strategy for NATO. New York times magazine, Dec. 13, 1981: 42, 46, 49, 134, 136.

"The former head of the C.I.A. argues that the United States should reduce its military forces in Europe and strengthen its defenses against the Soviet threat to third-world countries."

The United States and the Atlantic Community: issues and prospects. A series of public lectures held at the University of Texas, spring, 1966. Edited by James R. Roach. Austin, University of Texas Press [1967] 87 p. (D845.2.U5)

"First published in the Texas quarterly volume IX, number 3 (fall 1966)."

Partial contents.—Atlantic agenda: an introduction, by M. Donald Hancock.—NATO: evolution or decline, by Henry A. Kissinger.—The Atlantic economy: partners and rivals, by Andre Philip.—Germany, the continuing challenge, by Hans Speier.—Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union, by Fritz Erler.—American interests and Europe's future, by John H. McCloy.

The U.S. and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In Mandate for Leadership III: policy strategies for the 1990s, edited by Charles L. Heatherly and Burton Yale Pines. Washington, Heritage Foundation, c1989. p. 760–768.

Examines Reagan Administration policies, considers options for the next four years, and presents initiatives, including: calling a NATO summit to discuss burden-sharing and other issues, launching a study of NATO's crisis management system, and funding rocket launchers and long-range missiles.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization Mutual Support Act of 1979; report to accompany H.R. 5580 . . . including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office. Washington, G.P.O., 1979. 24 p. (Report, House, 96th Congress, 1st session, no. 96–612, part 1)

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Defense Policy Panel.

The Reykjavik process: preparation for and conduct of the Iceland Summit and its implications for arms control policy; report. Washington, G.P.O., 1987. 30 p. (JX1974.7.R494 1987)

At head of title: 99th Congress, 2nd session. Committee print no. 25.

"Addresses the process underlying the preparation for and the discussions at Reykjavik."

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Delegation to NATO Countries—1982.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization—an alliance of shared values; report. Washington, G.P.O., 1982. 84 p.

At head of title: 97th Congress, 2nd session. Committee print no. 22.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Delegation to Northern NATO and the Nordic Region.

NATO: a time for renewed commitment; report. Washington, G.P.O., 1984. 27 p.

At head of title: 98th Congress, 2nd session, committee print no. 21.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Special Subcommittee on NATO Standardization, Interoperability and Readiness.

NATO Mutual Support Act of 1979. Hearings on H.R. 4623 and H.R. 5580, 96th Congress, 1st session. Oct. 25, 1979. Washington, G.P.O., 1979. 70 p.

"H.A.S.C. no. 96–22"

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NATO Subcommittee 1980 Trip Report; report. Washington, G.P.O., 1981. 57 p.

At head of title: 96th Congress, 2nd session. Committee print no. 33.

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Review of operation and maintenance budgets and readiness. Hearings, 96th Congress, 1st session. Dec. 18–19, 1979. Washington, G.P.O., 1980. 110 p.

At head of title: H.A.S.C. no. 96–29.

"Review of the status of our readiness in Europe and the relationship of near term readiness to operation and maintenance accounts."

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Mutual security program: part 6—Mutual Security Act of 1957 [and] Mutual Security Act of 1958. Selected executive session hearings of the Committee, 1957–60. Washington, G.P.O., 1987. 992 p.

Volume XIX—historical series.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs.

NATO and Western security in the 1980's: the European perception; report of a staff study mission to seven NATO countries and Austria, January 2–18, 1980. Apr. 9, 1980. Washington, G.P.O., 1980. 78 p. (UA646.U48 1980)

At head of title: 96th Congress, 2nd session. Committee print.

Examines "Western European perceptions of major Western security, political, and military issues with primary focus on European views of the Soviet military threat, the effectiveness of NATO's defense capabilities, and the role of detente and arms control in preserving Western security."

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization Mutual Support Act of 1979; report to accompany H.R. 5580 . . . including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office. Washington, G.P.O., 1979. 17 p. (Report, House, 96th Congress, 1st session, no. 96–612, part 2)

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The United States and Europe: common bonds and differing perspectives; report of the twenty-third meeting of Members of Congress and of the European Parliament, January 19–21, 1984 pursuant to H. Res. 981. Washington, G.P.O., 1984. 46 p.

At head of title: 98th Congress, 2nd session. Committee print.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science.

Reaction to the Rejkjavik proposals. Hearing, 100th Congress, 1st session. Jan. 29, 1987. Washington, G.P.O., 1987. 119 p.

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The Reykjavik talks: promise or peril; report. Washington, G.P.O., 1987. 201 p.

At head of title: 100th Congress, 1st session, committee print.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East.

NATO's future role. Hearings, 97th Congress, 2nd session. May 20–June 9, 1982. Washington, G.P.O., 1982. 130 p. (KF27.F64214 1982g)

This hearing focuses on "the future capacity of NATO to fulfill its military obligations."

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs.

NATO Mutual Support Act of 1979. Hearing and markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommit-

tees on International Security and Scientific Affairs and on Europe and the Middle East, House of Representatives, 96th Congress, 1st session, on H.R. 5580. Nov. 14 and 27, 1979. Washington, G.P.O., 1979. 42 p. (KF27.F64825 1979d)

The legislation considered by this hearing "is designed to increase NATO combat readiness by facilitating the Department of Defense procurement and sale of logistics equipment during NATO training exercises and maneuvers. The legislation . . . attempts to accomplish this desirable objective in two main ways. The first is by waiving various provisions of U.S. domestic procurement law to facilitate agreements with our NATO allies for the acquisition of host nation support services and supplies. . . . The second major part of this legislation affects the Arms Export Control Act."

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services.

NATO Mutual Support Act of 1979; report to accompany H.R. 5580. Washington, G.P.O., 1980. 15 p.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Procurement Policy and Reprogramming Subcommittee.

NATO support agreements. Hearing, 96th Congress, 2nd session, on H.R. 5580. Jan. 30, 1980. Washington, G.P.O., 1980. 17 p.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations.

NATO—a status report; a report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. Washington, G.P.O., 1980. 24 p.

At head of title: 96th Congress, 2nd session. Committee print.

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NATO Mutual Support Act of 1979; report to accompany H.R. 5580. Washington, G.P.O., 1980. 21 p. (Report, Senate, 96th Congress, 2nd session, no. 96-842)

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NATO today: the alliance in evolution; report. Washington, G.P.O., 1982. 102 p. (UA646.3.N2465 1982)

At head of title: 97th Congress, 2nd session. Committee print.

The study reviews and analyzes various issues of contention within NATO . . . based on extensive research conducted in Europe and Washington during February 1982."

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on European Affairs.

Crisis of will in the NATO Alliance. Hearing, 99th Congress, 1st session. Sept. 19, 1985. Washington, G.P.O., 1986. 81 p. (Hearing, Senate, 99th Congress, 1st session, S. Hrg. 99-400, part 3)

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A NATO strategy for the 1990's. Hearing, 99th Congress, 1st session. Oct. 3, 1985. Part 5. Washington, G.P.O., 1986. 263 p.

(Hearing, Senate, 99th Congress, 1st session, S. Hrg. 99-460, part 5)

Vandevanter, Elliot.

A further inquiry into the nature of alliances: NATO and the OAS. [Santa Monica, Calif., Rand Corp., 1968] 77 p. (A36.R28, no. 3832)

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How allies collaborate: the NATO training experience. Santa Monica, Calif., Rand Corp., 1968. 56 p. (Rand Corporation. Memorandum RM-5847-PR) (Q180.A1R36, no. 5847)

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Studies on NATO: an analysis of integration. Santa Monica, Calif., Rand Corp., 1966. 102 p. (Rand Corporation. Memorandum, RM-5006-PR) (Q180.A1R36, no. 5006)

Walker, John A. S.

Partners in science: the NATO science for stability programme. NATO review, v. 34, June 1986: 24-29.

Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of NATO's Scientific Affairs Division discusses "the most dramatic, manifestation of the economic cooperation envisaged under Article 2—the NATO Science for Stability Programme. . . . The aim of Science for Stability is to assist Greece, Portugal and Turkey to enhance their scientific and technological contributions to their economies and thus to improve their national well-being."

Wall, Patrick.

Advice to the alliance: how to strengthen NATO's unity and effectiveness. Sea power, v. 28, Apr. 1985: 108, 112, 117-121.

"A conservative member of Parliament since 1954, Sir Patrick Wall is a member of the British Select Committee on Defence, president of the North Atlantic Assembly, and former chairman of the Assembly's Defence Committee. Sea Power asked him to develop, from that special vantage point, his recommendations for this special Sea-Air-Space issue on what should be done to strengthen NATO's unity and effectiveness. His 'Advice to the Alliance' incorporates his personal views and does not necessarily reflect either the policies of Her Majesty's Government or the collective judgement of NATO as a whole."

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NATO from north of Norway to south of Simonstown, by Patrick Wall, Vincent C. Thomas, and James D. Hessman. Sea power, v. 27, Nov. 1984: 57-62, 65, 67-69, 71.

In this interview, Sir Patrick Wall, President of the North Atlantic Assembly discusses "problems facing the alliance and NATO matters in general."

Weinberger, Caspar.

Consensus: the cement of the Alliance. In The Presidency and national security policy. New York, Center for the Study of the Presidency [c1984] p. 14–22. (Proceedings, v. 5, no. 1, 1984)

Emphasizes the need for consensus in the Western Alliance to keep it alive in spite of a difference in the opinions among its members.

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NATO: more than just a military alliance. Defence issues, v. 2, no. 34, 1987: 1–4.

In this May 25, 1987 speech before the Center for Defense Studies, Brussels, Belgium, Secretary of Defense discusses U.S. commitments to NATO. States that "unequivocally . . . the United States has exactly the same deep and vital stake in NATO and the defense of Europe that it has had since World War II and, . . . always will have.

Wettern, Desmond.

The mix of interests in East-West relations. Aussenpolitik, v. 33, Jan. 1982: 74–86.

"Even if it were to continue the policy aimed at preventing a war in the European-Atlantic region, the Kremlin has . . . created a long-term global threat to the West that could, among other things, affect the Western world's energy and raw materials supplies."

Wiebes, Cees. Zeeman, Bert.

The Pentagon negotiations March 1948: the launching of the North Atlantic Treaty. International affairs (London), v. 59, summer 1983: 351–363.

"According to official NATO historiography, the negotiations that led to the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty started on 6 July 1948 in Washington. However, for a few years it has been known that negotiations on a security treaty between the United States and West European nations had already been conducted before that date."

Womer, Norman Keith.

NATO: costs and opportunities. Clemson, S.C., Strom Thurmond Institute, Clemson University, 1986. 29 p. (Working paper series WP010785)

"Explores a system of direct sales of conventional arms as a means of reducing costs. Such a system may well have the advantage of promoting standardization within NATO, of maintaining . . . competition in the development of weapons, of maintaining a defense industrial base in each country, of strengthening the NATO alliance, and of reducing costs of conventional arms."

II. THE EVOLVING SOVIET CHALLENGE

Alterman, Eric R.

Central Europe: misperceived threats and unforeseen dangers. World policy journal, v. 2, fall 1985: 681–709.

The author explores the following questions: "Is NATO strategy based on a fundamental misreading of Soviet intentions? If this is indeed the case . . . is it not possible that in responding as it has, NATO is actually helping to create a threat that might not have existed in the first place?"

Atlantic Council of the United States.

U.S. policy towards the Soviet Union: a long-term Western perspective, 1987–2000. Edited by Andrew J. Goodpaster, Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., and Robert Kennedy. Lanham, Md., University Press of America, c1988. 252 p. (E183.8.S65A87 1988)

The emergence of the USSR as a world power, by Herbert J. Ellison.—The military dimensions of U.S.-Soviet relations, by Barry M. Blechman and Douglas Hart.—U.S.-Soviet economic and technological interaction, by John P. Hardt.—The USSR in the 1980s and beyond, by Robert F. Byrnes.—Sino-Soviet relations to the year 2000: implications for U.S. interests, by Huan Guocang.—Western and Eastern economic constraints on defense: the mutual security implications, by Timothy W. Stanley, with an appendix by John P. Hardt.

Barnet, Richard J.

Annals of diplomacy: Alliance II. New Yorker, v. 49, Oct. 1983: 94, 98, 103–104, 107–116, 120–122, 124–126, 128, 133, 136, 141–142, 144, 146, 148–162, 165–167.

"The history of diplomacy is a story of shifting alliances. . . . The anarchic international system is always in motion. Times change, and so do allies. The postwar alliance of victors and vanquished was itself proof of that. By the early nineteen-eighties, both the United States and the Soviet Union were seeking to reassert greater control over their respective allies and clients, and in the process tensions within both blocs increased. . . . Increasing numbers in Western Europe and in the Soviet client states of the East found themselves more absorbed with the problems posed by their protector than by their adversary."

Bertram, Christoph.

Europe's security dilemmas. Foreign affairs, v. 65, summer 1987: 942–957.

"As the alliance ponders the best response to Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev's various arms control initiatives, there is also a new sense of uncertainty over the central, nuclear

aspect of NATO strategy; this unease is accompanied by the prospect of unprecedented manpower constraints on armed forces of NATO countries on both sides of the Atlantic. Even for an alliance that has learned to live with its internal frictions and weathered many crises of cohesion, dealing with this range of problems is a tall order. No one who is concerned about the West's future can afford to take it lightly."

Challenges for U.S. national security: the Soviet approach to arms control verification, problems and prospects and conclusions: final report. Prepared by the Staff of the Carnegie Panel on U.S. Security and the Future of Arms Control. Washington, (11 Dupont Circle, Washington, D.C. 20036), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, c1983. 101 p. (UA12.5.C45 1983)

Contents.—The Soviet approach to arms control.—Verification.—Problems and prospects.—Conclusions: the future of arms control.

Assesses "the key security challenges of the 1980s and explores what contribution, if any, arms control might make to U.S. security."

Confronting Moscow: an agenda for the Post-Detente Era. Edited by W. Bruce Weinrod. Washington, Heritage Foundation, c1985. 78 p.

"Critical issues"

Partial contents.—The U.S.-Soviet strategic nuclear relationship, by C. Lord.—The challenge of arms control, by J. Hackett.—NATO's role in meeting the Soviet challenge, by M. Hamm.—Eastern Europe: loosening the Soviet grip, by A. Puddington.—East-West trade policy: maintain the present course, by L. Brady.

Congressional Research Service. Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division.

The Gorbachev speech to the United Nations, New York, Dec. 7, 1988. Dec.28, 1988. Washington, Congressional Research Service, 1988. 26 p. (88-776 F)

Mikhail Gorbachev's United Nations speech was a milestone in his effort to sell "new thinking" to the world and to his own country. His announcement of unilateral Soviet force reductions in Europe and Asia was the most important feature. The speech also emphasized the new Soviet view of the role of the United Nations, interdependence and global problems, human rights, and U.S.-Soviet relations. Gorbachev also offered proposals to end the war in Afghanistan.

Containment: 40 years later. Foreign affairs, v. 65, spring 1987: 827-890.

Partial contents.—On ending the Cold War, by W. W. Rostow.—The sources of Soviet conduct.—The Cold War, by Walter Lippmann.—Containment then and now, by George F. Kennan.

Containment: concept and policy. Edited by Terry L. Deibel and John Lewis Gaddis. Washington, National Defense University Press, 1986. 2 v. (E744.C7615 1986)

Partial contents.—Origins of containment, by George F. Kennan.—Public opinion and containment, by Ole R. Holsti.—Containment and the national security policymaking process, by Lynn E. Davis.—Alliances and security relationships: a dialogue with Kennan and his critics, by Terry L. Deibel.—Soviet conventional power projection and containment, by Robert E. Harkavy.—Containment and the future: a European perspective, by Francis Pym.—Containment in Europe: the critical context, by Catherine McArdle Kelleher.—Socio-cultural imperatives for a new containment policy, by James H. Billington.—Containment and the shape of world politics, 1947–1987, by Richard H. Ullman.—Inching beyond containment: detente, entente, condominium—or orchestraint, by Alton Frye.—Containment: choices and opportunities, by Dimitri K. Simes.—The rise and fall of containment: informal remarks, by Norman Podhoretz.

Council on Foreign Relations. Commission on U.S.-Soviet Relations.

The Soviet challenge: a policy framework for the 1980s. [New York] Council on Foreign Relations [1981] 31 p.

Critchley, Julian.

The North Atlantic Alliance and the Soviet Union in the 1980s. London, MacMillan; Atlantic Highlands, N.J., Humanities Press, 1982. 210 p. (UA770.C74 1982)

Traces "the probable course in the next ten years of the trial of strength, which has already lasted for more than decades, between the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and the United States, and its allies, on the other."

Crozier, Brian.

Soviet crisis and Western disunity: contending timetables. Strategic review, v. 10, fall 1982: 21–28.

"The West faces a sweeping and possible climactic Soviet offensive with weakened internal defenses and a disarray. . . . But the Soviets, too, are working under a timetable of corrosive crisis within their own system and empire. . . . The Western nations can hope to surmount their historic predicament only by joining in the effort to bring about a visible reversal of the Soviet offensive. . . . They must cease in effect subsidizing the opponent's power through high-technology transfers and easy credits."

Dannenbring, Fredo.

East-West relations: are there common NATO positions? NATO review, v. 32, Oct. 1984: 1–7.

Author claims that "the Alliance has broad agreement both on a strategy for East-West relations and a commitment to create the necessary security in which a more constructive dialogue can be pursued."

DeCarmoy, Guy.

Defence and detente: two complementary policies. NATO review, v. 30, June 1982: 12–17.

Reviews Soviet and NATO military developments during the era of detente and considers the challenges the NATO alliance faces in the 1980s.

Donnelly, C. N.

The Soviet operational manoeuvre group: a new challenge for NATO. International defense review, v. 15, no. 9, 1982: 1177–1186.

Examines one of the Soviet new operational concepts—Operational Manoeuvre Group (OMG). It is a concept of the very greatest importance designed specifically to defeat present NATO defensive plans."

Donnelly, Christopher.

The development of the Soviet concept of echeloning. NATO review, v. 32, Dec. 1984: 9–17.

The author reviews "the Soviet concept of echeloning so as to understand better what is driving the Soviet reassessment, where it might be leading, and what its implications are for NATO."

Fahey, John A. Gillette, Philip S.

U.S.-Soviet relations: an agenda for the future: military liaisons between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Washington, Foreign Policy Institute, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 1988. 16 p. (FPI policy series, 9)

"The time is ripe for the United States to explore ways of expanding the NATO-Warsaw Pact dialogue. One way for NATO and the Warsaw Pact to enhance the dialogue is to exchange military liaison missions (MLMs) linking the two alliances. . . . The MLMs would aim to promote common interests and mutual understanding, and to provide continuous and direct on-site liaison and communications at the highest operational military level in Europe."

The Future of Soviet policy toward Western Europe. Edited by Harry Gelman. Santa Monica, Calif., Rand [1985] 204 p. (D1065.S65F87 1985)

"Papers presented at an international conference held in Ebenhausen, West Germany, Oct. 26–28, 1984, under the auspices of the Rand Corporation, the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, and the Institut francais des relations internationales., 'Prepared for the Ford Foundation [and] the North Atlantic Treaty Organization', 'September 1985', 'R-3254-FF/NATO.' "

Gallois, Pierre.

The Soviet global threat and the West. Orbis, v. 25, fall 1981: 649–662.

"While the European countries of NATO are thus mounting a guard that has now become ridiculous in face of the Soviet arms, and while these same countries are called upon by the

United States to increase still further their expenditure on conventional arms vulnerable to the Soviet missiles, the Soviet Union is getting nearer to the sources of energy supplies, the free availability of which is essential to the liberal industrial societies, and is also, through intermediate political regimes, laying hands on vast terr ories where these same industrial powers purchase the raw materials without which their economies would be paralyzed."

Gormley, Dennis M.

Soviet views on escalation, by Dennis M. Gormley and Douglas M. Hart. Washington quarterly, v. 7, fall 1984: 71–84.

"This paper has a dual purpose: first, it surveys the evolution of Soviet views on escalation from 1960 to the present, relating changes in views to growth in military capabilities; second, it examines contemporary Soviet escalation incentives and disincentives in the framework of evolving Western defense strategy."

Greenwald, G. Jonathan.

Vienna—a challenge for the Western alliance. Aussenpolitik, v. 38, no. 2, 1987: 155–167.

"The third CSCE Follow-up Conference began in Vienna November4, 1986 and . . . marks a further stage in the Helsinki Process, which began with the signing of the CSCE Final Act at the 1975 Helsinki Summit and has brought its 35 participating states . . . together for earlier follow-up conferences in Belgrade (1977–78) and Madrid (1980–83), as well as a number of specialized meetings. . . . The Vienna Conference is charged with two principal tasks: to review the state of implementation of existing agreements and to consider possible new steps that could be taken to advance security and cooperation in Europe." Focuses on "tensions which CSCE produces within NATO."

Greenwood, Ted.

Soviet intimidation of the West: the violation of the Montreux Convention. Global affairs, v. 3, fall 1988: 50–70.

"Since 1976 and arguably since 1968, the Soviet Union has repeatedly violated the Montreux Convention's prohibition against the passage of aircraft carriers through the Turkish Straits. . . . No official challenge or even complaint about this behavior has been issued by Turkey or any other Western government."

Grigorenko, Petro.

Diplomatic delusions. Reason, v. 13, Jan. 1982: 39–41.

A former major general in the Soviet Army, who was arrested and confined for his dissident activities in the Soviet Union, asserts that the Soviets used the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to achieve their goals, yet refused to fulfill their human rights obligations under the agreements.

Haslam, Jonathan.

Soviet take fresh look at Western Europe. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 44, May 1988: 38–42.

Argues that though the Soviet military was concerned about the deployment of the Pershing II and cruise missiles it was the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative that was the driving force behind the concessions that led to the INF Treaty. Describes the history of intermediate range nuclear missile deployments and the negotiations over their removal to show that until recently the Soviets underestimated the influence of Western Europe on U.S. foreign policy in the European theater. Concludes that now "Soviet policy seems to be in transition between treating Western Europe as a mere satellite of the United States and treating it as an independent actor in world politics."

Hassner, Pierre.

Moscow and the Western alliance. Problems of communism, v. 30, May–June 1981: 37–54.

"The months since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 have witnessed the dawning of a new era in Soviet foreign policy, with the launching of a major Soviet peace campaign. To some extent, this campaign represents an effort to consolidate previous gains and to counteract trends that Moscow perceives as dangerous in Western, and particularly US, policy. It is also an attempt to exploit opportunities that Moscow sees before it, particularly in Western Europe."

Helmer, Olaf.

The future relationship between the superpowers. Futures, v. 18, Aug. 1986: 484–492.

"This article looks at how the relationship between the USA and the Soviet Union may develop over the next 20 years. It discusses the effectiveness and stability of nuclear deterrence, the potential elimination of nuclear weapons and America's Strategic Defense Initiative."

The Heritage Foundation arms control handbook: a guide to the history, arsenals and issues of U.S.-Soviet negotiations. Edited by W. Bruce Weinrod. Washington, Heritage Foundation, 1987. 175 p. (JX1974.7.H47 1987)

Covers such issues as intermediate range forces, verification, sea-based strategic forces, anti-satellite weapons, compliance, and the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship.

Holzman, Franklyn D.

Are we falling behind the Soviets? Atlantic monthly, v. 252, July1983: 10, 12, 14, 18–19.

Hyland, William G.

Prospects for East-West relations, by William G. Hyland, Karl Kaiser, and Hiroshi Kimura. New York, Trilateral Commission, 1986. 52 p. (Triangle papers: 31) (D849.H94 1986)

Partial contents.—The United States.—The balance of relations.—The new Soviet leadership.—Trilateral relations.—Strategic policy and arms control.—The political relations.

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U.S.-Soviet relations: the long road back; America and the world. Foreign affairs, v. 60, no. 3, 1982: 525–550.

Reviews the Reagan administration's relations with the U.S.S.R. Discusses the Administration's policies regarding arms control, military strategy and strategic and tactical forces. Reviews U.S. policy toward the Middle East in light of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Considers economic relations between NATO countries and the U.S.S.R., in light of political activities in Poland.

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The USSR and the Western Alliance. Atlantic Community quarterly, v. 19, fall 1981: 312–330.

Discusses Soviet objectives of maintaining control in Eastern Europe and gaining influence over the policies of Western European countries. Reviews Soviet policies toward Western Europe since the early 1970s, in light of those objectives.

Jacobsen, Carl G.

East-West relations at the crossroads. Current history, v. 82, May 1983: 201–204, 224–227.

"NATO solidarity has always rested on the assumption that it was a defensive alliance. Fear that Washington has switched into offensive gear in pursuit of unilateral ambitions is sapping cohesion and undermining support."

Jones, Harry Edward.

Poland and the Western Alliance: what could we have done? What can we do? Atlantic Community quarterly, v. 20, winter 1982–83: 369–375.

The author, who served as the U.S. Consul in Poznan from 1980 to 1982, reviews events in Poland and evaluates Western responses to the declaration of martial law. He also considers the role Western economic assistance policies might play in future relations between the West and Poland.

Kaplan, Lawrence S.

NATO and the Nixon Doctrine ten years later. Orbis, v. 24, spring 1980: 149–164.

"The direction for the 1980s lies not in a unilateral revival of the Truman Doctrine, but in a reinvigorated and unified NATO in which both authority and responsibility are more widely shared than in the past," concludes the author.

Kirkpatrick, Jeane.

The superpowers: is there a moral difference? World today, v. 40, May1984: 177–188.

An article "concerning whether there is or is not a moral difference between the so-called 'superpowers': the United States and the Soviet Union. . . . A subtopic . . . of a more

general question: whether there is a significant moral difference between the democratic countries of the West and the Communist countries of the Eastern bloc."

Lebow, Richard Ned.

The Soviet offensive in Europe: the Schlieffen plan revised? International security, v. 9, spring 1985: 44–78.

Critiques Soviet conventional offensive military strategy as dangerous, unrealistic, unnecessary and "increasingly unrealizable military" and calls for a more defensive orientation for both the U.S.S.R. and NATO.

Legvold, Robert.

The revolution in Soviet foreign policy. Foreign affairs, v. 68, no. 1, 1989: 82–98.

"Since Gorbachev came to power in March 1985, Soviet ideas about international politics and how the Soviet Union should perform as a superpower have been in constant flux."

MacDonald, Hugh.

The Western Alliance and the Polish crisis. World today, v. 38, Feb. 1982: 42–50.

Mertes, Alois.

East-West relations: the political dimension. NATO review, v. 33, Feb. 1985: 1–9.

The author states that "the East-West conflict is a political one. . . . It is thus important to clarify the debate in progress within our Allied countries on the question of the political nature of tne Soviet threat, . . . it is what divides public opinion in the West on issues of disarmament and security."

Miko, Francis.

Soviet policy in Nordic Europe: new focus on the forgotten flank? Feb. 1, 1985. Washington, Congressional Research Service, 1985. 53 p. (85–33 F)

"Growing superpower competition in the arctic region has been paralleled by increased Soviet military and political activity in Nordic Europe and adjacent waters. . . . The new security environment in Nordic Europe has serious implications for the U.S."

Pines, Burton Yale.

NATO: casualty of a new U.S.-Soviet detente. Washington, Heritage Foundation, 1987. 11 p. (Heritage lectures 139)

The Atlantic Alliance faces serious dangers because of the emerging Washington-Moscow relationship. These dangers ultimately, of course, are military. But for now and the near future, the dangers are mainly, indeed almost entirely, political."

Quester, George H.

The superpowers and the Atlantic alliance. Daedalus, v. 110, winter 1981: 23–40.

Explores the extent to which Western European confidence in the U.S. commitment to the defense of Europe is affected by the erosion of the U.S. strategic advantage and by decreased European confidence in U.S. foreign policy decision making.

Robinson, Roger W., Jr.

East-West trade and national security. Washington, Heritage Foundation, 1986. 7 p. (Heritage lectures 50)

Presents policy recommendations which address the elements of East-West economic and commercial relations which may be providing "windfall contributions to Soviet military-related innovation, the USSR's hard currency earnings structure, and the Soviet Union's ability to maintain and expand its costly global commitments."

Schmidt, Helmut.

A policy of reliable partnership. Foreign affairs, v. 59, spring 1981: 743–755.

Chancellor Schmidt states that "this policy of reliable partnership begins with and is based on cooperation among democracies. . . . It would also be desirable to agree on a global concept for Western policy. . . . Finally . . . the elements of cooperation which have been built up in the last ten years with the Soviet Union and its allies must be developed further."

Slocombe, Walter B.

Extended deterrence. Washington quarterly, v. 7, fall 1984: 93–103.

"Distinguished U.S. spokesmen have joined in questioning the credibility of the U.S. making any nuclear response to a Soviet attack in Europe."

Soviet propaganda campaign against NATO. Washington, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1983. 42, A11p.

Stent, Angela E.

Accommodation: the U.S.S.R. and Western Europe. Washington quarterly, v. 5, autumn 1982: 93–104.

"Western Europe's economic woes and the serious strains in the Atlantic alliance, particularly on East-West trade issues, continue to provide the Soviet Union with new opportunities to strengthen its Westpolitik."

Swords and shields: NATO, the USSR, and new choices for long-range offense and defense. Edited by Fred S. Hoffman, Albert Wohlstetter, and David S. Yost. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, c1987. 369 p. (UA646.3.S96 1987)

Thatcher, Margaret.

Soviet Union has never concealed its intention to dominate the world. National security newsletter of the Reserve Officers Association [magazine], v. 3, May 1985: 12–13.

Excerpts from Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's February, 1985 address to a joint session of the U.S. Congress in

which she speaks on burden sharing, deterrence, and dealing with the Soviet Union from a position of strength.

Ulam, Adam.

Europe in Soviet eyes. Problems of communism, v. 32, May-June 1983: 22-30.

"The Marshall Plan brought unprecedented economic prosperity to Western Europe. But the Plan failed to achieve one of its basic aims—the political integration of the West. Current Soviet policy toward Europe is designed to exploit this weakness, nurturing the fragmentation of the European community on the one hand and encouraging and deepening the fissures within the Atlantic Alliance on the other. The Soviet leadership fluctuates over how to accomplish this: by patience and prudence, or by aggressiveness and risk-taking."

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs.

The Reagan-Gorbachev Summit and its implications for United States-Soviet relations. Hearing, 99th Congress, 1st session. Oct. 31, 1985. Washington, G.P.O., 1986. 39 p. (KF27.F6 1985L)

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The Reagan-Gorbachev summit and its implications for United States-Soviet relations. Hearing, 100th Congress, 1st session. Dec. 16, 1987. Washington, G.P.O., 1988. 123 p. (KF27.F6 1987i)

Valley, Bruce L.

Superpower arms control and the NATO allies: a question of interests. Naval War College review, v. 34, Nov.-Dec. 1981: 42-48.

Examines factors which threaten the cohesion of the NATO alliance, including arms control negotiations with the U.S.S.R., technological developments, and political and economic pressures within individual countries to reduce the number of troops committed to NATO.

Wettern, Desmond.

The essence of the Soviet threat dialectic. Aussenpolitk, v. 35, no. 1, 1984: 31-43.

The author examines "Moscow's endeavor to establish a regional military supremacy in Europe and to decouple the European theatre from the balance of mutual deterrence governing relations between the two superpowers." Contends that the security concepts of the Soviet Union and NATO are totally incompatible because of "the Soviets' categorical rejection of the deterrence concept in the place of which they put the guiding principle of an indispensable ensurance of a Soviet capability to wage war."

Whence the threat to peace. 4th ed. Moscow, Military Publishing House, Novosti Press Agency Pub. House, 1987. 95 p. (UA23.O8513 1987)

This Russian publication states in the introduction, that its "aim is to comment on the new developments in the international situation, the state of the American war machine, and

US and NATO military strategy that have emerged in the two years since the previous edition. New sections have been introduced—on verification of the signed treaties and agreements and on prevention of the militarization of outer space. Information about general purpose forces and chemical weapons has been expanded. The true causes of the breakdown of the nuclear arms talks, and also the substance of the Soviet countermeasures, are fully discussed."

Wieck, Hans-Georg.

The future of East-West relations. NATO review, v. 29, Dec. 1981: 13–18.

Considers the implications of Soviet military developments and foreign policy initiatives for the security of the North Atlantic Alliance.

Worner, Manfred.

Security policy perspectives and tasks of the North Atlantic alliance in the light of changing East-West relations. Armed Forces journal international, v. 124, Mar. 1987: 38, 40, 42.

Contends that "there is no substitute for the nuclear strategy which has helped preserve the peace of America and Europe."

Zagladin, Vadim.

The other side of the Hill: the Western threat to the Soviet Union. NATO's fifteen nations, Aug.–Sept. 1982: 22–24, 26.

"Professor Vadim Zagladin, a senior member of the Soviet administration [who] has considerable experience of Western countries . . . expounds the Soviet point of view. He gives a full analysis of the inception and the development of the threat to the Soviet Union as seen there and states its aims and position."

III. NATO'S FORCES AND STRATEGY

Abshire, David M.

The defense of Western Europe: looking to the 1990's. Washington, National Forum Foundation, 1987. 12 p. (Policy forum, v. 4, no. 5)

Ambassador Abshire addresses "the key areas for action, that will put NATO in the best possible posture to respond to the challenges of the coming decade?"

The Achilles heel. NATO's fifteen nations, Jan. 1982: 12–13, 16–17, 20–22, 25–27, 30–32, 34, 36–38, 41–43.

Partial contents.—Conventional air defence in Europe, by C. Braune.—Belgium, by M. DeSmet.—Canada, by K. Lewis.—Denmark, by N. Holst-Sorensen.—Germany, by F. Obleser.—Greece, by N. Kouris.—Italy, by L. Bartolucci.—The Netherlands, by C. Baas.—Norway, by M. Sorensen.—Portugal, by J. Ferreira.—Turkey, by T. Sahinkaya.—United Kingdom, by M. Beetham.—United States, by C. Gabriel.

"NATO's integrated air defence system was a tremendous achievement when it was initiated in the 1950s with much enthusiasm and devotion. Since then it has been allowed to become obsolescent."

Adapting NATO's deterrent posture. Edited by Richard G. Lugar and Robert E. Hunter. Washington, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, c1985. 88 p. (UA646.3A65 1985)

Partial contents.—The politics of NATO consensus, by Richard G. Lugar.—The changing parameters of European security policy, by Lawrence Eagleburger.—The future of extended nuclear deterrence, by Walter B. Slocombe.—Europe's armies and forward deterrence, by Anthony S. Cordesman.—Emerging technologies and deep attack concepts, by Fred E. Haynes.—Strategic implications of emerging conventional technologies, by William E. Hoehn, Jr.—Adapting NATO's deterrent posture, by Tom Fedyszyn and Paul Ingholt.

Aliano, Richard A.

American defense policy from Eisenhower to Kennedy: the politics of changing military requirements, 1957–1961. Athens, Ohio University Press, c1975. 309 p. (UA23.A57)

"This study will focus on the domestic forces behind the dramatic shift in American defense establishment policy which occurred during the transition years from the second Eisenhower to the Kennedy administrations."

Alliances in U.S. foreign policy: NATO and the quest for collective defense. Edited by Alan Ned Sabrosky. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1988. 150 p. (Studies in global security) (E876.A46 1988)

Contents.—Alliances in U.S. foreign policy, by Alan Ned Sabrosky.—Extended deterrence and alliance cohesion, by Earl C. Ravenal.—Economic relationships among the allies: sources of cohesion and tension, by James P. O'Leary.—No entangling alliances? The Congress and NATO, by Karen A. McPherson.—Public opinion: the fulcrum of alliance cohesion, by Gregory D. Foster.—Changing patterns of collective defense: U.S. security commitments in the third world, by Terry L. Deibel.—The continuing quest for collective defense, by Alan Ned Sabrosky.

Alternative Defence Commission (Gt. Brit.)

Without the bomb: non-nuclear defence policies for Britain. London, Paladin, 1985. 92 p.

Contents.—Thinking about war and defence.—What would a non-nuclear Britain have to fear from the superpowers?—Britain, NATO and Europe.—Central Europe: Western military options.—National defence: British military options.—Strategies against occupation.

The chapter on Britain and NATO examines British options regarding the alliance. "There is ample evidence of a deep and widespread disquiet about the nuclear strategy of Britain and NATO as a whole and a conviction that new strategies must be developed. The clearest manifestation of this has been the massive protests in recent years throughout Western Europe against the deployment of cruise and Pershing II missiles."

American defense policy. Edited by John F. Riechart, Steven R. Sturm (Department of Political Science, United States Air Force Academy). 5th ed. Baltimore, Md., Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982. 860 p. (UA23.A626 1982)

Atlantic Council's Working Group on the Credibility of the NATO Deterrent.

The credibility of the NATO deterrent: bringing the NATO deterrent up to date. Atlantic Community quarterly, v. 19, summer 1981: 152–167.

Examines the significance of threats outside the NATO area for NATO security. Identifies the growing inadequacies of the NATO defense posture and suggests ways to compensate for new demands outside the NATO area on allied strength. Considers major divisions within the Alliance which increasingly endanger its cohesiveness.

Barbara, James C. Brown, Robert F.

Deep thrust on the extended battlefield. Military review, v. 62, Oct. 1982: 21–32.

"The extended battlefield is a widely discussed topic today. This article reviews Soviet tactics and organizations and identifies certain vulnerabilities for possible exploitation by NATO in a future conflict. The authors propose means for taking advantage of such opportunities."

Baylis, John.

NATO strategy: the case for a new strategic concept. International affairs (London), v. 64, winter 1987: 43–59.

"The 'global double-zero' agreement of December 1987 between the United States and the Soviet Union . . . has challenged the very foundations of NATO's 'flexible response' doctrine. In the wake of the double-zero agreement, Western governments have a crucial question to decide on alliance defence orientation. . . . This article will argue that the time is ripe for a major review of NATO strategy and the adoption of a new doctrine which will give military planners clear direction into the 1990s."

Bell, Michael J.

Flexible response—is it still relevant? NATO review, v. 36, Apr. 1988: 12–17.

"The article describes the theoretical underpinnings of flexible response, looks at the political framework which has influenced its evolution, assesses current work underway to sustain its credibility, and looks at future challenges."

Bertram, Christoph.

Europe's security dilemmas. Foreign affairs, v. 65, summer 1987: 942–957.

"As the alliance ponders the best response to Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev's various arms control initiatives, there is also a new sense of uncertainty over the central, nuclear aspect of NATO strategy; this unease is accompanied by the prospect of unprecedented manpower constraints on armed forces of NATO countries on both sides of the Atlantic. Even for an alliance that has learned to live with its internal frictions and weathered many crises of cohesion, dealing with this range of problems is a tall order. No one who is concerned about the West's future can afford to take it lightly."

Betts, Richard K.

Compound deterrence vs. no-first use: what's wrong is what's right. Orbis, v. 28, winter 1985: 697–718.

"Reliance on nuclear threats is dangerous, but so are the alternatives. . . . This is true even if conventional capabilities are improved. The first part of this article discusses what is obviously and logically wrong with NATO's doctrine, and the second discusses why it is still strategically and politically right."

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Surprise attack: lessons for defense planning. Washington, Brookings Institution, c1982. 318 p.

Partial contents.—Deterrence, shock, and defense.—Sudden attacks in the postwar era.—Why surprise succeeds, I: operational causes.—Why surprise succeeds, II: the fog of peace.—The NATO central front, I: politics.—The NATO central front, II: operations.—Nuclear surprise.—Beyond the central front.—Hedging against surprise.

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Biosca, Vicente Blay.

The strategic importance of the Canary Islands to the defense of Western Europe. International defense review, v. 20, no. 10, 1987: 1331-1335.

"The geographical situation of the Canaries is of great strategic importance to NATO, for these islands lie in the direct route of north-south maritime traffic towards the Cape of Good Hope and also straddle the usual shipping lanes between South America and Europe. . . . While Spain has sufficient military capabilities to counter a local threat to the Canaries, the same cannot be said in the event of a large-scale East-West conflict."

Blackwell, James A., Jr.

In the laps of the gods: the origins of NATO forward defense. Parameters, v. 15, winter 1985: 64-75.

"The military strategy of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is two-pronged, consisting of the principles known as flexible response and forward defense. . . . It is revealing to trace the military implementation of the strategy of forward defense through the early years of Allied defense planning."

Bracken, Paul.

The NATO defense problem. Orbis, v. 27, spring 1983: 83-105.

"Any examination of the defense of NATO runs into two problems. First, reasonable judgments about the Soviet Union, however alarmist, recognize that Moscow has no immediate national interest in starting large-scale military actions in Europe. . . . The second problem . . . is that it involves so many bizarre issues, especially when tactical nuclear weapons are brought into the picture, that any analysis of the problem in peacetime takes on an aura of either sterility or surrealism."

Brody, Richard I.

Strategic defences in NATO strategy. London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1987. 45 p. (Adelphi papers 225)

Contents.—The strategic impact of technological developments: a cautionary tale.—The evolution of strategic objectives.—The three faces of MAD.—MAD, the theatre threat and ATBM.—Strategic defences and the theatre perspective.

Brown, James.

Challenges and uncertainty: NATO's southern flank. Air University review, v. 31, May-June 1980: 3-9, 12-16.

Brown, Neville.

European security, 1972-1980. London, Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 1972. 168 p. (UA646.B77)

Canby, Steven.

More troops, fewer missiles, by Steven Canby and Ingemar Dorfer. Foreign policy, no. 53, winter 1983-1984: 3-17.

The authors argue for the strengthening of NATO's conventional defenses that would remove the need for GLCMs and Pershing II. "Given Soviet fears of the first-strike capabilities

. . . dispensing with the Pershing II deployment would reassure Moscow without undermining the security of the West European countries." Creating conventional parity on the central front would minimize the risks of war.

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NATO military policy: the constraints imposed by an inappropriate military structure. [Santa Monica, Calif., Rand Corp.] 1972. 13 p. (AS36.R28, no. 4783; UA646.3)

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NATO: reassessing the conventional wisdoms. Survival, v. 29, July–Aug. 1977: 164–168.

"NATO must recognize that the sine qua non of an effective defence of Western Europe is a large reserve . . . NATO must face the fact squarely that its tactical doctrine, its organization for combat and its deployment are not suited to armoured warfare-or for tactical nuclear war-fighting."

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NATO strategy: political-military problems of divergent interests and operational concept. Military review, v. 59, Apr. 1979: 50–58.

Identifies shortcomings in the current NATO defense strategy. While the U.S. is urging the use of conventional force as a deterrent, West Europeans still believe that nuclear response is the answer to any serious aggression.

Cardwell, Thomas A.

Follow-on forces attack: joint interdiction by another name. Military review, v. 66, Feb. 1986: 4–11.

"Why has the NATO concept of follow-on forces attack caused such controversy in European capitals? Is it a new, radical departure from previous concepts?"

Cimbala, Stephen J.

NATO strategy and nuclear weapons: a reluctant embrace. Parameters, v. 18, June 1988: 51–62.

The article discusses "the relationship between conventional and nuclear deterrence in Europe, addressing sequentially NATO's deterrence dilemmas, Soviet strategy, conventional deterrence and defense options, and the implications of advanced technology."

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NATO vulnerabilities: is defeat possible? Military review, v. 65, June 1985: 58–70.

"There has been much speculation over the years about how well NATO's military forces would fare against those of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact. This article considers the possibility that the NATO forces could serve as adequate deterrents but might be vulnerable to defeat should deterrence fail."

Soviet "blitzkrieg" in Europe: the abiding nuclear dimension. Strategic review, v. 14, summer 1986: 67–75.

"Western military analysts have increasingly focused on the likelihood of a Soviet 'conventional-only' option of waging a 'blitzkrieg' offensive against NATO in the event of war in Europe. Clearly Soviet planners would prefer such an option to the risks entailed in a resort to nuclear weapons. Yet, in embracing the option, the Soviets would have to make a series of extremely fragile assumptions regarding the progression of the battle and NATO responses. . . . In all, a conventional war in Europe on any appreciable scale will be a war capable of quickly turning nuclear."

Theater nuclear and conventional force improvements. Armed Forces & society, v. 11, fall 1984: 115–129.

"The pressures of domestic politics and budgets in Europe have prevented Europeans from increasing commitments to improved conventional forces. This creates feedback which supports theoretical rationales for better nuclear forces."

Clarke, John L.

NATO, neutrals and national defence. Survival, v. 24, Nov.–Dec. 1982: 260–265.

Examines defense doctrines and force structures of Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland. Suggests that "the experience of the European neutrals makes clear that these countries have been able to generate much more manpower at much lower cost than the NATO countries have been able to achieve," and considers whether NATO countries might be able to adopt similar policies.

Claude, Inis L., Jr.

The common defense and great-power responsibilities. Political science quarterly, v. 101, no. 5, 1986: 719–732.

"Examines the difficulties faced by the United States and other great powers in making their external responsibilities for defense of their allies and for the stability of the international system as a whole compatible with their obligation to provide for the 'common defense' of their own societies."

Cleveland, Harlan.

Western Europe's dilemma: is a strong defense possible without nuclear arms? USA today (magazine), v. 116, Sept. 1987: 52–54.

"The prospect that arms control could mean results, not just endless talk, brings to center stage Europe's nuclear dilemma: how to maintain the Alliance and defend Western Europe without using weapons nobody wants used?"

Cohen, William S.

NATO, SDI and arms control. Armed Forces journal international, v. 122, Apr. 1985: 34, 36, 38.

Examines the implications for NATO of the Strategic Defense Initiative.

Coker, Christopher.

Discriminate deterrence and the alliance. Strategic review, v. 16, spring 1988: 51–59.

"The concept of 'discriminate deterrence' has triggered a furious response in Western Europe. . . . Militarily, such concepts as 'discriminate deterrence' carry the danger of distracting the Alliance from urgent priorities in shoring up its direct defenses in Central Europe. Politically, such concepts play into the hands of forces that embrace of the notion of 'conventional deterrence.'

Cole, Paul M.

The Northern balance: changing realities in defending Northern Europe. Defense & foreign affairs, v. 14, Dec. 1986: 21–23, 27, 30.

"Describes the Soviet buildup in the Kola Peninsula and the defense responsibilities of Scandinavia."

Congressional Research Service. Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division.

NATO standardization: political, economic, and military issues for Congress; report to the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives. Washington, G.P.O., 1977. 58 p. (UA646.3.U56 1977)

At head of title: 95th Congress, 1st session. Committee print.

"The study examines the political and military factors surrounding the decision by the NATO alliance to deploy long-range theater nuclear forces (LRTNF) in Western Europe. It also contains a discussion of the history of alliance nuclear strategy; the reaction on the part of the Soviet Union; and prospects for arms control."

Coroalles, Anthony M.

Maneuver to win: a realistic alternative. Military review, v. 61, Sept. 1981: 35–46.

The author contends that the foundations of NATO strategy are flawed by their dependence on firepower attrition. He discusses the tactical aspects of an alternative maneuver strategy.

Cowen, Gina.

Reflections on consensus in NATO: past experience and present problems. Arms control, v. 4, Sept. 1983: 134–146.

"The ongoing debate over INF, declaratory 'no first use' and Flexible Response in general is the latest example in a series of attempts by the alliance to come to terms with the apparent inevitabilities of alliance structure and strategy."

The Crisis in Western security. Edited by Lawrence S. Hagen. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1982. 247 p. (UA646.3.C74 1982)

Partial contents.—On the logic of security and arms control in the NATO alliance, by Philip Windsor.—Arms control and western security: a question of growing irrelevance, by Richard

Burt.—Arms control and European security: some basic issues, by Colin S. Gray.—The future of the Strategic balance, by Desmond J. Ball.—Technology, deterrence and the NATO Alliance, by Lothar Ruehl.—NATO and long-range theatre nuclear weapons: background and rationale, by Paul Buteux.—East-West relations and the politics of security, by Helmut Sonnenfelt.—Military power and arms control: towards a reassessment, by Hugh MacDonald.

Critchley, Julian.

The defence of Europe or European defence? NATO review, v. 24, Feb. 1976: 13–16.

Briefly reviews European defense capabilities in light of improvements in Soviet weaponry, explores the defense-of-Europe, i.e. NATO option and the European-defense, i.e. European arms industry option and suggests that weapons standardization and some U.S. involvement will be essential under either option.

Danopoulos, Constantine P.

Alliance participation and foreign policy influence: the military's role. Armed Forces & society, v. 11, winter 1985: 271–290.

The article attempts "to determine whether and why participation in defense alliances influences the attitudes of the professional military of member-states and their foreign policy. This is to be accomplished by discussing the military's behavior and the foreign policy orientations of two NATO members, Greece and Portugal; two of their counterparts in the Warsaw Pact, Czechoslovakia and Poland; and two traditionally neutral states, Egypt and India. The article will focus on how the military affect foreign policy and assess the nature of the impact."

Davis, Jacquelyn K.

The Atlantic Alliance and U.S. global strategy, by Jacquelyn K. Davis, and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Cambridge, Mass., Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1983. 47 p.

Partial contents.—The United States and European defense/deterrence.—Soviet/ Warsaw Pact theater strategy, tactics, and force posture.—Flexible response and tactical planning: revising NATO strategy.—Deep strike and forward defense: a new conventional option for NATO?—European security and the United States: evolving a new partnership.

DeBoer, Connie.

The polls: our commitment to World War III. Public opinion quarterly, v. 45, spring 1981: 126–134.

Discusses results of polls surveying public opinion in NATO countries regarding military defense issues. Suggests that "changes in public opinion in Western countries on arms and defense expenditure are related to people's expectations of war, to their perception of the distribution of military power, and to whether or not they feel threatened by Russians and the East bloc."

Defence and consensus: the domestic aspects of western security. Part I. London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1983. 58 p. (Adelphi paper no. 182)

"The Papers presented here and in Adelphi Papers No. 183 and 184 were given at the Twenty-fourth Annual Conference of the IISS at Scheveningen, The Hague, The Netherlands in September 1982."

Contents.—Introduction, by C. Bertram.—Domestic consensus, security and the Western Alliance, by K. Biedenkopf.—Public opinion and the defence effort: trends and lessons, the United States, by L. Kaagan, and Europe, by R. Wildenmann.—The media and the making of defence policy: the US example, by J. Fromm.—The media and the image of defence policy: Europe, by L. Ruehl, and Japan, by M. Nishihara.—The management of defence expenditure, by F. Cooper.

Defence and consensus: the domestic aspects of western security. Part II. London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1983. 42 p. (Adelphi paper no. 183)

"The Papers in this volume are devoted to the task of defining to what extent this lack of trust is justified, to what extent it is inherent in a doctrine of nuclear deterrence, and to what degree it may be remedied by more rational concepts for nuclear weapons."

Contents.—Introduction, by C. Bertram.—The critique of nuclear deterrence, by A. Roberts.—Domestic consensus and nuclear deterrence, by H. Brown.—Domestic concerns and nuclear doctrine: how should the nuclear posture be shaped? by J. Holst.

The Defense of Western Europe: London, England. New York, International Security Council, 1988. 102 p.

Partial contents.—The defense of Western Europe, by William R. Van Cleave.—INF, Perestroika, America, Europe with note on the London Declaration, by Leopold Labedz.—The chemical and biological threat to Europe, by Joseph D. Douglass, Jr.—NATO out-of-area contingencies: responsibilities and commitments, by Donald R. Cotter.

DeLeon, Peter.

Emerging security considerations for NATO's Northern Flank. RUSI [Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies], v. 130, June 1985: 34–39.

"The Nordic nations are being enmeshed by exogenous phenomena—almost entirely in terms of the larger Soviet-American confrontation—that are seemingly well beyond their manipulation or control."

DeRose, Francois.

Inflexible response. Foreign affairs, v. 61, fall 1982: 136–150.

The author, who served as France's Ambassador to NATO from 1970 to 1975, recommends an "across-the-board updating of NATO's . . . doctrine of deterrence and defense. Such an updating would be consistent with, indeed proceed from, the view

that the Alliance should avoid at all costs putting itself in the position where it would have to resort to tactical nuclear weapons from the very first hours of conflict. At the same time it would rule out a formal commitment to no first use as militarily, morally and diplomatically wrong and self-defeating."

Dezcallar, Rafael.

On West European defense cooperation: a Spanish view. Washington quarterly, v. 10, winter 1987: 153–169.

"The aim of this paper is to examine the underlying conditions for the present Atlantic security system. . . . Analyzes some factors that should be considered in the European security system: the policies of some West European nations, the interests of the superpowers, and the slow emergence of a West European political identity."

Dick, C. J.

Catching NATO unawares: Soviet Army surprise and deception techniques. International defense review, v. 19, no. 1, 1986: 21–26.

The author analyzes the Soviet tactic of "quick victory" (Maskirovka) which he claims is their primary anti-NATO military strategy. He draws conclusions and offers specific recommendations.

Domke, William K. Eichenberg, Richard C. Kelleher, Catherine M.

Consensus lost? Domestic politics and the "crisis" in NATO. World politics, v. 39, Apr. 1987: 382–407.

"The purpose of this essay is to present further data on the degree of domestic cleavage on security issues within NATO countries, and to attempt an explanation of these cleavages. The essay includes summary of research on public and elite opinion in the United States, Britain, France, West Germany, and the Netherlands."

Dutch decision on cruise missiles. Survival, v. 28, Mar.–Apr. 1986: 174–176.

"In December 1979, the Netherlands government joined in the NATO dual-track decision on Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM) in Europe but postponed its decision on whether to participate in the basing programme. . . . The government on 1 June 1984 announced a plan for proceeding with GLCM deployments. . . . On 1 November 1985, Cabinet reached a decision to deploy cruise missiles while reducing the country's nuclear tasks."

Farrar-Hockley, Anthony.

Dynamic defence: the northern flank. RUSI [Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies], v. 128, Dec. 1983: 5–11.

A brief look at the role of Norway, Denmark, and West Germany in NATO's northern flank.

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The influence of the Northern Flank upon the mastery of the seas. Naval War College review, v. 35, May–June 1982: 4–14.

Considers the Soviet potential for offensive action in northern Europe and NATO's chances for defense.

Feld, Werner J.

The interface between East-West relations and the North-South dimension, by Werner J. Feld and Robert S. Jordan. Atlantic Community quarterly, v. 21, winter 1983–84: 346–355.

Explores the effect of the North-South dimension on the East-West relationship. "It may be hypothesized that the greater the political and economic support of Third World countries for either the Western or the Eastern bloc the more benefits either side would derive from the North-South dimension. Conversely, high levels of determined opposition by the Third World to major objectives of the Western or Eastern bloc, or persistent negative images of either bloc by the elites or informed publics in the developing countries, would be damaging."

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NATO and the Atlantic defense: perceptions and illusions, by Werner J. Feldman and John K. Wildgen. New York, Praeger, 1982. 171 p. (UA646.3.F44 1982)

Flynn, Gregory.

Public opinion and Atlantic defence. NATO review, v. 31, no. 5, 1983: 4–11.

"Do recent shifts in public opinion require fundamental changes in Western strategy? Does the nuclear protest movement spring from greater popular involvement in security policy? Would a greater understanding of the Soviet threat necessarily lead to increased acceptance of Allied policies? These and other questions are considered by Mr. Flynn on the basis of a research project conducted by the Institute in collaboration with the Atlantic Treaty Association when detailed, comparative public opinion profiles were prepared for seven Allied countries. A team of specialized social scientists from each of these countries studied data available from the past decade in an attempt to determine underlying trends in popular attitudes towards Western security needs and policies."

Freedman, Lawrence.

NATO myths. Foreign policy, no. 45, winter 1981–82: 48–68.

Reviews NATO's strategy of flexible response and its weaknesses. Surveys the antinuclear weapons movement in Europe, and probes the extent to which debates over nuclear strategy increase divisiveness within the alliance. Advocates less emphasis on nuclear strategy, and a new approach to the design and deployment of conventional forces.

Freeman, Waldo D., Jr.

NATO central region forward defense: correcting the strategy/force mismatch. Washington, National Defense University, 1981. 31 p. (National Security Affairs issue paper no. 81-3)

"Addresses NATO Central Region conventional inferiority and its implications for strategy. It argues that alternative solutions must be found."

Partial contents.—The strategy/force mismatch.—Precision-guided munitions.—Force structure improvements.—Fortifications, barriers, and obstacles.—Defensive use of urban areas.—Correcting the mismatch.

Gallis, Paul. Lowenthal, Mark. Smith, Marcia.

The Strategic Defense Initiative and United States alliance strategy. Feb. 1, 1985. Washington, Congressional Research Service, 1985. 75 p. (85-48 F)

Partial contents.—Early debate over anti-ballistic missiles: 1960s to 1972.—Western Europe and the ABM Treaty: the public debate since 1972.—The Strategic Defense Initiative and the NATO Alliance: political repercussions.—Potential military effects of SDI.

Giuffrida, Louis O.

Effecting cooperation within NATO on civil emergency plans. Defense management journal, v. 20, 1984: 14-17.

"Successful national defense hinges on population survival and industrial mobilization. In the U.S., civil preparedness responsibility rests largely with the Federal Emergency Management Agency. . . . As NATO partners, the United States and its allies are taking steps to ensure a coordinated response to national and international disasters. This article highlights those initiatives as well as other defense-related efforts in FEMA."

Gray, Colin S.

The transition from offense to defense. Washington quarterly, v. 9, summer 1986: 59-72.

"Looking from the mid 1980s, it is prudent to assume that only a U.S. defense transition that has an enforceable, competitive, military viability will be of interest to us. The better able the United States and its allies will be to enforce a cumulatively dramatic change in relative effectiveness between offense and defense, in favor of the latter, the more likely it will be that a cooperative transition will prove negotiable."

Haass, Richard N.

Managing NATO's weakest flank: the United States, Greece, and Turkey. Orbis, v. 30, fall 1986: 457-473.

"The United States often finds itself attempting to nurture close relations with two or more states that are in close proximity but at odds with one another. . . . The United States often has no option but to choose between or among those it has wooed. In many instances, the United States ends up alienating one protagonist for not doing enough on its behalf, alien-

ating the other for doing too much. Greece and Turkey constitute a unique and important example of this problem."

Haig, Alexander M., Jr.

The future of deterrence. Washington, Heritage Foundation, 1987. 9 p. (Heritage lectures 92)

"The peace of the world depends upon deterrence and specifically, the deterrence of aggression across a spectrum of force, ranging from the nuclear to the conventional. Deterrence has many components. There must be adequate capabilities, in fact and in perception, to meet challenges at any level," argues the former Secretary of State.

Hamm, Manfred R.

The AirLand Battle doctrine: NATO strategy and arms control in Europe. Comparative strategy, v. 7, 1988: 183–211.

"The AirLand Battle reflects the efforts of the U.S. Army to come to grips with the challenges of having to 'fight and win outnumbered'. . . . The AirLand Battle doctrine is basically compatible with NATO strategy and does not signify an 'aggressive turn' in U.S. defense policy. . . . Like Active Defense, its goal in central Europe is an effective close-up forward defense along the inter-German border."

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Moscow's emerging Blitzkrieg option. Contemporary review, v. 249, Nov. 1986: 232–235.

"NATO planners are increasingly worried about Moscow's growing ability to launch an attack against Western Europe without NATO being able to exercise its nuclear option. Last year in May, NATO's Military Committee concluded that NATO's conventional forces might be overrun before a political decision could be made to employ nuclear weapons. In such a hopeless situation, our European allies would probably prefer defeat and surrender to wanton nuclear destruction."

Heitman, Helmoed-Romer.

The South Atlantic: NATO's unprotected communications zone. Navy international, v. 90, Feb. 1985: 103–107.

Hendrickson, David C.

NATO defense: no need for basic change. Parameters, v. 17, summer 1987: 76–85.

Examines proposals for changing the NATO alliance.

Hofmann, Wilfried.

Is NATO's defence policy facing a crisis? NATO review, v. 32, Aug. 1984: 1–7.

"Should NATO be seeking alternative strategies? Should it renounce the option of being the first to use nuclear weapons? Could it establish a purely conventional deterrence?

Hopmann, P. Terrence.

The path to no-first-use: conventional arms control. World policy journal, v. 1, winter 1984: 319–337.

"The proposal to link a no-first-use policy with conventional force limitations in Europe represents not only a way to resolve the current strains within the Atlantic alliance, but also the first step in a process of negotiating a more durable security arrangement in Europe."

Howard, Michael.

Reassurance and deterrence: Western defense in the 1980s. Foreign affairs, v. 61, winter 1982–1983: 309–324.

Howe, Geoffrey.

Defense and security in the nuclear age. Atlantic Community quarterly, v. 23, spring 1985: 33–42.

In this March 15, 1985 speech at the Royal United Services Institute, London, Sir Geoffrey reviews NATO's defense options, explores the relationship between defense in its broadest sense and systems intended to defend against nuclear weapons, and highlights the "issues our Alliance must tackle if its success in ensuring peace is to continue."

Hyland, William G.

Soviet theatre forces and arms control policy. Survival, v. 23, Sept.–Oct. 1981: 194–199.

Ikle, Fred C.

NATO strategy: competition vs. stability. Washington, U.S. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, 1986. 4 p. (Defense issues, v. 1, no. 14)

In this Mar. 2, 1986 address at the Wehrkunde conference in Munich, Germany, under Secretary of Defense for Policy discusses significant issues for the NATO alliance.

The Ikle-Wohlstetter report. National interest, no. 12, summer 1988: 11–22.

"Discriminate Deterrence, the report of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, was published in January of this year. . . . It has already stimulated controversy, particularly in Europe. Here, we publish an introductory summary of the report's conclusions, together with the reactions of three leading European commentators."

Contents.—What the report says, by Stephen D. Prowse.—The wrong tree, by Christoph Bertram.—Why Europe still matters, by Pierre Lellouche.— Sharpening the question, by Laurence Martin.

Jablonsky, David.

NATO's long-term defense planning: will it work? Parameters, v. 11, June 1981: 75–82.

Kaiser, Karl.

NATO strategy toward the end of the century. Naval War College review, v. 37, Jan.–Feb. 1984: 69–82.

"A review of future NATO strategy must consider strategy in its widest meaning: as a long-term approach to prevent war, to maintain a free society and to receive the support from a

democratic public. Such a notion of strategy goes beyond the military component. In fact, the necessity of paying more attention to the nonmilitary dimensions does constitute one of the problems for the future.

Nuclear weapons and the preservation of peace: a response, by Karl Kaiser and others. Foreign affairs, v. 60, summer 1982: 1157-1180.

In response to the proposal made by McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara, and Gerard Smith that NATO renounce the first use of nuclear weapons in Europe, four prominent West German authorities on foreign affairs and national defense, Karl Kaiser, George Leber, Alois Mertes and Franz-Josef Schulze, support a reduction of NATO countries' dependence on an early use of nuclear weapons, but contend that: "a renunciation of the option of first use would be contrary to the security interests of Europe and the entire Alliance." Following their article, Stanley Kober, Earl C. Ravenal, Carl N. Anderson, and Donald L. Hafner also comment on the "no first use" proposal, and Bundy, Kennan, McNamara, and Smith reply to their comments.

Kanarowski, Stanley M.

The German Army and NATO strategy. Washington, National Defense University Press, 1982. 94 p. (National Defense University. Monograph series no. 82-2) (UA712.K24 1982)

Partial contents.—Defense of Central Europe—The basic decisions on German rearmament.—Development of the German Army structure.

Kaplan, Lawrence S.

NATO and the United States: the enduring alliance. Boston, Twayne Publishers (G. K. Hall and Co.), 1988. 237 p. (UA646.5.U5K37)

Examines the "history of the relationship between the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization."

King-Harman, Anthony L.

NATO strategy—a new look. RUSI [Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies], v. 129, Mar. 1984: 26-29.

"A strategic review is long overdue in NATO. It is needed to justify and indeed supply the basis for defence spending. It is needed to give the military commanders a comprehensive range of strategic guidance taking on board whatever ideas may be found to be practical to provide stronger conventional forces, and to help and if necessary direct them to establish defence priorities—the essence of cost effective military planning. Above all it is needed so that the publics in our countries can fully understand and thereby support NATO policy and the defence spending it will continue to involve."

Komer, Robert W.

Costs and benefits of a credible conventional component. Armed Forces journal international, v. 121, May 1984: 112, 114, 116.

The author, former U.S. Special Advisor on NATO Affairs discusses the "essential prerequisites" to a stronger NATO conventional option stating that "NATO is in a period of strategic transition from primary reliance on nuclear deterrence toward the more balanced 'flexible response' posture."

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Maritime strategy vs. coalition defense. Foreign affairs, v. 60, summer 1982: 1124–1144.

Discusses the advantages and disadvantages of two U.S. strategies: a maritime supremacy strategy which tacitly acknowledges Soviet military predominance on the Eurasian landmass and stresses U.S. exploitation of the sea; and a coalition approach which focuses on generating sufficient collective capabilities to provide a credible conventional defense of such high priority areas as Western Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Persian Gulf littoral.

Laqueur, Walter.

Containment for the 80's. Commentary, v. 70, Oct. 1980: 33–42.

Examines the challenges facing the United States in the 1980s: relations with the Soviet Union, with our European allies, and with the developing countries.

Lawrence, Richard D. Record, Jeffrey.

U.S. force structure in NATO an alternative; a staff paper. Washington, Brookings Institution [1974] 136 p. (Studies in defense policy) (UA646.5.U5L38)

Lellouche, Pierre.

SDI and the Atlantic Alliance. SAIS review, v. 5, summer-fall 1985: 67–80.

Liberman, Peter J. Thomason, Neil R.

No-first-use unknowables. Foreign policy, no. 64, fall 1986: 17–36.

"Most no-first-use advocates urge force as well as declaratory changes—primarily, a conventional build-up in Western Europe. This is the version analyzed here."

Liversage, Toni. Winter, Judith.

Influencing the decision makers. Journal of European nuclear disarmament, issue 8, Feb.–Mar. 1984: 14–15.

"NATO's nuclear strategy has been increasingly questioned in recent years. . . . What is special about the development in Denmark is that it has been manifested on a parliamentary level from an acceptance of the dual-track decision in December 1979, to a wide de facto rejection of it by a majority in the present Danish parliament (Folketinget), four years later. The main reason for this rejection is found in new developments taking place inside the Danish Social Democrat Party."

Lunn, Simon.

The modernization of NATO's long-range theater nuclear forces; report prepared for the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives by the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Washington, G.P.O., 1981. 80 p. (UA646.3.L84)

At head of title: 96th Congress, 2nd session. Committee print.

"This study concludes that significant military and economic benefits are available to the alliance through judicious increases in standardization."

MacDonald, Hugh.

NATO's dilemma: defense, security, and arms control. Millennium, v. 9, no. 2, 1981: 147–160.

Describes the NATO debate on theatre nuclear force posture modernization. Examines military strategy dilemmas that NATO faces and interests underlying Soviet strategy. Suggests that both NATO and the Soviets need to rethink the relationship between defense policy and security needs. Proposes a context for future developments, including Eurostrategic arms control addressing Eurostrategic problems.

Malone, Daniel K.

ROLAND: a case for or against NATO standardization? Washington, National Defense University, Research Directorate, 1980. 120 p. (National security affairs monograph series, 80–5) (UF530.M26)

Contents.—ROLAND, the NATO coalition and standardization.—The military requirement.—Establishing the rules.—Assembling the team.—Expectation versus realization.—Hoisting the mainsail; setting the jib.—Technology transfer: the view from the shop floor.—Could or should the United States adopt another weapon via the "two-way street" paved (or blazed) by ROLAND?—Historical retrospect.

Manpower issues for NATO: recruitment, retention, reserves. Belgium, North Atlantic Assembly, 1983. 94 p.

Contents.—General discussion.—Individual countries.—Special issues.—Concluding remarks.

Martin, Laurence W.

NATO and the defense of the West: an analysis of America's first line of defense. New York, Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, c1985. 159 p. (UA646.3.M26 1985)

Mason, R. A.

Western deterrence: posture and rationale. Air University review, v. 33, May–June 1982: 2–10.

The author's objective is to summarize "the perceptions that have led to the adoption by the United Kingdom and NATO of the deterrence posture, explain the constituent parts of alliance deterrence, and make one or two observations on current

issues: Trident, cruise missile, Pershing II, and the enhanced radiation weapon or neutron bomb."

Mason, Ronald.

Defence capabilities and new technologies. NATO's sixteen nations, v. 28, Feb.-Mar. 1983: 28, 31, 33-34.

"This article is primarily about how the application of modern technology may sustain or improve NATO's military position. . . . The technologies and evolving weapon systems have the potential to increase the flexibility, survivability and endurability of NATO's military response to aggression in a wide range of scenarios. To achieve these advantages, we must be prepared to move away from traditional investment patterns and outmoded weapon systems."

McKitrick, Myra Struck.

A conventional deterrent for NATO: an alternative to the nuclear balance of terror. Parameters, v. 13, Mar. 1983: 51-58.

There is an essential difference between 1953 and 1982 in the relationship between conventional and theater nuclear forces. "A realistic conventional deterrent for NATO exists only in the realm of speculation" argues the author.

Meacham, James.

NATO's central front. Economist, v. 300, Aug. 30, 1986: 3-22.

"The central front in Europe is the most highly militarised region in the world. Two million men from NATO and the Warsaw pact glare at each other across the border that divides the two Germanies."

Contents.—If deterrence fails.—If push comes to shove.—The worst possible case?—Would it were dark.—What would happen next.—No place to hide.—The other dimension.—Keeping them out.—Can the line be held?

Mearsheimer, John J.

Maneuver, mobile defense, and the NATO central front. International security, v. 6, winter 1981-82: 104-122.

Meehan, John F.

NATO and alternative strategies. Parameters, v. 16, spring 1986: 14-23.

"Flexible Response, incorporating elements of deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial, may well be the optimum strategy. Discussion rages over the operational concepts and the means to implement the strategy, not over the strategy itself. Accordingly, the crisis in NATO will end not with the selection of a "new" strategy but when the allies agree on what concepts and means will accomplish the chosen strategy with the most efficiency, least cost, and minimum risk."

Menaul, Stewart.

NATO in the eighties: a war-winning strategy. [London, Institute for the Study of Conflict] 1980. 26 p. (Conflict studies, no. 117)

"As the decade ended with unabated Soviet expansionism the West's pursuit of detente and arms limitations was increasingly seen as illusory. Fulfillment of Soviet aims of neutralising US strategic superiority and interdicting sea lanes as means to dominate Europe depend on superior nuclear and conventional power. The USSR has now achieved this, so that NATO strategy relying on threat of escalation to the strategic level is no longer valid. The Soviet leaders have doctrine and forces for conducting war in Europe: NATO has neither."

Mertes, Alois.

Outlook for the Conference on Confidence Building and Disarmament in Europe. Aussenpolitik, v. 35, no. 1, 1984: 18–30.

"The conference provides an historic opportunity to arrive at more predictability and stability throughout Europe through concrete confidence building measures. . . . Our main aim for the first phase of the conference is therefore to make it clear that the participating countries pursue solely peaceful aims with their military potentials. The Stockholm conference therefore complements other arms control negotiations: It does not immediately plunge into an attempt to reduce the potentials. . . . Step by step, we want to develop the basis for ever further-reaching agreements."

Military strategies for the future. Washington quarterly, v. 6, summer 1983: 49–98.

Contents.—Mutual arms reduction: an impossible dream?, by R. Kupperman.—Nuclear strategy: is there a future?, by C. Gray and K. Payne.—Strategy for survival, by A. Collins, Jr.—Crisis management in the alliance, by G. Schmuckle.—Strategic responses to nuclear proliferation, by R. Jones.

Mitchell, Pat.

Increasing the combined operational effectiveness of NATO forces: the role of the Military Agency for Standardization. NATO review, v. 32, Mar. 19i84: 16–19.

The Chairman of the Military Agency for Standardization describes the Agency's role in developing common tactical doctrine operational procedures, and military terminology.

Nathan, James A.

How's the strategy playing with the allies? United States Naval Institute proceedings, v. 114, Aug. 1988: 57–62.

Discusses the relationship of U.S. maritime strategy to the interests of the U.S.'s allies. Argues that despite the strategy's intentions being clearly aimed at serving allied interests, as well as implicating them by requiring their wide-ranging assistance, the allies have problems with the maritime strategy including the strategy's being "at odds with U.S. allies' own defense needs, at least in the Pacific. Allies usually measure defense associations by two tests: do they enhance their security? And are they cost-effective? Protracted conventional war against the Soviets in Soviet home waters may not meet these criteria."

NATO's Northern Flank. NATO's sixteen nations, v. 33, Nov. 1988: 19–23, 25, 27–30, 33, 35–40, 44, 47–48, 50–54.

"With its sparsely populated stretches of land, vast distances and limited communications, NATO's Northern Flank has always presented strategic problems."

Contents.—Alliance Defence of the Northern Flank, by Geoffrey Howlett.—Norway and the strategic developments on NATO's Northern Flank, by Johan Jorgen Holst.—Iceland and the Alliance's second task, by Jon Baldvin Hannibalsson.—Denmark: no simple formula for security, by Ib Faurby.—Neutrality in the North: Sweden, Finland, and the Nordic system, by Bo Huldt.—Arctic perspectives from different NATO viewpoints, by George Lindsey.

Neild, Robert. Boserup, Anders.

Beyond INF: a new approach to nonnuclear forces. World policy journal, v. 4, fall 1987: 605–620.

"With the likelihood of an agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States on medium- and short-range nuclear missiles, the issue of nonnuclear forces in Europe is coming to the fore. . . . Out of apparent recognition that the military confrontation in Europe cannot be eased unless the nonnuclear problem is addressed, the Warsaw Pact has made a variety of proposals. In particular, it has put forth the idea, which so far has received little attention in the West, that doctrine for the use of nonnuclear forces be made defensive and that consultations on doctrine be held between NATO and the Warsaw Pact."

Nerlich, Uwe.

Change in Europe: a secular trend? Daedalus, v. 110, winter 1981: 71–103.

Surveys Soviet objectives in Western Europe and changes in Western Europe throughout the 1970s, consonant with those objectives. Analyzes U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union and Atlantic alliance relationships. Contends that the United States and Western Europe must develop a more global common outlook, a common answer to the problem of how to deal with the Soviet Union, and new arrangements for joint policy-making.

New technology and Western security policy. Edited by Robert O'Neill. Hamden, Conn., Archon Books, c1985. 178 p. (UF530.N49 1985)

Papers presented at the 26th annual Conference of the International Institute for Strategic Studies held at Avignon, France, 1981.

New technology for NATO: implementing follow-on force attack. Washington, U.S. Office of Technology Assessment, 1987. 231 p.

"OTA-ISC-309" (UA646.3.N4748 1987)

Newhouse, John.

Arms and allies. New Yorker, v. 59, Feb. 28, 1983: 64–70, 73–74, 76, 78, 80–81.

Reviews the concerns underlying the decision by NATO to deploy additional intermediate range nuclear missiles in Western Europe unless progress is made in arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union regarding intermediate nuclear forces in Europe. Discusses the political implications of deploying the missiles in NATO and the effects of cancelling the deployment.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Defence Planning Committee.

Enhancing Alliance collective security: shared roles, risks and responsibilities in the Alliance; a report by NATO's Defence Planning Committee. Brussels, Belgium [The Organization] 1988. 79 p.

"With regard to the common defence, the sharing of roles, risks and responsibilities embraces a wide range of contributions by member countries: financial and human resources, land and facilities, services and sacrifices, co-operation and solidarity. Moreover, the provision of money and people is not an end in itself. What counts is how these inputs are translated into defence capabilities. Some of these contributions are quantifiable but many are not. Precise comparisons of one type of contribution with another are not possible. Perceptions vary of the value and the cost of individual contributions and are also affected by what is considered a reasonable balance between burdens and benefits."

Nunn, Sam.

NATO challenges and opportunities: a three-track approach. NATO review, v. 35, June 1987: 1–8.

U.S. Senator and Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee states that "for nearly four decades, NATO has kept the peace in Europe. The United States has played a vital role in this peacekeeping effort, and has also been a principal beneficiary. . . . We cannot, however, take NATO or the deterrence of war for granted. If we are to preserve peace into the next century and beyond, NATO must make hard decisions about the essential elements of its security policy."

Osgood, Robert E.

The revitalization of containment. Foreign affairs, v. 60, no. 3, 1982: 465–502.

Briefly reviews the oscillations of U.S. foreign policy since World War II. Surveys the Reagan administration's foreign policies. Considers the centrality of containment in Reagan's policies. Discusses the defense budget, military policies for the defense of NATO, including arms control; U.S. relations with NATO allies, China and Japan; and policies toward developing countries.

Oswald, J. J. R. McKendrick, R.

Flexible response—is there an alternative? RUSI [Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies], v. 131, Mar. 1986: 20–25.

"This article addresses the question as to whether there is a realistic alternative to NATO's current flexibility in response. It briefly sketches the development of NATO's strategy, outlines the threads of the present debate, reviews alternative proposals and highlights some of the difficulties that these present."

Peters, John E.

Evaluating FOFA as a deterrent. RUSI [Journal of the Royal United Service Institute for Defence Studies], v. 132, Dec. 1987: 39–44.

"NATO has recently adopted Follow-on Forces Attack (FOFA) as its doctrine for the defence of Western Europe. FOFA constitutes a significant departure from earlier NATO doctrine and as a result has been the subject of considerable debate. Much of the debate has focused on FOFA's adequacy as a theatre defensive doctrine; little attention has been paid to FOFA as a deterrent. Although the NATO establishment has largely dealt with the question of FOFA's effectiveness as defensive doctrine, the issue of the effectiveness of its deterrent capability remains.

Politics and security in the southern region of the Atlantic Alliance. Edited by Douglas T. Stuart. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988. 209 p. (JX1393.N67P65 1988)

Partial contents.—The management of discord in Alliance relations, by Simon Serfaty.—Burden sharing and the southern region of the Alliance, by Rainer W. Rupp.—On Spain, NATO and democracy, by Antonio Sanchez-Gijon.—Portugal in Atlantic-Mediterranean security, by Alvaro Vasconcelos.—Turkey's security policy: continuity and change, by Ali L. Karaosmanoglu.

Pond, Elizabeth.

The security debate in West Germany. Survival, v. 28, July/Aug. 1986: 322–336.

"The security debate has gone underground in West Germany since that surprisingly uneventful day at the end of 1983 when the first Pershing IIs went operational at Mutlangen. . . . Depending on how the super-powers now manoeuvre, the American Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and arms control could well become much more divisive issues between the US and West Germany than Euromissile deployment."

Posen, Barry R. VanEvera, Stephen W.

Overarming and underwhelming. Foreign policy, no. 40, fall 1980: 99–118.

Suggests that reforms of U.S. military strategy and force posture should precede defense budget increases. Recommends improving combat readiness, prepositioning more equipment in

Europe, shifting more army manpower from support to combat roles, and reforming U.S. weapon design practices. Contends that reforms and improvements by NATO allies would do more to redress the European balance than U.S. reforms.

Power and policy: doctrine, the Alliance and arms control. Part 1. London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1986. 72 p. (Adelphi papers no. 205)

Contents.—NATO's strategy: an undervalued currency, by Bernard W. Rogers.—Strategic choices: their roles in NATO's defence planning and force modernizations: Part I, by James A. Thomson.—Strategic choices: their roles in NATO's defence planning and force modernizations: Part II, by Francois Heisbourg.—The roles of strategic and theatre nuclear forces in NATO strategy: Part I, by Bernard Jackson.—The roles of strategic and theatre nuclear forces in NATO strategy: Part II, by Leon Sloss.

Power and policy: doctrine, the Alliance and arms control, part II. London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1986. 78 p. (Adelphi papers 206)

Contents.—The evolution of Soviet doctrine, by Fritz Ermath.—The impact of NATO doctrinal choices on the policies and strategic choices of Warsaw Pact States: part 1, by James F. Brown.—The impact of NATO doctrinal choices on the policies and strategic choices of Warsaw Pact States: part II, by Dennis M. Gormley.—Strategic policy options and the implications for arms control, stability and East-West relations, by Karsten D. Voigt.—Arms control implications of NATO and Warsaw Pact doctrines, by Dennis Ross.—Denial and punishment: straddling the horns of NATO's dilemma, by Johan Jorgen Holst.

Power and policy: doctrine, the Alliance and arms control, part III. London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1986. 76 p. (Adelphi papers 207)

Partial contents.—Strategic choices and alliance cohesion, by Richard R. Burt.—NATO doctrine and national operational priorities: the central front and the flanks: part I, by Philip A. Karber.—NATO doctrine and national operational priorities: the central front and the flanks: part II, by Peter Stratmann.—Problems of over-extension: reconciling NATO defence and out-of-area contingencies: part I, by Anthony Farrar-Hockley.—Problems of over-extension: reconciling NATO defence and out-of-area contingencies: part II, by Robert W. Komer.

Priorities in U.S. defense policy. Washington, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1979. 36 p. (AEI foreign policy and defense review, v. 1, no. 3) (E840.A585, v. 1, no. 3/UA 23)

"Essays by Maxwell D. Taylor, Lloyd Norman, and Steven L. Canby—all established experts in military affairs—suggest both disagreement and consensus about the ranking of priorities in American defense policy. Their views on U.S. strategic

and conventional force needs reflect continuing debate among military leaders and thinkers about the security challenges the United States is most—and least—likely to face in the years ahead, and about the specific preparations needed to meet the ones most urgent."

Quayle, Dan.

After the INF Treaty: the NATO Defense Initiative. Strategic review, v. 16, winter 1988: 9–13.

"In the wake of the INF Treaty, the Alliance urgently needs to unite behind a concerted NATO Defense Initiative designed to shore up the badly weakened pillars of its Flexible Response Strategy. . . . Under the best of assumptions nuclear weapons can no longer substitute for NATO conventional forces—in deterrent effect. . . . The overriding priority is the creation of a truly flexible conventional response posture. . . . Beyond improvements in the strength and resilience of forward defenses, this calls centrally for deep-strike conventional weapons . . . missions for which advanced, conventionally armed cruise missiles are ideally suited."

Quester, George H.

Dilemmas of common deterrence. Political science quarterly, v. 101, 1986: 733–752.

"Considers some trends and paradoxes about common deterrence as it has taken the place of common defense and examines the credibility of the United States extending a 'nuclear umbrella' to protect its close allies."

Rallo, Joseph C.

Defending Europe in the 1990s: the new divide of high technology. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1986. 136 p. (Studies in international political economy) (UA646.R25 1986)

Ravenal, Earl C.

Counterforce and alliance: the ultimate connection. International security, v. 6, spring 1982: 26–43.

"It is its adherence to alliance commitments that skews the United States' strategy toward counterforce weapons and targeting and warps American doctrines of response toward the first use of nuclear weapons, prejudicing crisis stability and increasing the likelihood of escalation to nuclear war."

Record, Jeffrey.

France 1940 and the NATO Center 1980: a disquieting comparison. Strategic review, v. 7, summer 1980: 67–74.

Draws parallels between NATO's current defensive posture and the Western defenders in Europe in 1940. Criticizes the maldeployment of NATO forces, contending that they are not deployed opposite the Warsaw Pact's principal concentration of forces.

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U.S. strategy at the crossroads: two views, by Jeffrey Record and Robert Hanks. Cambridge, Mass., Institute for Foreign

Policy Analysis, 1982. 72 p. (Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. Foreign policy report)

Contents.—Beyond NATO: new military directions for the United States, by Jeffrey Record.—Toward a new national strategy for the United States, by R. Hanks.

Richardson, Elliot L.

Requirements of defence and deterrence in the 1980s. NATO review, v. 30, June 1982: 8–11.

Reviews the necessity of maintaining the NATO triad of strategic nuclear, tactical nuclear, and conventional forces, in light of Soviet military posture and foreign policies. Discusses the importance of NATO tactical nuclear forces in deterring conflict. Contends that "many sincere people have, unfortunately, focused their attention on the potential effects of nuclear weapons, without seriously considering the deterrent role they have successfully played for decades. It is clear that, in view of Soviet conventional superiority, NATO nuclear forces will have to continue to play a significant role in deterring possible Soviet threats against Europe or political pressure in a crisis."

Rogers, Bernard W.

The Atlantic Alliance: prescriptions for a difficult decade. Foreign affairs, v. 60, summer 1982: 1145–1156.

The Supreme Allied Commander Europe discusses NATO's security objectives and surveys external and internal problems facing the Alliance. He suggests that NATO should strive to attain a conventional posture which would constitute a credible deterrent to Warsaw Pact conventional aggression, but he points out the dangers inherent in a NATO policy of "no first use" of nuclear weapons.

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Follow-on forces attack (FOFA): myths and realities. NATO review, v. 32, Dec. 1984: 1–9.

Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) on means to enhance NATO's conventional capacity and deterrent.

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Greater flexibility for NATO's flexible response. Strategic review, v. 11, spring 1983: 11–19.

The Supreme Allied Commander, Europe contends that the answer to NATO's security problems "must be found in the determination to go ahead with nuclear modernization—if the Geneva negotiations yield no results—and in a concerted modernization of NATO conventional forces that is within both the technological and economic reach of the member nations. Such an effort to raise the nuclear threshold is consistent with Flexible Response, forward defense and the requirements of truly credible deterrence."

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Increasing threats to NATO's security call for sustained response. NATO review, v. 29, June 1981: 1–6.

General Rogers, the Supreme Allied Commander for Europe, surveys the Soviet threat to NATO and outlines the long-term steps he feels NATO should take for its defense. He advocates strengthening the northern, central, and southern regions, maintaining a full continuum of strategic nuclear, tactical nuclear, and conventional forces and augmenting forces and resources, so that NATO's security interests outside its borders can be protected.

Rose, Francois de.

Alternative strategies for the West. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 27, June–July 1982: 14–17.

The author, a member of the French diplomatic service, reviews the challenges to NATO and suggests a new NATO strategy, with an emphasis on conventional forces and a change in the relationship of France with NATO's military structures.

Rostow, Eugene V.

There is no alternative strategy. Global affairs, v. 3, spring 1988: 1–21.

"Our policy of collective security cannot be replaced by a policy of hunkering down behind the Conestoga wagons or by one of global or regional unilateralism. Such proposals—and there are many of them these days—defy the geography and arithmetic of power."

Rothgeb, John M., Jr.

Loose vs. tight: the effect of bloc structure upon foreign interactions. Journal of politics, v. 43, May 1981: 493–511.

"Three categories of blocs are used: loose bloc states (defined as the NATO states), tight bloc states (defined as the Warsaw Pact states), and a non-bloc category containing all targets not mentioned in the first two categories. The focus is upon East and West Germany's interactions with their own blocs, . . . with the other bloc, . . . and with non-bloc entities."

Ruhle, Hans.

NATO strategy: the need to return to basics. Strategic review, v. 16, fall 1988: 28–35.

"The post-INF debate in NATO seems to have degenerated into a confusion of slogans, with particular prominence achieved by such terms as 'conventional deterrence' and 'conventional balance' in Europe. It is encumbent upon the Alliance to rethink the fundamental relationship between the nuclear and conventional components of its force posture for deterrence and defense."

Russell, Robert E.

How secure is NATO's northern cap? Air University review, v. 35, Sept.–Oct. 1984: 58–67.

"The Northern Flank, in which Norway is the key NATO member, has yet to receive all the attention it deserves. Europe's 'northern cap' is usually defined as the northern one-third of the Scandinavian countries. . . . This area's critical relationship to the rest of NATO should not be overlooked: its

unusual geography, the size and strength of the Soviet military in the area. . . . All combine to suggest that the situation in the northern cap is a potentially volatile one."

Ruth, Friedrich.

Deterrence and arms control—NATO's security policy. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 27, Feb.-Mar. 1982: 14-16, 18-19.

Ambassador Friedrich Ruth, Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, discusses the credibility of NATO's peacekeeping strategy, the balance of forces in Europe, the political framework in which arms control negotiations take place, objectives for arms control negotiations and considerations such negotiations must address.

Schear, James A. Nye, Joseph S., Jr.

Addressing Europe's conventional instabilities. Washington quarterly, v. 11, summer 1988: 45-55.

"The new treaty . . . the so-called INF accord—is a major milestone in U.S.-Soviet diplomacy. . . . It would be a mistake to think that it will remove Europe's security problems. On the contrary, the agreement is forcing Western leaders to look anew at what can be done to shore up Western Europe's conventional defenses."

Schmitz, Peter N.

Defending the NATO alliance: global implications. Washington, National Defense University Press, 1987. 178 p.

Partial contents.—Is NATO an island?—The issue of a common foreign policy.—Neglected elements in transatlantic relations.—Political consultation and cooperation.—Toward an alliance global strategy.

Schulze, Franz-Joseph.

SDI and the conventional defense of Europe. International defense review, v. 19, no. 9, 1986: 1225-1228.

"The strengthening of NATO's conventional posture . . . must include the capability to intercept Soviet short-range and intermediate-range missiles."

Security and disarmament. Trialogue, v. 30, summer-fall 1982: whole issue.

Partial contents.—In search of security, by R. Aron.—From disarmament to arms control, by M. Momoi.—East-West relations: strategic crossroads, by Z. Brzezinski.—Peace and Security, by A. Mertes.—A special statement, by I. Gandhi.—A new start for strategic arms control, by J. Nye.—On "common security." by D. Owen.—Security and disarmament, by T. Yokomichi.—Avoiding an arms race in outer space by C. Trezza.

Semialignment and Western security. Edited by Nils Orvik. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1986. 286 p. (UA646.3.S434 1986)

Sergeyev, V.

NATO's aggressive plans and standardisation of weapons. International affairs (Moscow) no. 10, Oct. 1980: 80–86.

Soviet publication accuses the U.S. of using NATO programs for standardization of weapons as a means of influencing the military system and strategy of NATO countries. Contends that NATO's standardization program escalates the arms race and jeopardizes peace.

Sharp, Jane M. O.

Arms control and Alliance commitments. Political science quarterly, v. 100, winter 1985–86: 649–667.

"Explores the problems of trying to pursue nuclear arms control with the Soviet Union while maintaining NATO's capability to deter a Soviet attack on Western Europe. The author argues that reducing reliance on the nuclear component of NATO's deterrent does not require compensatory increase in conventional military forces."

Shattering Europe's defense consensus: the antinuclear protest movement and the future of NATO. Edited by James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Washington, Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, c1985. 226 p. (UA646.3.S436 1985)

Southern region of NATO. NATO's sixteen nations, v. 33, July 1988: 18–20, 22, 24–25, 27–28, 31, 35–36, 38, 40, 44, 47–48, 51–53, 55–57.

Contents.—The Lion's share—the challenge for allied forces Southern Europe, by James Busey.—Europe's eastern outpost—modernisation and evolution in Turkey, by Rasit Guerdilek.—The essential link—Greece in NATO, by Van Coufoudakis.—Italy's strategic dilemma, by L. Caligaris.—Spain's new approach—Atlantic Solidarity, by Victor de la Serna.

Steinbruner, John D.

The prospect of cooperative security. Brookings review, v. 7, winter 1988–1989: 33–63.

"Pressures in both the United States and the Soviet Union are pushing the two countries toward consideration of cooperative security measures. John D. Steinbruner outlines a potential arrangement to reduce and stabilize strategic and conventional forces."

Support of NATO strategy in the 1990's; a report to the United States Congress in compliance with Public law 100–180. Washington, U.S. Dept. of Defense, 1988. ca. 58 p. in various pagings.

"Report concerns U.S. and allied planning for the future security posture of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It responds to the Congressional request (spelled out in the Appendix) that the Secretary of Defense discuss how Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) missile reductions fit with NATO

objectives and how they relate to the Alliance's flexible response strategy. . . . It includes seven supporting sections matched to specific questions from the Congress."

Taft, William H., IV.

NATO's renewed commitment to armaments control. Defense issues, v. 2, no. 20, 1987: 1–3.

In this speech at a National Defense University symposium on Mar. 26, 1987, Deputy Secretary of Defense discusses issues of significance to NATO. "The NATO ministers have made a strong start toward a higher confidence deterrent at an affordable alliance cost. Our defense industries have enlisted in the effort, and we anticipate even greater benefit from the synergism of the Free World's greatest industrial communities."

Takeshita, Lloyd S.

The Strategic Defense Initiative and NATO. Military review, v. 66, Apr. 1986: 31–37.

"The Strategic Defense Initiative continues to be a center of controversy. . . . How do the member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization feel about this issue, and how does it fit into their concept of 'joint' defense? This author contends the issue does not fit as neatly as the United States would hope."

Technologies for NATO's follow-on forces attack concept; a special report of OTA's assessment on improving NATO's defense response. Washington, U.S. Office of Technology Assessment, for sale by the Supt. of Docs., G.P.O., 1986. 39 p.

"This report provides an overview of the U.S. technological developments of interest for FOFA. While it does not rate or rank these developments, it does describe what they are and how they might contribute to implementing FOFA. It also provides background on the role of FOFA in NATO strategy, the threat it responds to, and operational concepts for FOFA."

Thies, Wallace J.

On NATO strategy: escalation and the nuclear allergy. Parameters, v. 18, Sept. 1988: 18–33.

"This article proceeds in three steps. Part one considers the reasons why flexible response has become an inadequate basis for strategic collaboration in peacetime and for successful military operations in wartime. Part two considers the requirements that any new strategy will have to meet to be a viable replacement, while part three proposes an alternative approach based on the principle of symmetrical response."

Thompson, John B.

NATO infrastructure at a crossroads—a perspective. NATO review, v. 32, Mar. 1984: 20–26.

NATO's Controller for Infrastructure describes the NATO Infrastructure Programme which "has been responsible to date for the planning and implementation, throughout the Alliance, of a wide range of common support facilities." . . . He writes "currently, the programme is undergoing a transition, involv-

ing improved procedures for NATO infrastructure adopted last year, aimed at refining multi-year planning and financing by linking infrastructure planning more closely to the NATO force planning process."

Tolnay, Laszlo.

The basis of NATO's military policy and doctrine. Development and peace, v. 5, spring 1984: 133–146.

Tornetta, Vincenzo.

Rethinking NATO strategy. Washington quarterly, v. 7, summer 1984: 13–20.

Italy's Permanent Representative to NATO from January 1980 to April 1983 recommends "an active reconsideration of NATO's present strategic directives in order to continue to insure an effective and credible deterrence, without undermining public support." He points out that "geographic and strategic constraints imply that Europe's defense requirements—and particularly the need to insure a credible deterrence—go beyond a pure and simple balance of conventional forces, because geography may play against the continent."

Toyka, Viktor.

A submerged forward defense. United States Naval Institute proceedings, v. 110, Mar. 1984: 145–147.

Warsaw Pact antisubmarine and antisurface operations "in the Bergen-Shetland Gap as well as north and northwest of the British Isles," during naval exercises in the summer of 1983, indicate that "the Baltic approaches are no longer regarded as a de facto NATO bottleneck against Soviet bloc navies. NATO naval planners . . . must worry about adequate defense of the vital sea lines of communication in the North Atlantic, the Bergen-Shetland Gap, and even in the North Sea against a possible surface and submarine threat—in addition to the already significant air threat."

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Delegation to NATO.

NATO and U.S. security: report of the Committee Delegation to NATO, submitted to the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 95th Congress, 1st session. Washington, G.P.O., 1977. 19 p. (UA646.3.U38 1977)

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations.

The implementation of the NATO long-term defense program (LTDP); first report by the Committee on Government Operations. Washington, G.P.O., 1981. 41 p. (Report, House, 97th Congress, 1st session, no. 97–37)

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services.

Department of Defense authorization for appropriations for fiscal year 1989. Hearings, 100th Congress, 2nd session. Feb. 18–Apr. 11, 1988. Washington, G.P.O., 1986. 540 p. (Hearings, Senate, 99th Congress, 2nd session, S. Hrg. 100–790, Pt. 1)

"S. 2455, authorizing appropriations for fiscal year 1989 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strength for such fiscal year for the armed forces, and for other purposes."

U.S. defense policy in the 1980s. Daedalus, v. 110, winter 1981: whole issue.

Partial contents.—Toward an American conception of regional security, by M. Nacht.—The superpowers and the Atlantic alliance, by G. Quester.—The Atlantic alliance, by R. Bowie.—Notes on some issues on technology and national defense, by H. Brooks.—Arms control and American defense policy: new alternatives and old realities, by J. Kruzel.—The relevance of arms control in the 1980s, by R. Burt.

Vayrynen, Raimo.

Eurostrategic arms race: doctrine[s] and their implications. Current research on peace and violence, v. 4, no. 1, 1981: 1-32.

The author, who is affiliated with the Department of Political Science at the University of Helsinki, surveys NATO and Soviet strategic doctrines, and discusses the implications of a shift from deterrence to war-fighting strategies for the allies of the superpowers. He reviews the growth of Eurostrategic systems and considers the prospects for nuclear disarmament in Europe.

Vermaat, J. A. Emerson.

The strange phenomenon of the "generals for peace." Strategic review, v. 13, spring 1985: 52-59.

"The appearance in Western Europe of a growing number of special interest groups 'for peace' reflects the decision by the International Department of the CPSU in Moscow to create a new facade of front organizations able to attract the professional and intellectual classes to the banners of the peace movement. Prominent among them has been a small but widely publicized group of 'Generals for Peace and Disarmament,' composed of retired military men from various NATO countries. . . . With some variations among its members, the group has faithfully echoed the Soviet line, particularly in its pronouncements on the key issues of the arms debate in Europe."

Wall, Patrick.

NATO's vulnerable northern flank. Atlantic Community quarterly, v. 24, spring 1986: 57-62.

Concludes that "NATO's northern flank is vulnerable—perhaps the most vulnerable of the alliance's many potential theaters of combat—and only a display of allied unity would convince the Russians that any attack will be answered by the whole strength of NATO."

Wallace, John F.

NATO's Achilles heel civil defence. NATO review, v. 28, Feb. 1980: 20-23.

"Since its early days, Civil Emergency Planning has played a part in the Alliance's defense posture, but its role has varied according to prevailing concepts." The article, "makes a strong plea for a greater emphasis on civil defence, which is one aspect of the broad field covered by Civil Emergency Planning."

The War game. Washington post, Nov. 15, 1981: A1, A24–A25; Nov. 16: A1, A10–11; Nov. 17: A1, A27; Nov. 18: A1, A26; Nov. 19: A1, A10; Nov. 20: A1, A24.

Contents.—NATO strategy questioned, by B. Graham.—German heartland uneasy.—NATO's nuclear strategy devised in political vacuum, by W. Pincus and B. Graham.—Ban the bomb: growing protest movement seeks neutral 'calm space', by L. Downie, Jr.—Arms decision stirred storm around NATO, by W. Pincus.—U.S. bombers in Britain become superpower pawns, by L. Downie Jr.— Allies seeking greater role in nuclear weapons policy, by W. Pincus.

Weinberger, Caspar.

Assessing current NATO strategy. NATO's sixteen nations, v. 29, Nov.-Dec. 1984: 38–41.

"NATO's strategy comes under criticism from time to time. This has been apparent recently in particular when senior political figures and larger political groupings in several allied countries are calling for a fundamental revision. Clearly, concepts and doctrines must move with the times and be kept up to date. The US Secretary of Defense, Mr. Caspar Weinberger, shows the basic reasoning for NATO's strategy of Forward Defense and Flexible Response when the concept first emerged and sets it into the present day."

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Why offense needs defense. Foreign policy, no. 68, fall 1987: 3–18.

Weinrod, W. Bruce. Hamm, Manfred R.

Strategic defense and America's allies. Washington, Heritage Foundation, 1985. 15 p. (Backgrounder no. 425)

"European concerns about SDI are understandable and legitimate. Any change in U.S. nuclear policy, or in the overall U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship, inevitably affects the allies. . . . A number of West European leaders appear to have reservations about SDI in general, its impact on the East-West balance, and most particularly, its effect on the U.S. ability to defend its NATO allies. The Soviet Union . . . is already trying to use SDI as a wedge to push the allies away from Washington."

Wendt, James C.

Improving the NATO force planning process: lessons from past efforts. Santa Monica, Calif., Rand [1986] 42 p. (UA646.3.W46 1986)

Wolfe, Alan.

After deployment: the emergence of a new Europe. World policy journal, v. 1, spring 1984: 549–574.

"To bring some perspective to the movement for a more autonomous Europe and its implications for U.S. foreign policy is the purpose of this essay. . . . Any new NATO weapons that Washington endorses will necessarily reaffirm Europe's governments, and raising fears of nuclear insecurity."

Worner, Manfred.

The challenge of international security. Atlantic Community quarterly, v. 19, winter 1981–82: 435–440.

The author, Chairman of the Defense Committee of the West German Bundestag, lists 7 facts which NATO countries will need to make clear to their populations to address the threat posed to national security by increasing pressure for unilateral disarmament and by increasing anti-Americanism. He briefly considers other security problems confronting the European countries of NATO.

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Security policy perspectives and tasks of the North Atlantic alliance in the light of changing East-West relations. Armed Forces journal international, v. 124, Mar. 1987: 38, 40, 42.

Contends that "there is no substitute for the nuclear strategy which has helped preserve the peace of America and Europe."

Yost, David S.

Ballistic missile defense and the Atlantic Alliance. International security, v. 7, fall 1982: 143–174.

"Although active defense of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) seems the most likely application for BMD, other strategic defense options are reportedly under consideration. European-based BMD against theater ballistic missiles such as the SS–20, SS–21, SS–22, and SS–23 is being examined as well. Such defenses are known as anti-tactical ballistic missiles (ATBM) or anti-tactical missiles (ATM). . . . The political and strategic issues that BMD programs could raise within the Alliance should be explored as deliberately as possible before economic resources are committed."

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European security and the SALT process. Washington, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University [1981] 96 p. (Washington papers 85)

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European-American relations and NATO's initial missile deployments. Current history, v. 83, Apr. 1984: 145–148, 184–186.

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Soviet ballistic missile defense and NATO. Orbis, v. 29, summer 1985: 281–292.

"Soviet ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities and research activities have, by contrast, been relatively neglected. This neglect is unfortunate, because it promotes misleading impressions about the strategic context of the SDI, and obscures the fundamental political military challenges that Soviet BMD could pose."

Zelikow, Philip.

Visions of the future war in Europe. Fletcher forum, v. 7, summer 1983: 313-321.

"Philip Zelikow reveals some of the assumptions and habits of thinking that have conditioned NATO planning for the future war in Europe. Zelikow discusses Western scenarios as to how the war may start, develop and end." He suggests planners consider the possibility that the next war could be long, involving extraordinary attrition of resources.

IV. NATO CONVENTIONAL FORCE ISSUES

Abshire, David M.

NATO's conventional defence: the need for a resources strategy. NATO review, v. 32, Oct. 1984: 8–13.

"Ambassador Abshire argues that if NATO's strategy of flexible response is to be truly flexible the conventional deterrent must be improved. For this to be possible, not only should the European member states assume more responsibility for the task, but NATO should develop an effective resources strategy."

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NATO's conventional defense improvement effort: an ongoing imperative. Washington quarterly, v. 10, spring 1987: 49–60.

Conventional defense improvement (CDI) "was already a NATO imperative, recognized by alliance councils as a critical priority in early 1984. Reykjavik underlined that need in the public consciousness and intensified the debate about how it should be accomplished."

Alberts, D. J.

Deterrence in the 1980s: part II: the role of conventional air power. London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1984. 57 p. (Adelphi papers, no. 193)

Contents.—What is a conventional deterrence for NATO?—NATO air power and conventional deterrence/defence.—Implications and inferences.—Summary, conclusions, and tentative suggestions.

Alberts, Donald J.

An alternative view of air interdiction. Air University review, v. 32, July–Aug. 1981: 31–44.

Provides an air force perspective on air interdiction. Describes what air interdiction is, considers when and why it can be useful, and probes the implications of air interdiction for force employment in the European scenario.

Alexander, Joseph H.

Combined amphibious operations in Northern Europe. United States Naval Institute proceedings, v. 106, Nov. 1980: 26–32.

"The art of amphibious warfare has been getting a fresh application on NATO's northern flank in recent years. Major NATO maritime exercises with significant amphibious assault phases are now being conducted on a biennial basis throughout Norway, Denmark, and northern Germany."

97-675 0 - 89 - 5

Alford, Jonathan.

NATO's conventional forces and the Soviet mobilization potential. NATO review, v. 28, June 1980: 18–22.

Analyzes the role of conventional forces in NATO and Soviet strategy. Focuses on the possible Soviet use of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. Contends "the core of NATO's defense should reside in a conventional capability to deny the Warsaw Pact either military or political advantage."

Baggett, Lee.

The security of the sea lines of communications. NATO's sixteen nations, v. 33, Feb.–Mar. 1988: 16–18, 20, 22.

Focuses on the importance of sea lifelines in NATO strategy, to emphasize the problems in ensuring their defense.

Bambini, Adrianp., Jr.

Chemical warfare and the NATO Alliance. Military review, v. 61, Apr. 1981: 27–33.

"This article examines NATO's ability to engage in chemical warfare with the Warsaw Pact. The author identifies areas in which he feels NATO is deficient and proposes actions aimed at eliminating these problems."

Betts, Richard K.

Conventional deterrence: predictive uncertainty and policy confidence. World politics, v. 37, Jan. 1985: 153–179.

The author argues that "recent studies overestimate the confidence NATO could have in conventional deterrence. . . . Consistent theories for optimizing conventional deterrence are confounded by contradictory requirements posed by different threats. The only comprehensive doctrine to hedge against all variants is one that retains a nuclear component."

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Conventional strategy: new critics, old choices. International security, v. 7, spring 1983: 140–162.

"One thing reformists agree on is the inadequacy of 'business as usual' approaches to defense. As the first section of this essay will suggest, there is much merit in such criticism, especially when it highlights the strategic quality of standard analyses oriented to calculating the 'balance' of military power. To an unfortunate degree, however, reformist critiques have made an impression by resorting to hyperbole, overlooking dilemmas, and fixating on stark conceptual alternatives that rarely stand up to the practical requirements of fielding a large, variegated force committed to meet multiple contingencies."

Blechman, Barry M.

Is there a conventional defense option? Washington quarterly, v. 5, summer 1982: 59–66.

The author writes that "although, theoretically at least, the conventional defense of Western Europe is feasible, postwar history suggests quite strongly that the increased resources and—more importantly—reforms in national military postures

that would be necessary to mount such a defense would not be sustained. Moreover, no matter how great an improvement in conventional military capabilities were made by NATO, such measures could not satisfy the political objectives of NATO's nuclear deployments."

Callaghan, Thomas A., Jr.

NATO's collection of forces: falling short of a balanced, conventional defense. Journal of defense & diplomacy, v. 5, no. 7, 1987: 15–19.

"The North Atlantic Treaty, for all its virtues, is fatally flawed. It calls forth a collective security mechanism for the defense of Europe but fails to provide a collective defense industrial effort to produce a collective conventional defense. In the early 1950s, alliance leaders tried to surmount this flaw."

Canby, Steven. Dorfer, Ingemar.

More troops fewer missiles. Foreign policy, no. 53, winter 1983–1984: 3–17.

The authors argue for the strengthening of NATO's conventional defenses that would remove the need for GLCMs and Pershing II. "Given Soviet fears of the first-strike capabilities . . . dispensing with the Pershing II deployment would reassure Moscow without undermining the security of the West European countries." Creating conventional parity on the central front would minimize the risks of war.

Carver, Richard Michael Power. Tuzo, Harry.

Conventional defence of Europe. RUSI [Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies], v. 128, June 1983: 7–11.

Advocates a European defense strategy based on strengthened conventional weapons systems. Further, that Britain's nuclear missiles ought to be counted in arms control negotiations.

Chichester, Michael.

NATOs maritime power: its place in a new strategy. Navy international, v. 91, Aug. 1986: 504–506.

"The politico-military threat is now global represented by the long-term Soviet campaign to extend its influence into areas of strategic and economic importance to the Western industrialised nations and to Japan, notably into southern Africa, the south-west Pacific area, and the Caribbean basin. . . . Of necessity Western maritime power predominantly provided by the USA will be the primary means of combating this threat outside the NATO area. Compared with 30 years ago the strategic commitments of the United States Navy have been dramatically extended."

Clark, Susan L.

Who will staff NATO? Orbis, v. 32, fall 1988: 521–539.

"While NATO has made some significant improvements in its conventional forces, most defense analysts are not satisfied with current trends. If projected into the next decade, they yield grim prospects . . . as future levels of defense spending

are unlikely to match the efforts of recent years. . . . In addition, manpower, a major component of conventional capability, is especially worrisome because of future demographic constraints." Looks at the trends in individual countries, at possible solutions and at Soviet bloc demographics.

Coffey, Kenneth J.

Defending Europe against a conventional attack. Air University review, v. 31, Jan.-Feb. 1980: 47-59.

"This article analyzes the significance of the changes that have occurred during the AVF All-Volunteer Force years, particularly regarding the ability of the army to provide massive reinforcements on a continuing basis in the event of a major land war in Europe."

Conventional defense of Europe: new technologies and new strategies. Edited by Andrew J. Pierre. New York, Council on Foreign Relations, c1986. 185 p. (Europe/America; 5) (UA646.C6749 1986)

Partial contents.—Enhancing conventional defense: a question of priorities, by Andrew J. Pierre.—Emerging technologies and their impact on the conventional deterrent, by Richard D. DeLauer.—Conventional defense: Europe's constraints and opportunities, by Francois L. Heisburg.—Defensive entanglement: an alternative strategy for NATO, by Andreas von Bulow.—On improving NATO strategy, by General Sir Hugh Beach.

Conventional forces in Europe. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 43, Dec. 1987: 9-20.

Series of three articles examines ways of dealing with the dilemma of the imbalance in conventional forces in Europe between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, given the coming elimination of intermediate-range nuclear forces from Europe.

Contents.—Dismantle offense, strengthen defense, by Dieter Senghaas.—Unilateral moves for stability, by Les Aspin.—Signs of a Soviet shift, by Leon V. Sigal.

Cooper, Mary H.

Defending Europe. Washington, Congressional Quarterly, 1987. 674-687 p. (Editorial research reports, 1987, v. 2, no. 24)

"Now that the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to remove intermediate-range nuclear missiles from Europe, attention is turning to talks aimed at reducing conventional forces deployed on the continent. The United States and its NATO allies could be at a disadvantage in these talks unless they settle differences over military strategy, defense spending and Europe's role in the alliance."

Cordier, Sherwood S.

The air and sea lanes of the North Atlantic: their security in the 1980's. [Washington] University Press of America [1981] 84 p.

Partial contents.—The air defense of Great Britain.—Challenge on the high seas: the Soviet navy.—Control of the air at sea..—Confronting the Soviet submarine threat.

Cowie, Charles A. Williams, Richard B. M.

NATO's rapid reinforcement plans: the role of civil air resources. NATO review, v. 35, June 1987: 26–29.

Chairman and vice chairman of NATO's Civil Aviation Planning Committee examine "the Rapid Reinforcement Plan (RRP)." This program "has become a cornerstone for NATO planning and a current primary deterrent available to the Alliance. This plan is intended to make the Soviets pause and consider the overall consequences before launching a full-scale attack on NATO territory, and to display the resolution of the Alliance to defend itself and repel any attack."

Cremasco, Maurizio.

NATO's Southern Flank and Italy's role in it. International spectator, v. 23, Apr.–June 1988: 79–89.

Analyzes "the interaction between NATO and the Mediterranean region and of Italy's role inside and outside the Alliance."

De Briganti, Giovanni.

Europe's navies: can they keep NATO ports open? Armed Forces journal international, v. 122, Apr. 1985: 48, 50, 54, 56, 58, 60, 64.

Assesses naval strength for each of the NATO navies.

Diehl, Paul F.

NATO's conventional inferiority. Global affairs, v. 2, fall 1987: 42–56.

"An arms control agreement that severely limits or eliminates medium and short-range nuclear weapons requires commensurate changes in NATO's strategy and military posture. This essay explores one aspect of this change: How will alliance members allocate the burden of redressing NATO's conventional force inferiority?"

Epstein, Joshua M.

Assessing the military balance: defense analysis and the defense debate. Brookings review, v. 3, spring 1985: 16–20.

This essay argues that the Reagan Administration's appraisal of the military balance is not sound. After identifying some aspects in which recent estimates are unsound, it discusses a way to assess defense needs more accurately-this technique is known as dynamic campaign analysis.

European Security Study.

Strengthening conventional deterrence in Europe: proposals for the 1980s. New York, St. Martin's Press [1983] 35 p.

Contents.—The need for stronger conventional capabilities for deterrence and reassurance.—The nature of the Soviet conventional military threat.—The specific requirements for effective NATO conventional defense.—The means for enhancing NATO's conventional defensive capability.—Summary of conclusions.

Garden, Timothy.

Strengthening conventional deterrence: bright idea or dangerous illusion? RUSI [Journal of the Royal United Services Institutes for Defence Services], v. 129, Sept. 1984: 32–37.

"Those who argue for investment in strengthening conventional deterrence wish to see more credible options available for holding a Warsaw Pact attack below the nuclear level." The author illustrates the difficulties associated with other more complex option by discussing one—counter-air-operations: with Tornado GRI with JP233 system, with area denial mines and runway penetrators.

Garrett, James M.

Conventional force deterrence in the presence of theater nuclear weapons. Armed Forces & society, v. 11, fall 1984: 59–83.

"To provide reasonable security acceptable to Western Europe, NATO's conventional deterrent must be credible in both West and East. If Pact leaders are not convinced by NATO's attempts to deter conventional attack, Western Europe faces twin dangers of conquest and nuclear war. If NATO loses courage through lack of faith in its own deterrents, the Pact can dictate terms of settlement in a future crisis or blackmail West Europeans at will. Today there is considerable doubt that NATO conventional forces either deter the Pact convincingly or reassure Western Europe."

Georgetown University. Center for Strategic and International Studies.

NATO: meeting the coming challenge; an alliance action plan for conventional improvements and armaments cooperation. Washington The University, 1987. 333 p.

"This paper is the first in a series of interim reports of a CSIS project designed to provide the framework of a Resources Strategy for the United States and its Allies."

Partial contents.—NATO at a watershed.—The need for a summit.—The nuclear context.—An action plan for conventional improvements.—The Soviet challenge in the 1990s.—NATO's response.—Improving the process.—Improving the forces.

Goldich, Robert L.

NATO conventional force structure and doctrine: possible defensive changes after an INF Treaty. Feb. 26, 1988. Washington, Congressional Research Service, 1988. 39 p. (88–169 F)

This report analyzes certain options for changing NATO's conventional military force structure and doctrine in the wake of the U.S.-Soviet treaty to eliminate intermediate range nuclear missiles signed in December 1987. Only changes which are militarily defensive, as distinguished from those which are primarily offensive or equally relevant to both defensive or offensive military operations, are addressed in this report. Pros and cons are presented for each option.

Grant, Richard L.

NATO MPs urge improvement in conventional force capabilities. NATO review, v. 33, Feb. 1985: 21–26.

Provides a summary of the discussion on NATO strategy, particularly the state of the Alliance's conventional forces which took place during the November 1984 annual session of the North Atlantic Assembly.

Greenwood, David.

Strengthening conventional deterrence: doctrine, new technology and resources. NATO review, v. 32, Aug. 1984: 8–12.

The author claims that although "there is now a clear consensus among NATO nations that a major effort should be made to strengthen conventional deterrence and defence in Europe. . . . There is no real agreement on how best to do this." By analysing the Soviet and Warsaw Pact "way of warfare" he concludes that both the "Rogers Plan" and the Weinberger "initiative" are unsatisfactory and advocates "more efficient use of the Alliance's resources through role specialisation" as the solution.

Hamm, Manfred R. Holmes, Kim R.

A European antitactical ballistic missile system, deterrence, and the conventional defense of NATO. Washington quarterly, v. 10, spring 1987: 61–78.

Hampton, J. P.

Integrated air defense for NATO. United States Naval Institute proceedings, v. 112, Sept. 1986: 114–116.

"The new generation of Soviet airlaunched cruise missiles and the Fencer, Backfire, and Blackjack bombers have greatly increased the Soviet air threat to NATO's southern flank."

Hanning, Norbert.

The defense of Western Europe with conventional weapons. International defense review, v. 4, no. 11, 1981: 1439–1443.

"The author advances the view that a credible deterrent is not necessarily related to the nuclear capability of a military power, but can also be ensured by conventional forces."

Harbison, Ian.

NATO's Atlantic patrol. Defence attache, no. 4, 1986: 24–27.

"Discusses operations of NATO's Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT) as it carried out a range of exercises in the Skaggerak, between Norway and Denmark."

Hine, Patrick, Sir.

Conventional defence: a military view. In RUSI and Brassey's Defence Yearbook, 1987. London, New York, Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1987. p. 95–108.

"While there have been significant improvements to NATO's military capability over the past five years, more are needed, particularly at the conventional level, if our defence posture is to remain adequate against an ever growing potential Soviet threat."

Huntington, Samuel P.

Conventional deterrence and conventional retaliation in Europe. International security, v. 8, winter 1983–84: 32–56.

Huntington discusses the strategic desirability, military feasibility, and political possibility of a NATO strategy of conventional retaliation.

Joffe, Josef.

Stability and its discontent: should NATO go conventional? Washington quarterly, v. 7, fall 1984: 136–147.

"If the Soviets are looking for new solutions, they are evidently more impressed by NATO's forward defense than its Western critics are," argues the author.

Jordan, Robert S.

The maritime strategy and the Atlantic Alliance. RUSI [Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies], v. 132, Sept. 1987: 45–54.

Examines NATO's maritime strategy and sums up its essential ingredients.

Kalb, Richard W.

United States maritime strategy: strengthening NATO's deterrent capability. Atlantic Community quarterly, v. 25, spring 1987: 98–103.

"For the first time since the end of World War II the United States has a coherent, publicly articulated maritime strategy that meets United States military requirements and contributes to Alliance security."

Kaplan, Lawrence S.

The United States and NATO: the formative years. [Lexington] University Press of Kentucky, 1984. 276 p. (JX1393.N67K37 1984)

Contents.—Introduction.—The treaties of Paris and Washington: two entangling alliances.—Isolationism, the United Nations, and the Cold War, 1947–1949.—Toward the Brussels Pact: December 1947–March 1948.—Brussels Pact to Atlantic Alliance: March–December 1948.—Completing the treaty: January–April 1949.—Treaty to organization: April 1949–January 1950.—The impact of the Korean War.—Western Europe in "The American century".

Kaufmann, William W.

Who is conning the Alliance? Brookings review, v. 5, fall 1987: 10–17.

"NATO's prospects for a robust conventional defense are probably not as dim as is generally supposed. . . . That same analyses indicate that, considering the investment the alliance has already made, a vigorous conventional defense is well within NATO's grasp and that the costs are well within its means."

Kelly, Ross S.

NATO's special operations forces. Defense & foreign affairs, v. 13, Feb. 1985: 32–33.

Klare, Michael T.

NATO's improved conventional weapons. Technology review, v. 88, May–June 1985: 34, 36–40, 73.

"A new generation of weapons will deliver clusters of nonnuclear explosives precisely on target. These munitions can help defend front lines, but they could also ignite nuclear war."

Komer, Robert W.

Costs and benefits of a credible conventional component. Armed Forces journal international, v. 121, May 1984: 112, 114, 116.

The author, former U.S. Special Advisor on NATO Affairs discusses the "essential prerequisites" to a stronger NATO conventional option stating that "NATO is in a period of strategic transition from primary reliance on nuclear deterrence toward the more balanced 'flexible response' posture."

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A credible conventional option: can NATO afford it? Strategic review, v. 12, spring 1984: 33–38.

"The prospects for a credible NATO conventional option . . . have brightened against the background of the faltering credibility of nuclear 'deterrence-on-the-cheap,' and with the emergence of promising technology that can be harnessed particularly to 'deep-strike' missions against Warsaw Pact air assets and follow-on forces. The thorny obstacles to such posture improvements are, as usual, the twin issues of costs and burden-sharing. Yet, a survey of the basic requirements and emergent hardware shows the potential costs to be marginal relative to the investments already made by the Alliance. . . . What is called for is an incremental road that begins with a relatively modest first-phase program, with counter-air capabilities as the prime candidate."

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Is conventional defense of Europe feasible? Naval War College review, v. 35, Sept.–Oct. 1982: 80–91.

"This essay will focus primarily on the Center Region, on the grounds that if NATO loses in the center the flanks are almost automatically forfeit, whereas if NATO can hold in the center, flank problems are more likely to be manageable."

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Treating NATO's self-inflicted wound. Santa Monica, Calif., Rand Corp., 1973. 16 p. (AS36.R28, no. 5092; JX1393.N58)

"The trouble with NATO is that its posture doesn't fit its policy. There is nothing wrong with NATO's defense policy of flexible response and a forward strategy, which seem well suited to deterring or if need be blocking any Soviet push westward. What is wrong is that, though the NATO powers profess

a strategy calling for a vigorous conventional response before the horrendous decision to go nuclear must be taken, their collective postures are poorly designed for enforcing much more than a brief conventional pause."

Lambeth, Benjamin S.

Conventional forces for NATO. Santa Monica, Calif., Rand, 1987. 37 p. (RAND/P-7311)

"Despite improvements in its conventional defense posture, NATO faces a persistent cleavage between its military thinking and broader political reality."

Lehman, John F.

Maritime strategy in the defense of NATO: the fourth David M. Abshire endowed lecture, September 25, 1986. Washington, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, c1986. 18 p. (Significant issues series, 0736-7136, v. 8, no. 7) (UA646.3.L357 1986)

Maiorano, Alan.

A fresh look at the Sixth Fleet. United States Naval Institute proceedings, v. 110, Feb. 1984: 52-58.

"If NATO is to control the choke points of Gibraltar and the Turkish Straits, the Sixth Fleet and the Southern Region NATO navies . . . must participate in more multinational operations."

Malone, Daniel K.

A realistic conventional deterrent. National defense, v. 67, July-Aug. 1982: 51-53.

The Director of the Armaments and Standardization Division of the U.S. Mission to NATO contends that "we are approaching a major breakthrough in, particularly, antiarmor weaponry, a breakthrough affecting technology, tactics, and doctrine, and the fundamental equations of politico-military affairs." He suggests that "the new NATO weaponry needed will find its success by destroying the Soviet ability to follow their doctrine, particularly as it affects what are commonly termed 'the second echelon forces.' "

Maurer, John H. McCormick, Gordon H.

Surprise attack and conventional defense in Europe. Orbis, v. 27, spring 1983: 107-126.

"Examines the possible nature and implications of an unanticipated Soviet attack against the Central Front and explores some of the ways NATO might begin to minimize its present high vulnerability to this contingency."

McDonald, Wesley L.

An exclusive AFJ interview with: Admiral Wesley L. McDonald, Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic; Commander-in-Chief, US Atlantic Command; Commander-in-Chief, US Atlantic Fleet. Armed Forces journal international, v. 122, Apr. 1985: 66, 68, 70, 72, 76.

This interview concentrates primarily on U.S. and NATO naval force structure, strength and deployment in the Atlantic Ocean.

McGeoch, Ian.

NATO's maritime flank—the need for an allied command, Western approaches to Europe. RUSI [Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence studies], v. 130, Dec. 1985: 20–26.

"It is the purpose of this paper to show that a major reform of the existing maritime command structure of the NATO Alliance is both necessary and expedient."

Meacham, James.

NATO: a two-step approach to deep strike. World today, v. 40, July 1984: 286–291.

"The Western alliance has within its grasp the beginnings of a revolution in conventional warfare. The improvement in accuracy of weapons that modern technology makes possible is so great that it constitutes an entirely new capability. . . . These systems have come to be known collectively as 'deep-strike' or ET (emerging technologies)."

NATO's armies. NATO's sixteen nations, v. 30, no. 1, 1985: whole issue (140 p.)

Partial contents.—The Canadian air-sea transportable brigade group.—Land defence of isthmus and islands.—The territorial defence of France.—The Norwegian mobilisation system.—Spanish army modernisation.—NATO's southern flank.

Rasiulis, Andrew P.

The conventional leg of NATO's deterrent triad: where do we go from here? Canadian defence quarterly, v. 16, autumn 1986: 17–18, 20–22, 24.

Analyzes the status and adequacy of NATO's conventional force posture in a threefold manner: "first, review the debate on conventional defence; second, examine the results; and third, determine, to the degree possible, what should be realistically expected in the near to mid future in terms of NATO's strategic policy."

Rowny, Edward L.

America's broad approach for effective arms control. Washington, National Forum Foundation, 1987. 8 p. (Policy forum, v. 4, no. 4)

"Ambassador Rowny argues that failure to achieve a conventional arms balance would only 'make the world safe' for aggression or intimidation based on Soviet conventional superiority.'"

Ruiz Palmer, Diego A.

Between the Rhine and the Elbe: France and the conventional defense of Central Europe. Comparative strategy, v. 6, no. 4, 1987: 471–512.

Analyzes the evolution of French military doctrine on the conventional defense of Central Europe from the time of France's withdrawal from NATO's integrated military structure in 1966 to recent joint military exercise in West Germany with the Bundeswehr.

Sabrosky, Alan Ned.

America in NATO: the conventional delusion. Orbis, v. 25, summer 1981: 293–306.

Surveys the balance of power in Europe. Suggests that a conventional defense of NATO Europe is improbable at best. Recommends that the U.S. concentrate on regaining escalatory dominance over the U.S.S.R, both in strategic-nuclear and theater balances.

Shilling, David M.

Europe's conventional defence: solid progress but challenges remain. Survival, v. 30, Mar.–Apr. 1988: 122–133.

"Recent months have seen a rising crescendo of criticisms of America's NATO Allies for inadequate defence spending. . . . The thesis of this article is that both perspectives underlying the resurgence of criticism of Allied defence spending are wrong. Most European governments have made good progress in the 1980s in improving their defence capabilities. In addition, the initial conventional force balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact is considerably better than most commentators suggest."

Sloan, Stanley R.

The NATO focus on conventional defense. National defense, v 70, Jan. 1986: 18–21.

"NATO decisions in the last two years have . . . strongly focused alliance activities on conventional defense improvements, and on the need to develop a rational plan to match military requirements with available resources."

Strachan, Hew.

Conventional defence in Europe. International affairs, v. 61, winter 1984–1985: 27–43.

"The focus of this article is on the two main sets of tactical and operational reforms that have been proposed. The first of these is defence in depth, which lays emphasis on a strategy of denial rather than on one of nuclear retaliation. . . . The other main operational solution that has been suggested for NATO's conventional defence has been the counter-attack and, particularly, the possible interdiction of Warsaw Pact second-echelon forces and of vital Soviet communications. This alternative is far more congenial to traditional military thought, but politically is not as satisfactory as the first."

Strengthening conventional deterrence in Europe: a program for the 1980s.

Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, c1985. 150 p. (UA646.E94 1985)

"European Security Study report of the special panel; ESECII."

Contents.—ESECS concepts for improving NATO deterrence and defense.—Surveillance and target acquisition.—Defeating the initial Warsaw Pact attacks.—Countering the Warsaw Pact air offensive.—Defeating the Warsaw Pact follow-on ground forces threat.—Disrupting Warsaw Pact command/control processes.—Ensuring secure, reliable and effective command/control.—Costs and schedules.—Stability, reassurance and arms control.

Tegnelia, James A. Thibault, George.

Emerging technology for conventional deterrence. International defense review, v. 18, no. 5, 1985: 643–645, 650–652.

"Strengthening NATO's conventional capabilities has been a continuing Reagan administration priority. Presented as a way to prevent the nuclear escalation of a military conflict, it relies on the development of so-called 'emergency technologies' to produce conventional weapon systems which will provide a deterrent to a non-nuclear Soviet attack."

Tucker, Michael.

Conventional weapons & wisdoms: a NATO dilemma for Canada. International perspective, Jan.–Feb. 1984: 3–6.

Turner, Stansfield.

Preparing for the unexpected: the need for a new military strategy. Foreign affairs, v. 61, fall 1982: 124–135.

"Small aircraft carriers are more appropriate, then, for both the sea control and the intervention missions. Yet carriers and amphibious forces cannot, as has been pointed out, meet all of the intervention requirements by themselves. Thus, a major element in the new strategy should be to retrain and re-equip the Army and Air Force with the flexibility for worldwide intervention in mind, rather than just the static defense of Europe and Korea."

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Subcommittee on Conventional Forces and Alliance Defense.

Alliance and defense capabilities in Europe. Hearings, 100th Congress, 1st session. Washington, G.P.O., 1988. 388 p.

U.S. Congressional Budget Office.

Army ground combat modernization for the 1980s: potential costs and effects for NATO. Washington, For sale by the Supt. of Docs., G.P.O. [1982] 74 p.

Analyzes the effects modernizing NATO army ground combat capabilities would have on the balance of power in Europe, and considers the money needed to achieve these effects. Also examines the growth in U.S. Army operative costs that would attend modernization.

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U.S. ground forces: design and cost alternatives for NATO and non-NATO contingencies. Washington, 1980. 87 p.

"Assesses the current capacity of U.S. ground forces to meet the so-called '1 and 1/2 war requirement.' This assessment in-

cludes an analysis of the current capabilities of NATO, using ratios of Warsaw Pact to NATO forces, and alternative approaches to improve those capabilities. The analysis also considers the current capabilities and ways to improve the Administration's proposed Rapid Deployment Force."

U.S. Dept. of Defense.

Rationalization/standardization within NATO. [Washington] 1981. 166 p.

Contents.—Introduction and overview.—NATO long-term defense program.—Post-Afghanistan NATO defense measures (phases 1 & 2).—Achieving alliance standardization and interoperability.—Weapon systems standardization programs.—Training.—Military doctrine, exercises, force structure and intelligence.

Vuono, Carl.

Providing modern conventional forces to NATO. NATO's sixteen nations, v. 33, Oct. 1988: 81–85, 87.

Chief of State of the U.S. Army focuses on capabilities "to provide modern, ready ground forces, trained for joint and combined operations as required by national and Alliance security objectives."

Walker, Wallace Earl. Krepinevich, Andrew F.

No first use and conventional deterrence: the politics of defense policymaking. In The Presidency and national security policy. New York, Center for the Study of the Presidency [c1984] (Proceedings, v. 5, no. 1, 1984) p. 355–377, 453–455.

"Focuses on the American domestic political environment and its role in the defense policy process. That environment imposes substantial constraints on any administration's freedom of action in defense policymaking. . . . In order to understand the prospects for an enhanced conventional deterrent in NATO, we must first examine America's perception of the Alliance and the implications involved in adopting such a policy."

Wettern, Desmond.

Allies on the sea: the 'other' navies of NATO. Sea power, v. 30, Apr. 1987: 33, 35, 37, 39, 43, 45, 47–49.

Country-by-country analysis of NATO's navies.

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Sharing the burden: the European Members' naval contribution to NATO. Sea power, v. 26, Nov. 1983: 20–21, 23–24, 26–28, 31.

Surveys the navies of the Western European Members of NATO, and discusses how those navies contribute to the defense of the Alliance.

Wickham, John A., Jr.

Reinforcing and strengthening the conventional defense. NATO's sixteen nations, v. 28, no. 1, 1983: 92–95, 97–98.

Wood, Robert S. Hanley, John T., Jr. ,

The maritime role in the North Atlantic. Naval War College review, v. 38, Nov.-Dec. 1985: 5-18.

"Sea control is required for power projection, and projection of power by maritime forces plays a major role in the defense of the alliance. Given Soviet priorities and Nato capabilities, sea control can be established more rapidly by going after the Soviet fleet rather than awaiting their attack."

V. NATO-WARSAW PACT BALANCE

Ashdown, Paddy.

The conventional balance of power in Europe: a different view. Contemporary review, v. 245, Nov. 1984: 231–237.

Critically examines "the widespread opinion that the Soviet Union has overwhelming conventional military strength, and therefore that we have no alternative to a 'First-Use' of nuclear weapons strategy in Europe. It is clear that a majority of people in Britain believe, not only that the Soviet Union has stronger nuclear forces than the West (an incorrect view), but also that they have stronger conventional forces."

Almquist, Peter.

Moscow's conventional wisdom: Soviet views of the European balance. Arms control today, v. 17, Dec. 1987: 16–21.

"The Soviets face an adversary which, in general, is technically more advanced, which spends more on military manpower and equipment, and which would have the natural advantages of the defender."

Atkeson, Edward B.

The "fault line" in the Warsaw Pact: implications for NATO strategy. Orbis, v. 30, spring 1986: 111–131.

"This article proposes to identify the centrifugal forces likely to have an impact on the policies of the non-Soviet members of the Warsaw Pact (NSWP) in time of crisis or war in Europe and to assess their implications for NATO's operational strategy and security."

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The new pact doctrine: implications for NATO. Army, v. 38, Nov. 1988: 11–14.

"On 29 May, 1987, the Political Consultative Committee (PCC) of the Warsaw Pact ratified a paper entitled 'On the Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty Member Countries,'" an extension of Soviet doctrine of reasonable sufficiency.

Biddle, Stephen D.

The European conventional balance: a reinterpretation of the debate. Survival, v. 30, Mar.-Apr. 1988: 99–121.

"The NATO conventional balance debate is crucial but confused. . . . Estimates of the balance range from optimism to deep gloom, but competing analyses too often argue past one another. . . . The purpose of this article is to examine the debate, to explain some of the underlying differences that drive such a diversity of views, and, most important, to offer

some policy implications that stem from a reinterpretation of the conventional balance problem."

Bingham, Price T.

Air power and the defeat of a Warsaw Pact offensive: taking a different approach to air interdiction in NATO. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air University Press, 1987. 41 p. (Report no. AU-ARI-CP-87-2/Cadre paper)

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NATO needs a new air interdiction approach. Armed Forces journal international, v. 124, Oct. 1986: 98, 100, 102, 104–105, 108, 110, 112.

Examines NATO's use of air power to counter a potential Warsaw Pact offensive.

Borawski, John.

Toward conventional stability in Europe? Washington quarterly, v. 10, autumn 1987: 13–29.

"U.S. and Soviet impending agreement on theater nuclear forces have liberated anxieties over the effect . . . on NATO's flexible response strategy, with its explicit threat to use nuclear weapons first in response to Warsaw Pact conventional aggression. . . . Despite the profound uncertainties surrounding the prospects for conventional arms control in Europe, an opportunity has emerged for a fresh examination of this neglected dimension of European security."

Burgeoning Warsaw Pact threat spurs dual challenge. Aviation week & space technology, v. 116, June 7, 1982: 40–44, 48, 53.

"Sustaining a high level of combat readiness with training at wartime flight tempos while undergoing an aircraft modernization program is the two-pronged challenge facing the U.S. Air Force in Europe (USAFE)."

Can America catch up? The U.S.-Soviet military balance. Washington, Committee on the Present Danger, [1984] 61, A–7 p.

Partial contents.—The view from the Kremlin.—The elements of deterrence.—The military balance.—Strategic offensive forces.—Strategic defensive forces. —U.S. strategic forces.—Theater nuclear forces.—U.S. theater nuclear forces.—General purpose forces.—Naval forces.—The NATO-Warsaw Pact general purpose force balance.—Chemical and biological warfare.—Prudent resource allocation.

Canby, Steven.

NATO military policy: obtaining conventional comparability with the Warsaw Pact: a report prepared for Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. Santa Monica, Calif., Rand, 1973. 94 p. (AS36.R, R-1088/UA646.3)

Chalmers, Malcolm. Unterseher, Lutz.

Is there a tank gap? Comparing NATO and Warsaw Pact tank fleets. International security, v. 13, summer 1988: 5–49.

"There is still widespread publicity given in the West to the claim that the Soviet Union and its allies have conventional forces that are substantially more powerful than those of NATO." The article looks at one single weapon category—the tank, "because of the tank's role as perhaps the most important symbol of Soviet politico-military power in Europe."

Collins, John M.

U.S./Soviet military balance: statistical trends, 1980–1987 (as of January1, 1988), by John M. Collins and Bernard C. Victory. Revised Apr. 15, 1988. Washington, Congressional Research Service, 1988. 187 p. (88–425 S)

This unclassified document is a quantitative comparison of U.S. and Soviet armed forces from 1980 through 1987. Statistical comparisons for 1970–1979 are contained in CRS Report no. 87–839 S, September 18, 1987. This summary supersedes all earlier CRS reports covering the years 1980–1987.

Revision of Report no. 87–745 S.

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U.S./Soviet military balance: statistical trends, 1970–1979 (end of year figures), by John M. Collins and Bernard C. Victory. Revised Sept. 18, 1987. Washington, Congressional Research Service, 1987. 143 p. (87–839 S)

This unclassified document is a quantitative comparison of U.S. and Soviet armed forces from 1970 through 1979. This summary supersedes all earlier CRS statistics for the 1970–1979 period.

Conventional balance in Europe: problems, strategies, and technologies: report on a workshop, Zoetermeer, The Netherlands, May 11–13, 1984. The Hague, The Netherlands, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 1984. 92 p. (UA646.C6747 1984)

Conventional forces in Europe: the facts. [Brussels], NATO, 1988. 33 p.

Presents information on ground forces and aircraft, but not naval forces.

Cordesman, Anthony H.

Fatal flaws in presenting the NATO/Warsaw Pact balance. Armed Forces journal international, v. 125, July 1988: 60, 62, 64, 66, 68.

Discusses the major differences in five recent unclassified counts of the NATO/Warsaw Pact military balance. Argues that "current unclassified estimates of the NATO and Warsaw Pact balance are inadequate for planning either force modernization or conventional force reductions aimed at reducing the major asymmetries between NATO and the Warsaw Pact."

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NATO's estimate of the balance: the meaning for US security policy. Armed Forces journal international, v. 119, Aug. 1982: 43, 50–58, 68.

Examines political and analytical problems in NATO's recent reassessment of the military balance, NATO and the Warsaw Pact: force comparisons. Suggests that while NATO and U.S. advocates of a strong defense often feel that the growth of Soviet bloc forces must be turned into a crisis to justify high defense budgets, "virtually all indicators seem to be that the constant harping on the Soviet nuclear threat, and the problems in NATO, is shifting public opinion heavily toward support of arms-control measures that are militarily dangerous and favor Soviet goals and objectives."

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Whence the Threat to Peace: the Soviet view of the threat. Armed Forces journal international, v. 120, Apr. 1983: 91–93, 95, 97.

"The Soviet Union has recently issued the second edition of its view of the balance of power. Called Whence the Threat to Peace, it also presents a detailed attack on the first editions of the US' Soviet Military Power and NATO's NATO and Warsaw Pact Force Comparisons. It is propaganda—but it provides an important perspective on the ways in which the USSR systematically attacks NATO's effort to rebuild Western defenses, undermines Western unity, and exploits every weakness in the West's case for arms control."

Dean, Jonathan.

Military security in Europe. Foreign affairs, v. 66, fall 1987: 22–40.

"In the longer run, the military confrontation in Europe seems as likely to shrink through independent actions on both sides. . . . NATO should develop a plan for exploiting fully the potential entailed in current Soviet proposals for lowering, in an orderly and verifiable way, the level of the NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation in Europe," argues the author.

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Watershed in Europe: dismantling the East-West military confrontation. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, c1987 i.e. 1986. 286 p.

Contents.—The end of the Western defense consensus.—The East-West military confrontation: war in Europe.—Shifting the emphasis to conventional deterrence: a critical evaluation.—Beyond the watershed in Europe.—Arms control in Europe: a disordered puzzle.—INF: the crisis of extended deterrence.—The MBFR marathon.—The conference on disarmament in Europe: a lasting institution.—The limited promise of arms control in Europe.—Political change and East-West solutions.—The inner-German relationship: can it change the political map of Europe?—Dismantling the NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation.

Eggleston, Roland.

Why NATO wants compulsory notification of maneuvers. [New York] Radio Liberty Research, 1985. 3 p.

"RL 77/85, Mar. 6, 1985"

"NATO . . . has introduced detailed proposals at the Stockholm Security Conference for compulsory advance notification of military exercises in Europe."

Epstein, Joshua M.

On conventional deterrence in Europe: questions of Soviet confidence. Orbis, v. 26, spring 1982: 71–86.

Discusses the trend toward convergence of doctrine and capability in Soviet conventional force modernization. Examines problems of military effectiveness which may result from Soviet military training methods and decision making patterns. Considers the incentives these operational limitations may create for the Soviets and the implications they may have for NATO countries.

The European conventional balance; policy focus. International security, v. 12, spring 1988: 152–202.

Contents.—Dynamic analysis and the contentional balance in Europe, by Joshua M. Epstein.—Measuring the conventional balance in Europe, by Kim R. Holmes.—Numbers, strategy, and the European balance, by John J. Mearsheimer.—Is NATO decisively outnumbered? by Barry R. Posen.

Fighting armies: NATO and the Warsaw Pact, a combat assessment. Edited by Richard A. Gabriel. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, c1983. 250 p. (UA646.N37 1983)

Analyzes "the combat ability of thirty-two ground armies relative to the type of war—combat scenarios—each army is most likely to encounter."

Farringdon, Hugh.

Confrontation: the strategic geography of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. London, New York, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986. 354 p. (UA646.F37 1986)

Flor, Roland.

Major exercises of NATO and Warsaw Pact land forces in Europe, 1984—a comparative analysis. Defense analysis, v. 2, Sept. 1986: 191–204.

"The findings presented here may certainly be known better by the military and government establishments concerned, but to the general public they may equally be illuminating. It is also based on—certainly incomplete—open literature only, with consequent information gaps."

Gormley, Dennis M.

A new dimension to Soviet theater strategy. Orbis, v. 29, fall 1985: 537–569.

"The Soviet Union has already deployed its first highly accurate dual-capable missiles in Eastern Europe. . . . These new short-range missiles (SS–21, SS–22, and SS–23) presage an emerging set of Soviet attack options that promise, by the start of the next decade, to turn currently debatable shortcomings in NATO's defenses into clearly dangerous deficiencies."

"Triple zero" and Soviet military strategy. Arms control today, v. 18, Jan.-Feb. 1988: 17-20.

"Eliminating battlefield missiles would at once rectify important conventional imbalances favoring the Warsaw Pact and reduce the fear of surprise attack. . . ."

Hamilton, Andrew.

Redressing the conventional balance: NATO's reserve military manpower. International security, v. 10, summer 1985: 111-116.

"Two arguments are advanced in this article. First, the NATO-Warsaw Pact conventional balance in Central Europe today is shaky but not beyond repair. . . . Second, NATO conventional capabilities can be strengthened dramatically by equipping and reorganizing available trained European military manpower to form new operational combat units."

Hansen, James H.

Countering NATO's new weapons: Soviet concepts for war in Europe. International defense review, v. 17, no. 11, 1984: 1617-1624.

"This article will survey the Soviet design for combat in the mid-1980s from the viewpoint of the Soviet military planner. Considering the major US/NATO weapons and forces which would be obstacles to a Soviet/Warsaw Pact victory, it will examine Soviet plans to neutralize or counter them."

Holmes, Kim R.

The conventional arms balance; part 1: the threatening Soviet lead. Washington, Heritage Foundation, 1986. 18 p. (Backgrounder no. 489)

"The U.S.-Soviet balance of conventional forces favors Moscow by a wide margin. The increasing technological sophistication of Soviet weaponry has added an extra punch to the already tremendous numerical lead Moscow holds in most categories of conventional arms. . . . The conventional imbalance is most dangerous for the U.S. in ground forces and air defense."

Contents.—The balance of land power.—The balance of sea power.—Tactical air forces.

Holst, Johan Jorgen.

A Western perspective on the East-West arms control agenda. NATO review, v. 30, June 1982: 23-28.

The Director of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs surveys prospects and guidelines for arms control negotiations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact regarding strategic nuclear weapons, intermediate range nuclear forces in Europe, and conventional forces in Europe.

Kaldor, Mary.

Beyond the blocs: defending Europe the political way. World policy journal, v. 1, fall 1983: 1-21.

Nuclear deterrence, now in existence, is a strategic expression of the bloc system—rivalry between the two superpowers institutionalized in NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The author argues for an alternative defense policy for Europe, based upon a non-bloc-minded defense policy, or concept of international relationship not defined in military terms.

Kelly, Andrew.

Not by numbers alone: a critique of the traditional approach to assessing the military balance. Bradford, School of Peace studies, University of Bradford; London, Housmans Publishers and Booksellers, 1984. 80 p. (Peace studies papers, no. 11)

Lussier, Frances M.

U.S. ground forces and the conventional balance in Europe. Washington, Congressional Budget Office, for sale by the Supt. of Docs., G.P.O., 1988. 125 p.

Contents.—Introduction.—Assessing the balance of NATO and Warsaw Pact ground forces.—Alternatives for improving NATO's conventional ground forces.

Mako, William P.

U.S. ground forces and the defense of Central Europe. Washington, Brookings Institution, c1983. 137 p. (UA646.3.M243 1983)

"Reviews the history of NATO conventional force preparations and discusses the assessments that various observers have made of NATO's capacity to resist an assault by the Eastern bloc. . . . Discusses the assumptions and force-balance calculations on which such assessments rest."

Martin, Richard C.

Warsaw Pact force modernization: a closer look. Parameters, v. 15, summer 1985: 3–11.

"The impact of lagging modernization is that the national armies rapidly are becoming less capable than their Soviet counterparts and less able to execute Soviet combined arms offensive doctrine." The article looks at the Polish, East German and Czechoslovak armies.

Mearsheimer, John J.

Why the Soviets can't win quickly in Central Europe. International security, v. 7, summer 1982: 3–39.

"The aim of this article is to examine closely the Soviets' prospects for effecting a blitzkrieg against NATO. In analyzing the matter, two closely related issues must be addressed. First, one must determine whether the Soviets have the force structure, the doctrine, and the raw ability to implement this strategy. . . . Secondly, when NATO's defense capabilities and the theater's terrain are considered, what then are the prospects for Soviet success?"

Myer, Allan A.

The balance in Central Europe: reflections through the Soviet prism. Naval War College review, v. 33, Nov.–Dec. 1980: 15–43.

"This paper, presented at the 1980 meeting of the International Studies Association, discusses the Soviet view of the balance in central Europe and offers some recommendations to NATO."

NATO and the Warsaw Pact: a combat assessment. Edited by Richard A. Gabriel. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1983. 252 p. (UA646.N37 1983)

NATO and the Warsaw Pact: force comparisons. Brussels, NATO Information Service, 1984. 51 p.

Contents.—Introduction.—Conventional forces.—Regional considerations.—Nuclear deterrence and the nuclear equation.—NATO and Warsaw Pact defence/military expenditure.—Military production and technology capabilities.

NATO and Warsaw Pact forces: conventional war in Europe. Defense monitor, v. 17, no. 3, 1988: 1-8.

"War in Europe is increasingly unlikely as political cooperation and mutual economic interests reduce tensions and military confrontation."

NATO-Warsaw Pact force mobilization. Edited by Jeffrey Simon. Washington, National Defense University Press, for sale by the Supt. of Docs., G.P.O., 1988. 563 p. (UA915.E85N37 1988)

"This book draws upon essays prepared for a NATO-Warsaw Pact conference, sponsored by the Mobilization Concepts Development Center of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, held at the National Defense University. In these essays, US and European specialists discuss developments and vulnerabilities in the two blocs. They address four issues: (1) mobilization and reinforcement, (2) developments in front-line states, (3) communications and transportation problems, and (4) difficulties on the flanks."

North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

NATO and the Warsaw Pact: force comparisons. [Brussels, NATO], 1984. 51 p.

Proceedings of a symposium on unity and conflict in the Warsaw Pact. Stockholm, November 18–19, 1982. Edited by Ingmar Oldberg. Stockholm, Swedish National Defence Research Institute, 1984. 158 p. (FOA symposium) (UA646.8.P76 1984)

Rogers, Bernard W.

Sword and shield: ace attack of Warsaw Pact follow-on forces. NATO's sixteen nations, v. 28, Feb.–Mar. 1983: 16, 18, 20, 23, 26.

"General Bernard Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, presents his ideas of how, by exploiting the West's technological lead, the Allies can best meet the threat of the numerically superior Warsaw Pact forces and so improve deterrence."

Rosenau, William.

NATO vs Warsaw Pact: is massive rearmament necessary? New York, Council on Economic Priorities, 1984. 4 p. (CEP publication N84-2)

"The administration claims that NATO's conventional forces are incapable of stopping a Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe. Only the threat of 'first use' of superior nuclear forces, it argues, will deter a conventional attack against our European allies. How true is this claim?"

Rosenblum, Simon.

Reforming the pacts. International perspectives, v. 17, May-June 1988: 13-16.

Objects to NATO because of its nuclear strategy—especially the refusal of NATO to adopt a "no first use" policy. Also expresses concern over NATO's "Follow-on Force Attack" conventional strategy. Argues that NATO and the Warsaw Pact should restructure their conventional forces to use only "nonprovocative defense weapons." Believes this could lead to negotiations that would reduce conventional forces in Europe until only small, short range conventional forces would remain.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on European Affairs.

Crisis of will in the Warsaw Pact. Hearing, 99th Congress, 1st session on U.S. policy toward East Europe, West Europe and the Soviet Union. Part 4 of 5. Sept. 19, 1985. Washington, G.P.O., 1986. 111 p. (Hearing, Senate, 99th Congress, 1st session, S. Hrg. 99-400, pt. 4)

U.S. General Accounting Office.

NATO-Warsaw Pact: assessment of the conventional force balance; report to the Chairmen, Committees on Armed Services, U.S. Senate and House of Representatives. Dec. 13, 1988. Washington, G.A.O., 1988. 27 p.

"GAO/NSIAD-89-23, B-230546"

"The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 established the Conventional Study Group and charged it to provide a report to the Congress on the balance of conventional forces between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact. . . . The Study Group, which was composed of representatives of the Library of Congress, the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), and the Congressional Budget Office, convened two separate panels of experts to discuss the force balance issue: one from the U.S. perspective and the other from the Soviet perspective. This report summarizes the views presented during both the U.S. and Soviet perspectives workshops."

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NATO-Warsaw Pact: U.S. and Soviet perspectives of the conventional force balance; supplement A to a report to the Chairmen, Committees on Armed Services, U.S. Senate and House of Representatives. Dec. 13, 1988. Washington, G.A.O., 1988. 68 p.

"GAO/NSIAD-89-23A, B230546"

"The supplement provides a more detailed description of the topics covered during the U.S. and Soviet perspectives workshops."

Wall, Patrick.

A net naval assessment. Sea power, v. 27, Oct. 1984: 6–8, 10–12.

The author, a Tory Member of Parliament, president of the North Atlantic Assembly, and former chairman of the Assembly's Defence Committee provides "what might be described as a 'line item' analysis of some of the factors that must be considered in developing a net assessment of the current naval/military balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact."

The Warsaw Pact and the Balkans: Moscow's southern flank. Edited by Jonathan Eyal. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1989. (UA646.8.W366 1989)

The Warsaw Pact: political purpose & military means. Edited by Robert W. Clawson and Lawrence S. Kaplan. Wilmington, Del., Scholarly Resources, 1982. 297 p. (UA646.8.W367 1982)

Contents.—The principal political relationship.—NATO and the Warsaw Pact.—The forces.—The weapons.—Doctrine and capabilities.

Wettern, Desmond.

The problem of military balance of power. Aussenpolitik, v. 33, no. 4, 1982: 348–355.

"The solution of complicated arms control problems becomes easier once military balance is no longer defined as equality of armament potentials but as equality of military options."

Yazov, Dmitry.

On the military balance of forces and nuclear-missile parity. Moscow, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1988. 16 p.

Former Soviet Deputy Minister of details the Soviet position on the military and nuclear balance in Europe.

VI. CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

Arms control in Europe: problems and prospects. Edited by Karl E. Birnbaum. Laxenburg, Austrian Institute for International Affairs, 1980. 122 p. (Laxenburg papers, LPI, 1980) (JX1974.A7692 1980)

Contents.—The balance of forces in Europe, by J. Alford.—NATO and WTO long range theatre nuclear forces, by M. Leitenberg.—Bridging the gaps: problems and possibilities for agreement in the Vienna negotiations on force reductions in Central Europe, by P. Hopmann.—Confidence building as an approach to cooperative arms regulations in Europe, by K. Birnbaum and F. Ceska.—The European neutrals and arms control, by H. Neuhold.

Blackwill, Robert D.

Conceptual problems of conventional arms control. International security, v. 12, spring 1988: 28–47.

"A new phase of conventional arms control efforts in Europe is underway. The twenty-three members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact are preparing in Vienna a mandate for new talks to begin this year on conventional force reductions and limitations in all of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. Conceptual complexities bedeviled MBFR and will hinder even more future arms control attempts dealing with the larger area. These conceptual problems can be divided into five categories."

Blacker, Coit D.

Negotiating security: the MBFR experience. Arms control, v. 7, Dec. 1986: 215–240.

"The analysis is divided into three parts. The first part examines the origins of the MBFR initiative and the essential history leading to the convocation of the negotiations. The second part explores the objectives of the two sides, including an analysis of the major NATO and Warsaw Pact proposals from 1973 to 1986. The third part investigates in detail why—despite the achievement of substantial consensus on most of the major issues that once divided them—the two alliances have been unable to reach even a preliminary agreement to reduce their forces in Europe."

Borawski, John.

Farewell to MBFR? Arms control today, v. 17, May 1987: 17–19.

The 13-year-old Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations in Vienna are likely to expire. Both NATO and the Warsaw Pact have proposed a new forum dealing not only with manpower ceilings, but also with main

combat weaponry. The article deals with various procedural and substantive obstacles confronting the new negotiations.

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Toward conventional stability in Europe? Washington quarterly, v. 10, autumn 1987: 13–29.

"U.S. and Soviet impending agreement on theater nuclear forces have liberated anxieties over the effect . . . on NATO's flexible response strategy, with its explicit threat to use nuclear weapons first in response to Warsaw Pact conventional aggression. . . . Despite the profound uncertainties surrounding the prospects for conventional arms control in Europe, an opportunity has emerged for a fresh examination of this neglected dimension of European security."

Bowman, William R.

Limiting conventional forces in Europe: an alternative to the mutual and balanced force reduction negotiations. Washington, National Defense University Press, for sale by the Supt. of Docs., G.P.O., 1985. 84 p. (National security affairs monograph)

Contents.—Negotiations on mutual and balanced force reduction.—NATO's problem: fighting a conventional war.—Will mutual and balanced force reductions solve NATO's problem?—An alternative to MBFR.

Brayton, Albert.

MBFR and conventional forces reductions in Europe. World today, v. 40, Dec. 1984: 497–507.

Chiappori, Boris Biancheri.

Conventional forces—time to redress the balance through negotiations. NATO review, v. 35, Dec. 1987: 16–19.

"Talks on conventional stability are currently underway in Vienna to establish a mandate for future negotiations between the sixteen NATO nations and the seven members of the Warsaw Pact, which would lead to the establishment of a verifiable, comprehensive and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels from the Atlantic to the Urals. Against this background, the author examines the long history of disparity between the conventional forces of the two sides and argues that redressing this disparity through negotiations should remain a key priority of NATO's arms control policy."

Conventional stability talks. Survival, v. 30, Sept.-Oct. 1988: 429–463.

Contents.—Specific approaches to conventional arms control in Europe, by Robert D. Blackwill.—Arms control and stability in Europe, by Stephen J. Flanagan and Andrew Hamilton.

Darilek, Richard E.

The future of conventional arms control in Europe; a tale of two cities: Stockholm, Vienna. Survival, v. 29, Jan.-Feb. 1987: 5–20.

Evaluates the outcome of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM) in terms of its

contribution to operational arms control. The article also assesses likely options for the future of conventional arms control in Europe (MBFR).

Dean, Jonathan.

Will negotiated force reductions build down the NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation? Washington quarterly, v. 11, spring 1988: 69–84.

"As the new NATO-Warsaw Pact, Atlantic-to-the-Urals force negotiations begin this spring . . . the big open question will be the Soviet position. Will the Soviet Union be prepared in these talks on conventional forces to make the same kind of numerous, far-reaching concessions. . . . Or will it take the unyielding position which for 14 years has made the MBFR negotiations in Vienna a classic example of unproductive, trench-warfare arms control? Prediction of an outcome for these negotiations is very difficult."

Engle, Kenneth W.

European arms control negotiations: prospects for a "window" in the 1980s. Air University review, v. 32, Sept.–Oct. 1981: 31–39.

Epstein, Joshua M.

On conventional deterrence in Europe: questions of Soviet confidence. Orbis, v. 26, spring 1982: 71–86.

Discusses the trend toward convergence of doctrine and capability in Soviet conventional force modernization. Examines problems of military effectiveness which may result from Soviet military training methods and decision making patterns. Considers the incentives these operational limitations may create for the Soviets and the implications they may have for NATO countries.

The Future of conventional arms control in Europe. Harry C. Blaney, III,

editor. Washington, Foreign Service Institute, 1988. 71 p. (U.S. Dept. of state. Publication 9675)

Partial contents.—Current state of conventional arms control negotiations, by Lynn Hansen.—Nuclear-conventional trade-offs, by Simon Lunn.—A European perspective, by Josef Holik.—New concepts and approaches, by Jonathan Dean.—A congressional perspective, by Timothy E. Wirth.—Toward a Western Alliance approach to conventional arms stability and deterrence, by Leon V. Sigal.

Hamm, Manfred R.

Deterrence, chemical warfare, and arms control. Orbis, v. 29, spring 1985: 119–163.

Focuses on the tactical and strategic implications of the chemical warfare imbalance between the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries.

Jung, Ernst F.

Conventional arms control in Europe in light of the MBFR experience. Aussenpolitik, v. 39, no. 2, 1988: 150–168.

The author, "Head of the Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany at the MBFR negotiations in Vienna, outlines the practical applications of the experience in this one and only forum on a bloc-to-bloc basis for the future dialogue in this field. . . . The aim in Vienna was to fix ceilings for armed forces, whereas at the same time weapon systems were continually increased. . . . A new conference, therefore, requires a negotiating framework with new concepts elaborated in light of previous MBFR experience."

Kaiser, Karl.

Conventional arms control: the future agenda. World today, v. 44, Feb. 1988: 22–27.

"After the successful conclusion of the INF the focus of attention has shifted to the field of conventional arms control. This is an area in which negotiations have so far failed to produce any result. . . . Many elements will come into play as East and West attempt to improve conventional stability in Europe."

Kamp, Karl-Heinz.

Perspectives of conventional arms control in Europe. Aussenpolitik, v. 38, no. 4, 1987: 331–343.

"Should intermediate range missiles be eliminated, Western Europe would be greatly disadvantaged against the Warsaw Pact regarding the ratio of conventional forces. This is why Germany in particular has urged disarmament negotiations in this sector as well. . . . As the weaker party NATO cannot accept linear and equal reductions because this would in no way change the power ratio. . . . The Warsaw Pact would have to be prepared to reduce its own offensive and invasion capabilities if a new stability is to be brought about in Europe."

Keliher, John G.

The negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions: the search for arms control in Central Europe. New York, Pergamon Press, 1980. 204 p. (National Defense University. PPS Pergamon policy studies)

Partial contents.—Arms control and the German problem: 1945–1968.—The road to MBFR: 1968–1973.—Preparatory consultations: January–June 1973.—The initial proposals and the forces in question.—Analysis of the reduction proposals.—The role of nuclear weapons in MBFR.

Killebrew, Robert B.

Conventional defense and total deterrence: assessing NATO's strategic options. Wilmington, Del., Scholarly Resources, 1986. 159 p. (UA646.3.K476 1986)

Legvold, Robert.

Gorbachev's new approach to conventional arms control. Harriman Institute forum, v. 1, Jan. 1988: 1–8.

Gorbachev has introduced a new theme of "reasonable sufficiency" as a guideline to military spending. "Almost certainly neither he nor his advisers have more than the most inchoate notion of how the Soviet Union would go about translating its current military posture into a demonstrably defensive one."

Linam, James.

Setting limits on conventional arms: a new strategy for U.S. negotiators. Washington, Heritage Foundation, 1986. 15 p. (Backgrounder no. 548)

"There is no military-security benefit from continuing to pursue the MBFR negotiations in their current form. . . . The Soviet advantage in virtually every aspect of the conventional balance has deprived NATO of negotiating leverage. . . . It is therefore time the U.S. exerted its leadership within the North Atlantic alliance to change the parameters for negotiating conventional force reductions."

Longstreth, Thomas K.

The future of conventional arms control in Europe. F.A.S. public interest report, v. 41, Feb. 1988: whole issue (1–16 p.)

The signing of the INF Treaty has led observers to shift their attention to "an intensive examination of new approaches to conventional arms control that might produce an agreement reducing confrontation and increase stability in Europe."

Mendelsohn, Jack. Halverson, Thomas.

The conventional balance: a TKO for NATO? Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 45, Mar. 1989: 30–34, 36–40.

"While NATO constantly stresses the Warsaw Pact's numerical superiority, particularly around budget time, its military leaders actually believe they could do a reasonable job defending against a Warsaw Pact attack."

Rasiulis, Andrew P.

Conventional arms control: stabilizing the balance in Europe. Canadian defence quarterly, v. 17, winter 1988: 39, 42–43, 46.

Contends that "with the INF arms control agreement now having eliminated an entire class of ground-based theatre nuclear systems (missiles with a range of 500 to 5,000 kms), the need to develop an enhanced Alliance-conventional posture has become even more urgent. This unparalleled pressure for the Alliance to rely more on conventional forces for the maintenance of deterrence and security is one of NATO's greatest challenges today."

Sloan, Stanley R.

Au revoir MBFR! National defense, v. 72, Feb. 1988: 47–50.

"By mid-1988, the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries are likely to begin new negotiations aimed at controlling conventional military forces throughout Europe 'from the Atlantic to

the Urals.' Once these talks begin, the long-running East-West negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) will likely be phased out. This may mean 'Farewell to MBFR,' as one analyst has written, but in some ways it may simply be 'au revoir' (until we meet again). The new talks, if not carefully conceived, could revisit some of the problems that have plagued MBFR for over fourteen years."

Confidence building measures and force constraints for stabilizing East-West military relations in Europe, by Stanley R. Sloan and Mikaela Sawtelle. Aug. 30, 1988. Washington, Congressional Research Service, 1988. 65 p. (88-591 F)

NATO and Warsaw Pact nations are moving toward new negotiations aimed at "enhancing conventional stability" in Europe, after fifteen years of unsuccessfully seeking agreement on "mutual and balanced force reductions" in Europe. The new negotiations have taken on added significance in light of the important strategic and arms control implications of the U.S.-Soviet treaty eliminating intermediate range nuclear missile systems which has focused increased attention on the relationship between NATO and Warsaw Pact nonnuclear forces in Europe. Confidence building measures (designed to increase predictability and transparency of military units and operations) and constraints on military forces (designed to limit their offensive options) could therefore play an important part in stabilizing East-West military relations in Europe over the next several years.

Conventional arms control and Europe's future. New York, Foreign Policy Association, 1989. 72 p. (Headline series, no. 287)

"Guides the reader through the thickets of past arms control negotiations, including MBFR and CSCE. . . . Examines the military balance between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces, the differences in their initial negotiating positions, the obstacles to an accord and the prospects. . . . Considers Western concerns and negotiating options and some of the key policy issues that the United States must resolve."

Conventional arms control and military stability in Europe, by Stanley R. Sloan, Steven R. Bowman, Paul E. Gallis, and Stuart D. Goldman. Oct. 16, 1987. Washington, Congressional Research Service, 1987. 86 p. (87-831 F)

This report analyzes proposals and prospects for conventional force reductions aimed at reducing the Warsaw Pact's potential for a short-warning attack against NATO in Central Europe in the context of potential U.S.-Soviet accord eliminating their intermediate range nuclear missiles. The report surveys the possible Western approaches to the new East-West conventional arms control negotiations likely to begin in 1988 and then discusses a variety of arms control measures that

could mitigate against a Warsaw Pact short-warning attack. It concludes with an analysis of the West's negotiating strategy for the new negotiations.

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Conventional arms control in Europe. SAIS review, v. 7, summer-fall 1987: 23–35.

Examines conflicting goals and approaches to the MBFR talks, the status of negotiations, the areas of agreement and disagreement and the plans of both blocks to make transition to different negotiating forums and procedures.

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East-West troop reductions in Europe: is agreement possible?; report prepared for the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs by the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress. Washington, G.P.O., 1983. 42 p. (JX1974.S568 1983)

At head of title: 98th Congress, 1st session. Committee print.

Staar, Richard F.

The MBFR process and its prospects. Orbis, v. 27, winter 1984: 999–1009.

The head of the U.S. delegation to the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks from 1981–1983 reviews the history, status, and prospects of MBFR negotiations in Vienna on reductions of NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional forces in Europe. Staar discusses the NATO draft treaty of 1982. He suggests that "two major problems in the negotiations remain. These involve the questions of agreed-upon data and associated measures."

Yost, David S.

Beyond MBFR: the Atlantic to the Urals gambit. Orbis, v. 31, spring 1987: 99–134.

"The relationship between MBFR and the NATO initiative for a new conventional arms control forum is complex. Despite their professed interest in concluding an MBFR agreement, the NATO participants apparently regard it as an increasingly unlikely prospect, owing to the Soviet Union's long-standing refusal to accept the verification measures proposed by the West. Various Warsaw Pact pronouncements have signaled declining Eastern interest in MBFR and a preference for an Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone."

VII. NATO NUCLEAR ISSUES

Adamson, David.

A 'no' to no-first-use. Foreign Service journal, v. 59, Sept. 1982: 20–23.

"The new NATO doctrine advocated by Bundy, Keenan, McNamara, and Smith . . . that NATO should unconditionally renounce the first use of nuclear weapons—is unconvincing," holds the author.

Adelman, Kenneth L.

Why an INF agreement makes sense; it is not the millenium. Vital speeches of the day, v. 43, June 15, 1987: 514–518.

A speech by the Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, delivered to the Mid-Atlantic Club, Harriman, New York, May 1, 1987.

After the INF Treaty: U.S. nuclear buildup in Europe. Defense monitor, v. 17, no. 2, 1988: 1–8.

"Britain, France, and the United States plan to install new nuclear weapons in Europe."

After the summit. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 44, Mar. 1988: 18–21, 24–28, 30–38.

Contents.—INF Treaty a good start, by Paul C. Warnke.—British fret about "vulnerability" by Joseph Rotblat.—The French foundation for European security, by Georges Fricaud-Chagnaud.—End the Cold War in Europe, by Mary Kaldor.—Japanese skeptical of Eurocentric accord, by Yoshikazu Sakamoto.—Danes look to detente for greater security, by Ove Nathan.—Limited success, limitless prospects.—Who needs summits anyway? by Inga Thorsson.

Alexiev, Alex R.

The Soviet campaign against INF: strategy, tactics, and means. Orbis, v. 29, summer 1985: 319–350.

"The Soviet anti-INF campaign remains a fascinating and instructive example of Moscow's foreign political modus operandi and perhaps the best case study of a concerted Soviet effort to manipulate domestic trends in Western countries. . . . A detailed analysis of the tactics and instruments used by the Soviets in the anti-INF campaign also provides considerable insights and a frame of comparison for Western analysts and policy makers seeking to understand and neutralize the present Soviet campaign against the Strategic Defense Initiative."

Alliance security: NATO and the no-first-use question. Edited by John D. Steinbruner and Leon V. Sigal. Washington, Brookings Institution, c1983. 222 p.

At head of title: Studies in defense policy.

Partial contents.—A historical perspective, by D. Schwartz.—Nuclear deterrence in Central Europe, by W. Kaufmann.—Nonnuclear deterrence, by W. Kaufmann.—Perspectives on strategy, by J. Alford.—No first use and NATO's nuclear posture, by L. Sigal.—Political prospects for no first use, by L. Sigal.—The no-first-use question in West Germany, by G. Krell, T. Risse-Kappen, and H. Schmidt.—Moving toward no first use in practice, by J. Holst.—Alliance security, by J. Steinbruner.

Arkin, William M.

Pershing II and U.S. nuclear strategy. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 39, June–July 1983: 12–13.

"Assuring European support for deployment of Pershing II missiles depends upon their role as theater weapons. Announced plans to allow reloading of launchers suggest that Pershing II would have a strategic mission as well."

Arms control and the Strategic Defense Initiative: three perspectives. Muscatine, Iowa, Stanley Foundation, 1985. 32 p. (Occasional paper 36)

Contents.—Soviet interpretation and response, by J. Hough.—A new dilemma for NATO, by S. Sloan.—Breaking the deadlock, by P. Warnke and D. Linebaugh.

Armstrong, Alan P.

Nuclear weapons and NATO. Military review, v. 60, May 1980: 11–17.

"A lot of money would be made available for the development of nonthreatening, asymmetrical weapons systems if theater nuclear weapons were removed from Europe or modified for strategic deterrent missions," argues the author.

Asmus, Ronald D.

Soviet countermeasures to NATO's "dual-track" decision? [Munich] Radio Free Europe, 1983. 14 p. (Research: RAD background report/248 (East-West))

"For some time now the Soviet Union and some of its Warsaw Pact allies have been issuing warnings or threats of various 'countermeasures' should NATO proceed with its scheduled deployment of 572 Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe. . . . The key targets of such ominous warnings have been the FRG and the United States. . . . This paper broadly surveys a variety of Soviet and Warsaw Pact statements on this issue."

Assessing the INF Treaty. Mar. 16, 1988. Washington, Congressional Research Service, 1988. 84 p. (88-211 F)

This CRS study provides a framework of issues for congressional use in evaluating the INF Treaty. After highlighting key provisions contained in the Treaty and providing a brief accounting of the NATO/Warsaw Pact military balance, the report presents pro/con arguments on the effect of the Treaty upon: NATO/Warsaw Pact military capabilities, issues, superpower and alliance relations, future arms control agreements, and U.S./Soviet defense spending.

Ball, George W.

The cosmic bluff. New York review of books, v. 30, July 21, 1983: 37-41.

Examines NATO's nuclear strategy and its reliance on America's nuclear threat to deter the Soviet Union from attacking Western Europe with conventional forces.

Beilenson, Laurence W. Cohen, Samuel T.

A new nuclear strategy. New York times magazine, Jan. 24, 1982: 34, 36, 38, 42, 44.

"A military scholar and a weapons analyst propose that we stop trying to match the Russians in conventional weapons and base our security on overwhelming power in nuclear arms."

Benoist, Jean-Marie.

The fallacy of the INF Treaty. Washington, Heritage Foundation, 1988. 10 p. (Heritage lectures 149)

"The question of the zero-zero option and the INF Treaty should be discussed from three points of view: 1) How did the West get there? 2) What aspects of the crisis does the current treaty illustrate? 3) What can be done to limit the dangers and inconveniences of this situation?"

Bertram, Christoph.

The implications of theater nuclear weapons in Europe. Foreign affairs, v. 60, winter 1981-1982: 305-326.

Betts, Richard K.

Security and solidarity: NATO's balancing act after the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces. Brookings review, v. 3, summer 1985: 26-34.

"The new missiles provoked the Soviet Union as much as they deterred it, and they shook European confidence in security. . . . The INF controversies reflected NATO's underlying quandaries. Short-term success is not all that valuable if the price is long-term failure to negotiate constraints on the Soviet threat and to deal with European fears that could crack the alliance just when it might be needed most."

Blaker, James R.

On-site inspections: the military significance of an arms-control proposal. Survival, v. 26, May-June 1984: 98-106.

Examines direct military utility of the 'on-site' arms-control inspection measures for the NATO security.

Borawski, John.

The future of INF. Parameters, v. 15, summer 1985: 37–46.

The article discusses some contemporary questions concerning future directions for NATO INF negotiating strategy.

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The INF Treaty and beyond. Parameters, v. 18, June 1988: 63–73.

The INF Treaty "is by any measure an achievement of historic proportions. . . . However, NATO European enthusiasm for the so-called 'double zero' outcome has been at best restrained. . . . How is it this historic arms control accord has bred so much anxiety? Can it be seriously contended that the elimination of twice as many Soviet as US missiles is disadvantageous to the Atlantic Alliance?"

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Towards theatre nuclear arms control? Washington quarterly, v. 3, winter 1980: 84–99.

"NATO allies have become increasingly concerned about the ramifications of the SALT II accords and follow-on negotiations on the grey-area weapons systems. While not directly embraced in the deliberately limited scope of the bilateral SALT negotiations, these systems include Soviet theatre nuclear delivery vehicles targeted at the heart of Western Europe."

Borklund, C. W.

Preventing nuclear war: is Western strategy changing again? Journal of social political and economic studies, v. 12, winter 1987: 443–463.

"Preventing another World War II generally and nuclear war specifically, once a central political issue in the United States and Western Europe—and one which resulted in the creation of both the Department of Defense and of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the late 1940s . . . is perceived by many observers to have fallen from the top of governmental priority lists."

Buteux, Paul.

The politics of nuclear consultation in NATO, 1965–1980. Cambridge; New York, Cambridge University Press, 1983. 292 p. (UA646.3.B767 1983)

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Strategy, doctrine, and the politics of alliance: theatre nuclear force modernisation in NATO. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1983. 158 p. (US646.3.B77 1983)

"This book examines the processes of nuclear policy-making in NATO and the interaction of alliance strategy with the doctrine underlying it. Dr. Buteux focuses on the issue of theater nuclear force modernisation to illustrate his thesis that NATO's strategic posture results from a political process in which other than purely strategic objectives are sought; agreements on alliance strategy may in fact be related only indirect-

ly to the actual military posture of the alliance and the means available to support it."

Center for Defense Information.

NATO, nuclear weapons, and the death of detente. Defense monitor, v. 9, Mar. 1980: 1–8.

Concludes that over the past decade the military buildup of the Warsaw Pact has been more than matched by the NATO countries. Discusses plans for new U.S. missiles in Europe and identifies new dangers which could place strains on the NATO alliance.

Charles, Daniel.

NATO looks for arms control loopholes. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 43, Sept. 1987: 7–12.

"The prospect of an INF accord has NATO leaders quietly scurrying to find other ways to maintain Europe's nuclear posture. Meanwhile, members of Congress are using the occasion to push high-tech conventional weapons."

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Nuclear planning in NATO: pitfalls of first use. Cambridge, Mass., Ballinger Pub. Co., c1987. 177 p. (U264.C48 1987)

"A Federation of American Scientists book."

This work "explores the . . . military operational plans for nuclear weapons in Europe—plans that will become the visible and concrete expression of NATO's nuclear deterrent in wartime."

Clarke, Douglas.

The impact of an INF treaty on Eastern Europe. [Munich] Radio Free Europe, 1987. 6 p. (Research: RAD background report/171 (East-West relations))

"If the tentative INF agreement comes into force, the Warsaw Pact will face 644 fewer NATO land-based nuclear missiles than without the treaty; but for the countries of Eastern Europe, this lessening of the nuclear threat might be more illusory than real. NATO has several options for at least partially replacing the lost missiles with nuclear systems that are not bound by the INF agreement. For this reason an INF agreement might be more for what it portends in political terms than for what it provides in increased security."

Coffey, Joseph I.

Deterrence and arms control: American and West German perspectives on INF. Denver, Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, 1985. 116 p. (Monograph series in world affairs, v. 21, Book 4) (UA646.C64 1985)

Partial contents.—The double-track decision of 1979.—American perspectives on INF and arms control.—West German perspectives on INF and arms control.—The future of INF.

Considerations after the INF Treaty. Survival, v. 30, May–June 1988: 195–231 p.

Contents.—NATO after global 'double zero', by Lewis A. Dunn.—Will the United States remain a European power? by Robert E. Hunter.

Cooper, Mary H.

Euromissile negotiations. Washington, Congressional Quarterly, 1987. 194–207 p. (Editorial research reports, 1987, v. 1, no. 16)

Cotter, Donald R.

The emerging INF agreement: a case of strategic regression. Strategic review, v. 15, summer 1987: 11–19.

"The nuclear arms reductions agreement that is taking shape at Geneva is a triumph not of arms control, but of a patient Soviet strategy that has aimed ever since the 1950s at a denuclearization of NATO's defenses. The agreement will have the effect of shutting the door to a long-needed modernization of NATO's nuclear arsenal, imposing new burdens on the Alliance's outgunned conventional defenses."

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NATO theater nuclear forces: an enveloping military concept. Strategic review, v. 9, spring 1981: 44–53.

"This article attempts to adduce a rationale for improving NATO's defensive posture through an integrated approach to modernizing the Alliance's conventional and nuclear capabilities. The argument is advanced that the 1979 NATO TNF decision, while a significant step forward, does not fulfill the required nuclear posture, and that a strengthening of the conventional component of the NATO posture can be achieved at acceptable cost."

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The nuclear "balance" in Europe: status, trends, implications, by Donald R. Cotter, James H. Hanson, and Kirk McConnell. Washington, United States Strategic Institute [1983] 48 p. (USSI report 83–1)

Contents.—Assessing the nuclear balance in Europe: faults, distortions and myths.—The evolution of NATO theater nuclear forces.—Theater nuclear weapons in Soviet strategy.—A comparison of NATO and Warsaw Pact land-based surface-to-surface missile systems.—The myth of the "forward based systems."—An overall TNW comparison.—The "balance" and NATO's force modernization.

Critchley, Julian.

Should the first use of nuclear arms be renounced? RUSI [Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies], v. 127, Dec. 1982: 32–34.

Crollen, Luc.

NATO and arms control. NATO review, v. 28, Dec. 1980: 20–24; 24–30.

Cruise missiles and Western European security: three perspectives. New scientist, v. 97, Mar. 31, 1983: 878–885.

Mark Hewish contends "Going to war with cruise missiles would be precise, ruthless and utterly effective." Michael Heseltine suggests that cruise missiles "do not represent a new dimension in warfare; rather, they continue the strategy that has kept the peace in Europe for 40 years." In a contrasting perspective, John Silkin argues that "cruise missiles are unnecessary, divisive and escalate the arms race. What is more, they could light the touch paper for a nuclear war in Europe."

Davis, Jacquelyn K.

Theater-nuclear force modernization and NATO's flexible response strategy. In National security policy for the 1980s. Philadelphia, American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1981. (Annals, v. 457, Sept. 1981) p. 78–87.

Contends that Soviet force developments have resulted in erosion of the military balance in Europe, calling into question NATO's deterrence posture and its reliance on a strategy of flexible response. Considers the role modernization of NATO's theater nuclear forces could play in strengthening NATO's deterrent and defense posture.

Davis, Lynn E.

Lessons of the INF Treaty. Foreign affairs, v. 66, spring 1988: 720–734.

"The INF treaty has provoked considerable unease in the West, by its provisions as well as by its implications for the future. Will NATO's strategy of flexible response remain credible? Will the imbalance between conventional forces in Europe now become more dangerous? Will the treaty unleash political forces leading to the denuclearization of the continent and American disengagement from NATO?"

Dean, Jonathan.

Alternative defence: answer to NATO's central front problems? International affairs (London), v. 64, winter 1987: 61–82.

"In the context of . . . agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) . . . Western military experts and diplomats are anxiously looking for new ways to improve NATO conventional defences. . . . This article examines the contentions of those supporting the new proposals . . . for reorienting NATO's defence posture."

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Beyond first use. Foreign policy, no. 48, fall 1982: 37–53.

"Examination of the rationale for the first use strategy advanced by its proponents can provide an opportunity to evaluate NATO's current defense strategy. The key question is whether the degree of emphasis it now places on nuclear deterrence can receive adequate support over the long run from West European public and parliamentary opinion and if not whether it is possible to reach some tentative conclusions

about the feasibility of relinquishing or of modifying that strategy."

DeBoer, Connie.

The polls: the European peace movement and deployment of nuclear missiles. Public opinion quarterly, v. 49, spring 1985: 119–132.

Presents public opinion data from the United States and Western Europe "on the stationing of cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles in Europe, on the use of nuclear weapons, and on the peace movement and the anti-nuclear weapons demonstrations."

DeRose, Francois.

NATO and nuclear weapons. Strategic review, v. 15, fall 1987: 27–35.

Asserts that "improvements in the Alliance's conventional defenses, based on advancing technology, can bolster the NATO deterrent by expanding the options available in crisis. But if they were to signify a further U.S. nuclear retrenchment from Europe, they could spell the beginning of the end of the Alliance."

DeSantis, Hugh.

After INF: the political-military landscape of Europe. Washington quarterly, v. 11, summer 1988: 29–44.

"In the final analysis, the historic aspect of the INF treaty may not be arms reduction but its effect—both real and symbolic—on a range of issues that directly impinge on European security and therefore on U.S. interests."

Dror, Yehezkel.

The politics of defense allocations in Western Europe. Public budgeting & finance, v. 3, spring 1983: 3–22.

"This article discusses some features of the politics of defense allocations in Western Europe as a case of budgeting under conditions of diminishing capacity to govern, coupled with harsher constraints on public expenditures."

Dyer, Philip W.

The moral dimensions of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. Parameters, v. 10, June 1980: 44–50.

"The US may find itself having to use these weapons first, thus raising more serious moral questions than would be offered by a strategic exchange in which its use of the weapons would be in retaliation to a Soviet first use of such weapons. . . . It therefore becomes essential that the US, after appropriate consultation with its NATO allies, take the initiative in arranging with the Soviets negotiations aimed at a mutual withdrawal of Tactical Nuclear Weapons from Europe."

Europe in search of a missile equilibrium. [Munich] Radio Free Europe, 1981. 10 p. (Radio Free Europe. Research RAD background report/124 (East-West))

"The East-West debate on 'Euromissiles' was elicited by the positioning of new, mobile medium-range missiles, code-named SS 20s, in the European part of the Soviet Union. This paper gives a short 'history' of the SS 20s, then it describes the Soviet and Western positions on how a missile equilibrium should be established."

European nuclear disarmament (END): pro and con. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 10, Dec. 1981: 38–46.

Feld, Werner J.

Arms control and the Atlantic community. New York, Praeger, 1987. 144 p. (JX1974.7.F45 1987)

First-use of nuclear weapons. F.A.S. public interest report, v. 37, Nov. 1984: 1–12.

Describes "what consultation and vetoes over first-use would exist already in the NATO alliance."

Gallis, Paul.

The Netherlands elections and the cruise missile issue: implications for the United States and for NATO. Feb. 10, 1986. Washington, Congressional Research Service, 1986. 36 p. (86–27 F)

"Though the Dutch government has made a decision to base 48 U.S. groundlaunched cruise missiles, broad popular opposition to nuclear weapons in the Netherlands remains. Should the principal opposition party come to power in the elections of May 1986, deployment of the missiles could be blocked and criticism of U.S. foreign policy would be intensified."

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Prospects for an INF accord: NATO's troubled response. Congressional Research Service review, v. 8, June 1987: 3–6.

Galvin, John R.

NATO after zero INF. Armed Forces journal international, v. 125, Mar. 1988: 54, 56–58, 60.

"The most immediate challenge ahead will be that of adapting to the changes brought about by the INF treaty."

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The INF Treaty—no relief from the burden of defence. NATO review, v. 36, Feb. 1988: 1–7.

"The challenge facing NATO after an INF Treaty is the same as it has been for almost forty years: How do we maintain effective deterrence and defence at an affordable cost?" argues Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

Garfinkle, Adam M.

The "INF" arena after Reykjavik: a broader U.S. approach? Strategic review, v. 14, fall 1986: 27–36.

"There is the danger, in the wake of Reykjavik, that negotiations pressures will lead to a separate U.S.-Soviet agreement on so-called intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in Europe. . . . The United States is prudent in driving for INF reductions as close to 'zero-zero' as possible. Yet such an agreement must embrace on the Soviet side not only SS-20 missiles, but the other modernized systems. . . . Above all, the United States' approach must be keenly sensitive to the imperatives of the conventional force balance in Europe."

Garner, William V.

Soviet threat perceptions of NATO's Eurostrategic missiles. Paris, Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, 1983. 133 p. (Atlantic papers no. 52-53)

Contents.—Soviet threat portrayals.—Evaluating Soviet threat portrayals.—Soviet military doctrine and the INF threat.—Soviet political-military interests at the INF negotiations.—Conclusion.

Garrett, James M.

The ambiguous roles of intermediate range theater nuclear forces. Journal of strategic studies, v. 8, Sept. 1985: 260-283.

"This analysis considers only the roles, missions and capabilities of NATO's INFs, old and new."

Garthoff, Raymond L.

The NATO decision on theater nuclear forces. Political science quarterly, v. 98, summer 1983: 197-214.

"The process of reaching the decision to deploy new long-range theater nuclear forces (LRTNF), as will be shown, involved complex internal dynamics of domestic and alliance politics at least as much as considerations of military requirements vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact."

George, James L.

INF. U.S. Naval Institute proceedings, v. 113, June 1987: 35-39.

"U.S. theater nuclear weapons have helped keep the peace for more than 40 years. If an INF agreement eliminates them, only Intermediate Navy Nuclear Forces can plug the gap to deter the Soviets and keep the peace."

Gilbert, Joseph.

Theatre nuclear weapons—myths and realities. NATO's sixteen nations, v. 28, Dec. 1983-Jan. 1984: 28-30.

Gilchrist, Peter.

A question of balance. Armed Forces, v. 6, July 1987: 330-332.

"If intermediate-range nuclear weapons are eventually withdrawn from Europe, NATO planners will undoubtedly face an entirely new set of problems caused by the Soviet Union's clear numerical superiority in shorter-range weapons." Describes seven major weapons systems that are at the core of the talks.

Gold, Philip.

The alliance calculates defense minus nuclear arms. Insight (Washington times), v. 3, Nov. 16, 1987: 34–35.

"As the Americans and the Soviets step to the brink of agreement on eliminating Euromissiles, many strategists are worried. Given the Warsaw Pact's conventional superiority, they see trouble for a NATO without its nuclear deterrent. Others see conventional defense as a viable option, given new strategies and effective use of weaponry."

Goldman, Andrew.

NATO needs a new missile. Orbis, v. 32, fall 1988: 541–550.

"Tactical nuclear weapons in Central Europe have recently assumed more importance than ever before. . . . The reason lies with the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty. . . . These missiles have dominated the military situation in Central Europe, so their removal turns NATO's attention to the nuclear weapons still permitted there by the treaty, battlefield launchers with a range of up to 300 miles. . . . To restore that deterrent, NATO must modernize its land-based tactical nuclear missiles."

Gordon, Michael R.

Dateline Washington: INF: a hollow victory? Foreign policy, no. 68, fall 1987: 159–179.

"The Reagan administration has cast the emerging intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) agreement as a historic accord that will reduce and not merely limit nuclear weapons. . . . More than in past U.S.-Soviet arms accords, political considerations have guided each side's negotiating strategies, as Washington and Moscow have vied for public approval in Western Europe. . . . Concessions have been made with the knowledge that an INF treaty will not fundamentally alter the overall superpower military balance."

Gray, Colin S.

NATO's nuclear dilemma. Policy review, no. 22, fall 1982: 97–116.

"The ill-advisability of a NATO declaratory stance of 'no first use' can only be presented judiciously if the more persuasive of the arguments in its favor are considered fairly. The potential for political damage to the alliance that lurks in the wings of 'no first use' discussion is so considerable that it is vital that the full panoply of considerations be weighed by all sides of the debate."

Grier, Peter.

World without nuclear weapons? Christian Science monitor, Nov. 18, 1986: 1, 6; Nov. 19: 3–4; Nov. 20: 3–4; Nov. 21: 2–3; Nov. 24: 3–4.

Contents.—Beyond theory to reality: can the world disarm?— NATO's arms hold USSR in line.—Is proving the terror of global nuclear war a waste of time?—If nuclear arms

went, would, superpower tension go too?—In nuclear world, hope is most important, all experts agree.

Haagerup, Niels J.

Scandinavian NATO without nuclear weapons? Washington quarterly, v. 9, winter 1986: 5–14.

Examines the impact of recent political trends in Scandinavia on NATO. "Just as a Nordic nuclear weapons-free zone is highly unlikely to be established in isolation from other East-West arrangements in Europe, or in any other manner, the outcome of the debates in Denmark and Norway will be strongly influenced by changes in the external political and military environments of the two countries."

Halperin, Morton H.

NATO and the TNF [theater nuclear forces] controversy: threats to the alliance. Orbis, v. 26, spring 1982: 105–116.

"Only after ascertaining what NATO is supposed to do, how it is supposed to do it, and what the major obstacles are to its effectiveness can we resolve the TNF dispute."

Hamm, Manfred R.

Missiles in Europe: the case for deployment. Washington, Heritage Foundation, 1983. 15 p. (Backgrounder no. 300)

"Fierce opposition by some Europeans to INF deployment of the first batch of missiles in three NATO countries will be a critical test of the Alliance's political resolve and cohesion. Yet there is no reason to postpone the initial deployment," argues the author refuting six main arguments by the critics of deployment.

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Nuclear weapons: a test ban and the NATO Alliance. Contemporary review, v. 250, June 1987: 303–307.

"Obsession with arms control is pervasive throughout Europe; however, only a little more than in the US Congress. We should recall that the Congress passed a resolution calling on the President to pursue the complete cessation of all nuclear tests. America is in fact already legally committed to do so through the Limited Test Ban Treaty and the pledges entailed in the Threshold Test Ban (TTBT) that remains unratified. Thus, it is unfair to blame the European allies alone for spinal atrophy."

Haseler, Stephen.

The Euro-missile crisis. Commentary, v. 75, May 1983: 28–32.

Helprin, Mark.

Drawing the line in Europe: the case for missile deployment. New York times magazine, Dec. 4, 1983: 53–54, 56, 104, 106, 108.

"The Euromissile crisis, says the author, is not military but political."

Hirschfeld, Thomas J.

Tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. Washington quarterly, v. 10, winter 1987: 101–121.

"Does the West still need thousands of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe? The short answer is that we can live with fewer if we modernize our nuclear forces, keep our conventional guard up, and keep Soviet capabilities proportional through arms control," argues the author.

Hoffmann, Hubertus G.

A missile defense for Europe? Strategic review, v. 12, summer 1984: 45–55.

Hoffmann, Stanley.

NATO and nuclear weapons: reasons and unreason. Foreign affairs, v. 60, winter 1981–1982: 327–346.

Holloway, David.

Nuclear weapons in Europe. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 39, Apr. 1983: 17–24.

Huisken, Ron.

INF: negotiations about what to negotiate about. Australian outlook, v. 38, Aug. 1984: 65–71.

"This paper looks at how INF came to dominate the arms control agenda, briefly traces the course of two years of negotiations and suggests a basis for their resumption."

Huygen, Maarten.

Dateline Holland: NATO's pyrrhic victory. Foreign policy, no. 62, spring 1986: 167–185.

"On November 1, 1985, after almost 6 years of acrimonious debate, mass demonstration, and governmental irresolution, the Netherlands finally decided to allow 48 American cruise missiles on Dutch soil. Holland became the fifth NATO country to accept new U.S. intermediate-range nuclear missiles. This deployment of Euromissiles has been hailed as an impressive show of unity for NATO, but for Holland it has become nothing more than a "show of division. . . . The Dutch deployment was a political conquest for NATO with serious and continuing military costs."

INF and after. END Journal of European Nuclear Disarmament, issue 32, Feb.-Mar. 1988: 4–10.

Contents.—INF; what goes, what stays, by Sheena Phillips.—NATO compensates for the deal, by Ian Mather.—France to go for third zero? by Jolyon Howorth.—The strange case of Europe's neutrals, by Fred Halliday.

INF Treaty. Harvard political review, v. 15, Mar. 1988: 10–13, 25.

Contents.—Why I support the INF Treaty, by Helmut Schmidt.—"Europeans distrust the INF agreement": examining the downside of the Treaty, by Giles Merritt, European affairs columnist for the International Herald Tribune.

The INF Treaty: alternative views. Journal of defense & diplomacy, no. 2, 1988: I–VII.

"The Journal invited several well-respected European community members who have serious reservations about the treaty to outline their views. As the lead-in to this discussion, we present an interview with Senator Dan Quayle, who discusses with Journal Editor Alan Capps some of the concerns and attitudes of U.S. Senators on the subject."

The INF Treaty—will it reduce the danger of war? World & I, v. 3, Mar. 1988: 137–145.

Contents.—It will weaken NATO solidarity, by Werner Kaltefleiter.—The sky isn't falling, by Michael Krepon.—It enhances security and stability, by Raymond L. Garthoff.—A prelude to appeasement and disarmament, by Evan G. Galbraith.

Kelleher, Catherine McArdle.

Managing NATO's tactical nuclear operations. Survival, v. 30, Jan.–Feb. 1988: 59–78.

"This article attempts only the broadest outline of existing operational procedures. These remain subject to the highest levels of classification. The details are in any event less important than the general principles involved in the transition from conventional to nuclear war, or in orchestrating nuclear escalation within the framework of a coalition among sovereign nations."

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The present as prologue: Europe and theater nuclear modernization. International security, v. 5, spring 1981: 150–168.

Reviews, from European perspectives, the debate on NATO's long-range theater nuclear force deployments in Europe. Surveys diverging American and European views of arms acquisitions, detente, and arms control.

Kerr, Donald M.

The nuclear defense of Europe, by Donald M. Kerr and Steven A. Maaranen. Washington quarterly, v. 6, autumn 1983: 93–110.

"Shifts in the 'correlation of world forces' threaten the effectiveness of NATO's defense strategy, prompting a comprehensive review of the alliance's dangerously vulnerable flexible response doctrine. . . . Without the ability to control nuclear escalation through superiority at either the theater or strategic nuclear level, flexible response strategy will become untenable."

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Nuclear force architecture for the 1980s, by Donald M. Kerr and Robert H. Kupperman. Washington quarterly, v. 5, winter 1982: 119–129.

"A coordinated theatre and strategic force posture is needed for both deterrence and conflict resolution needs. It is proposed

that ICBMs serve the multiple roles of supplementing the less vulnerable assured destruction elements of the triad, provide some damage limitation against counterforce targets, and act as a crisis management tool by rapidly supplementing other long-range theatre or strategic forces. An advantage of this coupling is that it enhances deterrence by heightening Soviet uncertainty about the likelihood of a conflict in Europe escalating to a strategic confrontation."

Kessler, Glenn Andrew.

A questionable infatuation: toward a solution of the TNF issue. Fletcher forum, v. 7, winter 1983: 17–26.

Kumata, Etsu.

The aftermath of the INF talks. Survival in the 21st century, Mar. 1988: 7–12, 29.

"The total abolition of INFs gives a devastating damage to the Western defense—can Western Europe defend itself from communist offensives through conventional warfare?"

Legge, J. Michael.

Theater nuclear weapons and the NATO strategy of flexible response. Santa Monica, Calif., Rand Corp., 1983. 93 p. (UA646.3.L354 1983)

"R–2964–FF.", "April 1983."

Leibstone, Marvin.

NATO's critical options. Strategic review, v. 16, spring 1988: 43–50.

"The INF Treaty and a prospective U.S.-Soviet agreement on deep cuts in strategic arms have jolted NATO into a new awareness of its conventional posture quandary and into a confused search for exits from this quandary."

Lellouche, Pierre.

SALT and European security: the French dilemma. Survival, v. 22, Jan.–Feb. 1980: 2–6.

Livingston, Robert Gerald.

Anti-nuclear protest and the Alliance. Atlantic Community quarterly, v. 21, spring 1983: 63–70.

"The American Administration has come to realize that it faces a problem which has been besetting other Alliance governments for over two years—widespread public protest against the American nuclear arms upon which NATO's defense depends."

Longstreth, Thomas K.

Circumventing the INF Treaty with new nuclear weapons. Journal of Federation of American Scientists, v. 41, Mar. 1988: 6–8.

The article deals with "effective circumvention of the Treaty by excessive modernization."

Lord, Carnes.

Second thoughts on INF? Global affairs, v. 2, summer 1987: 20–34.

"All of a sudden, it has begun to seem that the assumed political benefits of an INF agreement might be outweighed by its political liabilities, and that NATO Europe is rapidly losing confidence in the ability of the United States to manage the political dynamics of arms control in a fashion that is consonant with the fundamental security interest of the West."

Lucas, Michael.

The United States and post-INF Europe. World policy journal, v. 5, spring 1988: 183–233.

Examines changes in U.S.-European relations resulting from the INF agreement.

Lunn, Simon.

Intermediate range nuclear forces—problems and perspectives. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 27, Feb.-Mar. 1982: 46–48, 51–52.

Makins, Christopher J.

TNF modernization and 'countervailing strategy.' Survival, v. 23, July–Aug. 1981: 157–164.

McCausland, Jeff.

Dual track or double paralysis? The politics of INF. Armed forces & society, v. 12, spring 1986: 431–452.

INF deployment was deemed necessary due to the achievement of strategic parity by the Soviet Union. "NATO states must realize that the only purpose for nuclear weapons is in the nonuse; consequently, the deployment issue was a battle that should not be repeated. The battle for ideas and Alliance unity, however—a requirement for the deployment—continues to be waged every day."

McGeehan, Robert.

Europe and America in the year of the missiles. International journal, v. 38, winter 1982–83: 147–162.

"The modernization of NATO's intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), . . . has become a focus of Soviet propaganda, a test of alliance solidarity, and a matter of acute domestic political concern in virtually every NATO member-state."

McNamara, Robert S.

The military role of nuclear weapons: perceptions and misperceptions. Foreign affairs, v. 62, fall 1983: 59–80.

Former Secretary of Defense examines NATO's present nuclear strategy of "flexible response" and expounds his "own view on the military role of nuclear weapons." He concludes "that nuclear weapons serve no military purpose whatsoever. They are totally useless—except only to deter one's opponent from using them."

Mearsheimer, John J.

Nuclear weapons and deterrence in Europe. International security, v. 9, winter 1984–85: 19–46.

"The argument of this essay is that NFU no first use is a flawed idea. First the threat of nuclear escalation is a key element in the NATO deterrent equation which cannot be fully replaced by a significant improvement in NATO's conventional forces. Nuclear weapons, really are the ultimate deterrent. . . . An NFU policy would require a more formidable conventional deterrent; however, there is no reason to believe that NATO is going to improve significantly its conventional forces."

Mellor, David.

The INF Agreement: is it a good deal for the West? NATO review, v. 35, Dec. 1987: 1–5.

The author sees six major achievements for the West and concludes that "an INF agreement will not resolve all Europe's security problems. It was not intended to do so. But it does show that arms control has a role to play in enhancing our security."

Mendelsohn, Jack.

Wending our way to zero. Arms control today, v. 17, May 1987: 4–9.

Soviet acceptance of the zero option for European INF held out hope for a modest arms control agreement. Yet on both sides of the Atlantic the "zero option" has been considered to be contrary to the NATO's best interests.

Menaul, Stewart.

NATO and ballistic missile defense. Global affairs, v. 1, summer 1986: 9–16.

"What NATO needs is an effective exoatmospheric, high endoatmospheric interception capability and terminal defense of high priority military targets."

Moore, Robert A.

Theatre nuclear forces: thinking the unthinkable. International defense review, v. 14, no. 4, 1981: 401–408.

Describes deficiencies in NATO's tactical nuclear force (TNF) posture in light of the Soviet TNF modernization program.

Moorer, Thomas.

The false promises of the INF Treaty. National security report, v. 2, Jan. 1988: 5, 8.

In the debate on the pending INF Treaty, it is time to calmly examine basic U.S. defense policies and the lack of a grand strategy."

Nerlich, Uwe.

Missile defences: strategic and tactical. Survival, v. 27, May–June 1985: 119–127.

Raises some fundamental issues about the viability and desirability of NATO strategy to counter Soviet intermediate range ballistic missiles.

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Theatre nuclear forces in Europe: is NATO running out of options? Washington quarterly, v. 3, winter 1980: 100–125.

"At stake is the alliance's capacity to act multilaterally on virtually any major nuclear defense issue. . . . Thus in one sense it is mandatory for NATO to reach an early force-structure decision in late 1979 that will eventually allow deployment of long-range theatre nuclear capabilities in Western Europe."

Newhouse, John.

Arms and allies. New Yorker, v. 59, Feb. 28, 1983: 64–70, 73–74, 76, 78, 80–81.

Reviews the concerns underlying the decision by NATO to deploy additional intermediate range nuclear missiles in Western Europe unless progress is made in arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union regarding intermediate nuclear forces in Europe. Discusses the political implications of deploying the missiles in NATO and the effects of cancelling the deployment.

Norman, Colin.

NATO ponders its nuclear options. Science, v. 238, Dec. 11, 1987: 1498–1500.

"The INF treaty has focused renewed attention on proposals to modernize the nuclear weapons that will remain in Europe, but NATO is divided on their merits."

North Atlantic Assembly. Special Committee on Nuclear Weapons in the Atlantic Alliance.

Report . . . to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. Washington, G.P.O., 1985. 152 p. (Print, Senate, 98th Congress, 2nd session, committee print S. Prt. 98–265) (UA646.3.N58 1985)

Nuclear weapons and NATO. F.A.S. public interest report, v. 39, May 1986: whole issue (12 p.)

Examines such issues as first use of nuclear weapons; NATO's nuclear deterrent; the extinction of conventional warfare in Europe; and deciding future options.

Nuclear weapons and the Atlantic Alliance. Foreign affairs, v. 60, spring 1982: 753–768.

McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara, and Gerard Smith advocate that the U.S. and its NATO allies pledge not to use nuclear weapons against an attack by Soviet conventional forces in Europe, thus repudiating the "first use" policy which has been an option of NATO strategy for more than three decades.

Nuclear weapons in Europe. New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 1984. 118 p. (Europe/America; 1)

Contents.—Introduction, by A. Pierre.—The struggle for Europe: an American view, by W. Hyland.—U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe: symbols, strategy and force structure, by L.

Freedman.—The illusion of NATO's nuclear defense, by P. Warnke.—Nuclear weapons in Europe: a German Social Democrat's perspective, by K. Voigt.

Payne, Keith B.

Anti-tactical missile defense, allied security and the INF Treaty, by Keith B. Payne and Marc J. Berkowitz. Strategic review, v. 16, winter 1988: 24–34.

"This article examines the role of ATBM within the framework of allied defense requirements, and addresses contentions to the effect that the TBM threat to NATO—and Israel—is not significant, or that it can be countered adequately by alternative political or military measures."

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Nuclear policy and the defensive transition, by Keith B. Payne and Colin S. Gray. Foreign affairs, v. 62, spring 1984: 820–842.

The authors examine the role ballistic missile defense is expected to play in U.S. military strategy, the effect a commitment to strategic defense would have on stability, the role of strategic offensive forces during and after the development of a ballistic missile defense program, and how the European allies would react to a U.S. ballistic missile defense policy. They also consider Soviet policy concerning ballistic missile defense, Soviet response to a U.S. ballistic missile defense policy, and the arms control implications of such a U.S. policy.

Ranger, Robin.

NATO's new great debate: theatre nuclear force modernization and arms control. International journal, v. 36, summer 1981: 556–574.

This paper "summarizes the reasons why NATO's TNF modernization decision was strategically necessary but politically difficult, and it assesses the prospects for theatre nuclear arms control." It also considers the implications of deploying enhanced radiation warheads, commonly known as neutron weapons, in Europe.

Ravenal, Earl C.

No first use: a view from the United States. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 39, Apr. 1983: 11–16.

"What are the implications of a No-First-Use declaration for the United States' commitment to the defense of Europe? The author argues for a fundamental reexamination of the NATO posture of collective defense."

Record, Jeffrey.

Defending post-INF Europe, by Jeffrey Record and David B. Rivkin, Jr. Foreign affairs, v. 66, spring 1988: 735–754.

The INF Treaty will have profound implications for NATO's conventional deterrence and an unfavorable impact on its future modernization program. "NATO will have to learn to live with a lower order of both deterrence and defense in Europe in the post-INF treaty era."

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NATO's theater nuclear force modernization program: the real issues. Cambridge, Mass., Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1981. 102 p. (Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. Special report) (UA646.3.R4)

Contents.—Introduction.—NATO's present theater nuclear force posture.—The eroding theater nuclear balance.—The modernization program.—Toward a truly credible theater nuclear force posture.

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U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe: issues and alternatives. Washington, Brookings Institution, [1974] 70 p. (UA646.5.U5R42)

Reddy, Leo.

The INF Treaty: goals and implications. Atlantic Community quarterly, v. 26, spring 1988: 105–111.

The director of the INF Treaty ratification task force discusses "the Intermediate-range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty from the perspective of one of the American negotiators in Geneva. This view of the INF Treaty will discuss what the United States delegation was trying to achieve, the extent to which we succeeded, and the larger question of whether this document as it finally turned out is in our nation's security interest."

Reed, Jean D.

NATO's theater nuclear forces: a coherent strategy for the 1980s. Washington, National Defense University Press, 1983. 79 p. (National security affairs monograph series 83–8)

Contents.—NATO's nuclear strategy—a search for meaning.—Flexible response, credible deterrence, and escalation control.—To implement a strategy.

Richardson, Robert C., III.

A solution to the NATO-INF problem. Journal of social, political and economic studies, v. 13, spring 1988: 3–9.

"What NATO should now do to cope with the new environment that is emerging from the INF decision is simply to return to the strategy that worked well from 1956 to 1966, specifically, that of Tactical Nuclear Response From the Outset."

Rogers, Bernard W.

Arms control and NATO deterrence. Global affairs, v. 3, winter 1988: 23–40.

"Is the prospective INF reduction accord, in the long term, consistent with the best interests of the people governed by the Constitution? . . . Discusses aspects of NATO's strategy that impact on arms control negotiations; expands on NATO's mission of deterrence and its requirements; discusses arms control in general and the prospective double-zero INF agreement in particular."

Rostow, Eugene. Warnke, Paul.

The arms control debate. Fletcher forum, v. 7, summer 1983: 227–249.

"The majority of people remain divided about how best to end or slow down the arms race and to lessen the dangers of nuclear war. . . . In the following interviews, two of the leading figures in this arms control debate, Eugene Rostow and Paul Warnke—both former heads of the Arms Controls and Disarmament Agency (ACDA)—give their views on this important and controversial issue."

Rowny, Edward L.

Nuclear arms control and the NATO Alliance. Dept. of State bulletin, v. 84. Aug. 1984: 38–44.

Ambassador Rowny, chief negotiator for the U.S. delegation to the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks [START] in this his July 1984 address before the Royal United Services Institute in London reviews "developments to date in START, discuss[es] the impact which recent events have had on the NATO alliance, and, finally, give[s] you my thoughts on where we should go from here."

Rubenson, David. Bonomo, James.

The role of ATBM in NATO strategy. Survival, v. 29, Nov.–Dec. 1987: 511–527.

"The potential development of Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missile (ATBM) system has become an important and confusing defence policy question. . . . Technological advances have increased the likelihood that short-range ballistic missiles can be made sufficiently accurate for efficient use with conventional warheads. . . . This article will consider the role of ATBM within NATO's current strategy and financial constraints, and separate from SDI."

Ruehle, Michael.

Anti-missile defense in Europe and the ABM Treaty. Strategic review, v. 15, spring 1987: 49–57.

"There is a lively debate in Western Europe, particularly in the Federal Republic of Germany, over the quest in NATO for anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM) defenses. . . . Interpretations of the U.S.-Soviet ABM Treaty of 1972 do not loom as large in this debate as in the concurrent U.S. controversy in relation to SDI. The ABM Treaty was not addressed to ATBM. Still, pervasive ambiguities in the Treaty permit opponents of ATBM to invoke allegations of potential breach of letter. . . . A thorough examination shows the issue of Treaty relevance to rest on at best murky and spurious grounds."

Schwartz, Thomas.

NATO's nuclear dilemmas. Washington, Brookings Institution, c1983. 270 p. (UA646.3.S38 1983)

Seignious, George M., II. Yates, Jonathan Paul.

Europe's nuclear superpowers. Foreign policy, no. 55, summer 1984: 40–53.

"Both Great Britain and France are on the verge of nuclear build-ups ambitious enough to turn either one into the world's third nuclear superpower. The expansion of British and French arsenals will add greatly to the West's nuclear firepower, but on balance these forces will actually weaken Western security."

Sharp, Jane M. O.

Understanding the INF debacle: arms control and alliance cohesion. Arms control, v. 5, Sept. 1984: 95–127.

Sigal, Leon V.

The long and short of it: allied ambivalence about a zero INF deal. Arms control today, v. 17, May 1987: 10–13.

"New short-range deployments are doubtful because they are politically unacceptable and because they are militarily inappropriate."

Sloan, Stanley R.

Implications for NATO strategy of a zero-outcome intermediate-range nuclear missile accord. July 14, 1987. Washington, Congressional Research Service, 1987. 17 p. (87–614 F)

This report identifies some issues for NATO's strategy that could result from implementation of an arms control agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union eliminating from Europe all U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range (INF) and short-range missiles with ranges greater than 500 kilometers.

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NATO after Reykjavik. National defense, v. 71, May–June 1987: 65–66, 71–72.

"Four aspects of Reykjavik, . . . caught the attention of the allies. . . . The first was the near breakthrough on INF. The second was the U.S. proposal for eliminating all ballistic nuclear missiles within a decade. The third was the final and persistent impasse over strategic defenses. The fourth was the fact that such far-reaching discussions and proposals had not been foreshadowed in U.S. consultations with the allies prior to the summit."

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Nuclear strategy and arms control: challenges for U.S. policy, by Stanley R. Sloan and Robert C. Gray. New York, Foreign Policy Association, 1982. 80 p. (Headline series, no. 261)

"Examines the challenges currently facing American policy, first with regard to nuclear issues in Europe, where massive NATO and Warsaw Pact forces confront each other, and then with regard to the global competition between the United States and the Soviet Union in strategic nuclear forces."

Contents.—Nuclear dilemmas.—NATO nuclear policy: extending the U.S. guarantee.—Assessing the theater nuclear balance: contending approaches.— U.S. strategic nuclear policy.—Measuring the strategic balance.—Contending arms-control approaches.—Prospects and implications.

Snyder, Jed C.

European security, East-West policy, and the INF debate. Orbis, v. 27, winter 1984: 913-970.

"The INF issue is analyzed here both as a critical decision for the alliance and as an instrument for measuring the importance that the Soviet Union attaches to eroding the strategic relationship between the United States and its European NATO allies. The INF debate serves as a case study illustrating two historic problems of NATO strategy for the United States: (1) managing the pressures that inevitably result from increasingly divergent perspectives of the United States and its European allies on the nature and seriousness of the Soviet threat to Europe, and (2) navigating a course that remains sensitive to a strategic dilemma which has dominated nuclear affairs in the alliance for thirty-five years." Maps and charts provide data on Soviet SS-20 and NATO INF deployments, and chronologies of Soviet and U.S. INF proposals supplement the text.

Soofer, Robert M.

Defending America's allies from short-range Soviet missiles. Washington, Heritage Foundation, 1987. 9 p. (Backgrounder no. 580)

"The growing Soviet short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) threat to United States allies in Western Europe, Asia, and the Middle East has sparked interest in defensive systems capable of destroying these missiles in flight. Such defenses, known as Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missiles (ATBM) could strengthen NATO deterrence against a Soviet attack and provide increased security for such U.S. friends as Japan and Israel."

Sorenson, David S.

Ballistic missile defense for Europe. Comparative strategy, v. 5, no. 2, 1985: 159-178.

Speed, Roger D.

Strategic deterrence in the 1980s. Stanford, Calif., Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University [1980] 174 p. (Hoover Institution. Publication 214) (U162.6.S63)

Provides an overview of American and Soviet views of deterrence and discusses America's strategic forces and their relationship to deterrence. Suggests actions that can be taken to assure the continuing survivability of strategic forces. Analyzes America's policy for defending Western Europe.

Steinbruner, John D.

Alliance security: NATO and the no-first-use question. In Alliance security. Washington, Brookings Institution, 1983. p. 197-207. (U264.A43 1983)

Strategic defense, strategic modernization, and arms control. United States Naval Institute proceedings, v. 111, Sept. 1985: 131–144.

"This is the transcript of a panel discussion which brought together four recognized authorities on strategic issues."

Thies, Wallace J.

The Atlantic Alliance, nuclear weapons & European attitudes: reexamining the conventional wisdom. Berkeley, Institute of International Studies, University of California, c1983. 59 p. (UA646.3.T46 1983)

Thoemmes, Eric H.

NATO strategy and the INF Treaty. Global affairs, v. 3, spring 1988: 46–62.

"A proper assessment of the agreement involves more than simply considering the weapons to be removed and its verification provisions. Before a final judgment can be reached, the treaty must be placed in the overall context of NATO strategy, the arms control process, and the role of nuclear deterrence in East-West relations."

Thomson, James A.

After two tracks: integrating START and INF. Washington quarterly, v. 7, spring 1984: 17–28.

"This article examines two propositions supporting the integration of START and INF: that integration of these arms control forums will be more supportive of Western strategic doctrine than separate talks. That integration will reduce existing obstacles to agreements in the separate START and INF forums without creating new, offsetting, obstacles."

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The LRTNF decision: evolution of US theatre nuclear policy, 1975–9. International affairs (London), v. 60, autumn 1984: 601–614.

"The deployment by NATO in Europe of the so-called intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) missiles in December 1983 marked the culmination of a process largely completed four years earlier. From 1975 to 1979, the United States, together with its NATO allies, fundamentally changed alliance policy concerning theatre nuclear forces (TNF). Although America's European allies played a strong role in initiating this process, the change was ultimately one for the United States to make as the chief nuclear power of the alliance."

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Nuclear weapons in Europe: planning for NATO's nuclear deterrent in the 1980s and 1990s. Survival, v. 25, May–June 1983: 98–109.

"NATO planners need to look anew at: the structure of short- and medium-range theatre nuclear forces; the contribution that US sea-based and intercontinental nuclear assets

make to NATO's deterrent; NATO's capabilities to direct its forces in war; and the size of the nuclear stockpile in Europe."

Tornetta, Vincenzo.

The nuclear strategy of the Atlantic Alliance and the "no-first-use" debate. NATO review, v. 30, Dec. 1982: 1-7.

The author, Italian Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council, critiques the proposal by McGeorge Bundy, George Kennan, Robert McNamara, and Gerard Smith that NATO should adopt a "no-first-use" doctrine for nuclear weapons.

Treverton, Gregory F.

Managing NATO's nuclear dilemma. International security, v. 7, spring 1983: 93-115.

The realization that NATO's dilemma over the use of nuclear weapons "can only be managed and not resolved means that how decisions are reached matters nearly as much as what is decided. This section addresses the latter with some specific recommendations; concluding sections of this essay turn to the former."

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Nuclear weapons in Europe. London, International Institute for Strategic Studies [1981] 34 p. (Adelphi papers, no. 168)

Contents.—The strategic balance in the 1980s.—The Soviet nuclear threat to Europe.—Towards a realistic doctrine for NATO.—Options for arms control.—TNF: the political condition.

Tucker, Robert W.

The INF debate: the NOs have it. National interest, no. 10, winter 1987-88: 115-119.

"The debate between supporters and critics of the negotiations has been quite sharp. . . . Their opposition to INF is not based on a general animus toward arms control agreements with the Soviet Union, but on the dangers they see in this particular agreement. . . . They are persuaded that the effect of the agreement will be to weaken deterrence by eroding the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee, the rock on which the Atlantic Alliance has always rested."

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science.

The Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and its implications for U.S. arms control policy. Hearings and markup, 100th Congress, 2nd session on H. Res. 422. Mar. 22, 29, and 30, 1988. Washington, G.P.O., 1988. 242 p. (KF27.F6 1988k)

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs.

Overview of nuclear arms control and defense strategy in NATO. Hearings before the Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs and on Europe and the Middle

East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 97th Congress, 2nd session. Feb. 23, Mar. 18 and 22, 1982. Washington, G.P.O., 1982. 225 p. (KF27.F64825 1982a)

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services.

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the conventional balance in Europe; report of Senator Timothy E. Wirth to the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate. Washington, G.P.O., 1988. 55 p. (Print, Senate, 100th Congress, 2nd session, committee print S. Prt. 100-94)

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NATO defense and the INF Treaty. Hearings and meetings, 100th Congress, 1st and sessions. Parts 1-4. Jan. 25-Feb. 23, 1988. Washington, G.P.O., 1988. 4v. (Hearing, Senate, 100th Congress, 2nd session, S. Hrg. 100-493) (KF26.A7 1988)

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NATO defense and the INF Treaty; report together with additional, supplemental, and minority views. Washington, G.P.O., 1988. 137 p. (Report, Senate, 100th Congress, 2nd session, no. 100-312) (KF31.A7 1988)

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations.

The INF Treaty. Hearings, 100th Congress, 2nd session. Jan.25-Mar.22, 1988. Washington, G.P.O., 1988. 5 v. (Hearing, Senate, 100th Congress, 2nd session, S. Hrg. 100-522) (KF26.F6 1988)

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The INF Treaty; report. Washington, G.P.O., 1988. 515 p. (Report, Senate, 100th Congress, 2nd session, executive report no. 100-15)

U.S. Congress. Senate. Delegation to NATO Capitals.

The INF Treaty and the future of the Alliance; report by Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd on a Senate delegation visit to five NATO countries, February 6-14, 1988. Washington, G.P.O., 1988. 141 p. (Document, Senate, 100th Congress, 2nd session, no. 100-27)

"The purpose of the trip was to hold consultations and discussions with government leaders, opposition politicians, and leading figures from academia and the media in key NATO countries, focusing on the INF Treaty and its significance for the future of the NATO Alliance."

Ullman, Harlan K.

Is deterrence dead? RUSI [Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies] v. 130, Sept. 1985: 31-36.

"The purposes of this article are threefold: to identify the major trends and factors which suggest a new or at least changing strategic era may be upon us. To relate those observations to traditional Western notions of deterrence. To prescribe the first stages of a remedial solution for Western security policy."

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Out of the Euromissile mire. Foreign policy, no. 50, spring 1983: 39–52.

Suggests that the planned NATO deployment of additional intermediate range nuclear forces in Europe may make stability more fragile and verifiable arms control more difficult to achieve. Considers the political impact of an arms control agreement limiting intermediate range forces in Europe, problems of achieving such an agreement, and implications for deterrence.

Viotti, Paul R.

European peace movements and missile deployments. Armed forces & society, v. 11, summer 1985: 505–521.

"Peace movements are nationally oriented with much less transnational collaboration than is usually imagined. . . . They remain in the minority in the INF-deploying countries. . . . Strength varies from country to country . . . there are significant differences in enthusiasm for peace movement activity between Protestants and Catholics and between northern and southern Europeans."

Wegener, Henning.

The political framework and implications of the INF Treaty. NATO review, v. 36, Feb. 1988: 7–15.

"In the INF case, a clear negotiating strategy has led to a clear outcome and this successful process has reinforced in the Alliance a feeling of collective strength and collective manageability of political conflict."

West, Francis J., Jr.

After the INF Treaty the maritime strategy should become more important than ever. Almanac of seapower, v. 31, Jan. 1988: 2–5, 7–10.

"The greater potential for conventional conflict focuses attention on the need for—and the value of—maritime strategy."

Wettern, Desmond.

How the INF negotiations in Geneva failed. Aussenpolitik, v. 35, no. 2, 1984: 123–139.

Wettig, Gerhard.

Europe after the INF Treaty. Aussenpolitik, v. 39, no. 1, 1988: 24–35.

"Evaluates elimination of the INF from Europe as a crucial element of the current Soviet strategic concept which implies the use of superior conventional forces in case of war. . . . The INF agreement stipulates elimination of largely those very components of the U.S. nuclear arsenal upon which deterrence in the European theatre is based."

Wilson, Pete.

A missile defense for NATO: we must respond to the challenge. Strategic review, v. 14, spring 1986: 9–15.

Windsor, Philip.

Restoring the dynamic of arms control. Millennium, v. 11, spring 1982: 74–80.

The author attempts "to examine some of the reasons for the comparative failure of arms control over the past decade, and to see whether it can recapture its dynamic." He discusses Western European fears that the arms race is becoming more dangerous, that U.S. deterrent power is waning, and that the American commitment to Europe is weakening.

Winkler, Theodor H.

Arms control and the politics of European security. London, International Institute for Strategic Studies [1982] 43 p. (Adelphi papers, no. 177)

Contents.—The trend towards multilateralism in European arms control.— Multilateral arms control in Europe: the political setting.—Lessons from the past.—Prospects and limitations of European arms control.—The relevance of the past for the future.

Winters, Francis X.

After tension, detente: a continuing chronicle of European episcopal views on nuclear deterrence. Theological studies, v. 45, June 1984: 343–351.

"Summation of the British, French, German, Dutch, and Belgian episcopal positions on deterrence, we complete the survey of official Catholic contributions to the redefinition of public opinion within the nations of the Atlantic community on the volatile question of nuclear strategy; for the remaining NATO national hierarchies (Norway and Denmark on the northern flank and Greece and Turkey on the south, along with Italy) have remained silent on the question."

Worner, Manfred.

A missile defense for NATO Europe. Strategic review, v. 14, winter 1986: 13–20.

"Although definitive judgments must await the ultimate findings of the research effort, the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative carries positive implications for the NATO Alliance as a whole, particularly in light of existing capabilities and continuing efforts by the Soviet Union in the arena of defenses against ballistic missiles. Meanwhile, however, a more imminent threat casts its shadow on NATO Europe: the growing Soviet capacity, afforded by technological advances, to employ their massive arsenals of mid- and short-range missiles as conventional firepower against prime NATO targets heretofore assigned to attacking aircraft or nuclear forces."

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NATO defenses and tactical nuclear weapons. Strategic review, v. 5, fall 1977: 11–18.

Yost, David S.

START, INF and European security. World today, v. 39, Nov. 1983: 417–428.

"Western Europe has a vital stake in the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on both strategic arms reduction (START) and intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF). . . . The issue of whether START and INF should be linked or kept separate must ultimately take second place to the risks of cultivating high expectations about achieving security through arms control."

Younger, George.

INF and beyond. RUSI [Royal United Service Institute for Defence Studies] journal, v. 133, spring 1988: 3–6.

"The US/USSR INF agreement currently awaiting ratification will be an historic achievement and a landmark in East-West relations. . . . Now, therefore, is a good moment to ask what the achievement means and how Britain and the other NATO members should proceed."

VIII. ALLIED ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Abshire, David M.

Critical dimensions of transatlantic cooperation: a resources strategy. Atlantic Community quarterly, v. 21, winter 1983–84: 308–316.

"An effective resources strategy, productive transatlantic arms cooperation and more of a common market in the defense industrial field can become the foundation for reinvigorating the Alliance."

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NATO at the moral crossroads. Washington quarterly, v. 7, summer 1984: 3–12.

"Public consensus supporting the alliance must be broadened. Part of this broadening involves addressing the moral issues and choices related to NATO policies that are now being publicly debated."

Adams, Gordon. Munz, Eric.

Fair shares: bearing the burden of the NATO Alliance. Washington, Defense Budget Project at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 1988. 87 p.

"The NATO allies are shouldering a fair share of the fiscal and military burden of the alliance, according to a new study issued . . . by the Defense Budget Project. Contrary to popular perception, the European allies and Canada are not getting a 'free ride' in NATO at the expense of the United States, but have been contributing significantly to the alliance in terms of their economic resources, military capability, and consistency of support."

Albrecht, Ulrich.

European security and the German question. World policy journal, v. 1, spring 1984: 575–602.

Examines the position of Germany in the political situation between East and West and holds that a "conceptual breakthrough" of political detente and Ostpolitik is needed, extending into the military domain.

Alliance burdensharing: a review of the data. [Washington] U.S. Congressional Budget Office, 1987. 20 p.

Allies in a turbulent world: challenges to U.S. and Western European cooperation. Edited by Francia A. M. Alting von Geusau. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, c1982. 174 p. (D1065.U5A78 1982)

Partial contents.—The United States and Western Europe: an enduring relationship?—The Atlantic alliance: a view from

97-675 0 - 89 - 7

America, by David P. Calleo.—From Cold War to Global instability: a view from Western Europe, by Frans A. M. Alting von Geusau.—Allied foreign policies and political consultation.—Policies of detente following Soviet resort to force in Afghanistan and Poland, by Eberhard Schulz.—Crisis management outside the NATO area: allies or competitors, by Lincoln P. Bloomfield.—NATO political consultation and European political cooperation, by S.I.P. van Campen.—Allied strategy, security, and arms control.—Allied strategy and Atlantic security, by Frans A. M. Alting von Geusau.—The future of European-American relations, by Frans A. M. Alting von Geusau.

Allin, George R.

Spain's NATO dilemma. Military review, v. 65, Jan 1985: 61–73.

"Spain's ultimate decision concerning its role in NATO can have a profound effect upon the alliance. This article examines the nature of the dilemmas facing the Spanish government."

Amme, Carl H., Jr.

NATO without France; a strategic appraisal. Stanford, Calif., Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1967. (Hoover Institution publications) (UA646.3.A75)

"The first part of this study analyzes the differences in strategic concepts of the major NATO nations. . . . The second part . . . examines the actual force posture in the confrontation as it exists with the withdrawal of France from NATO. . . . The third . . . part . . . deals with the problem arrangements within the Atlantic Alliance for the control and use of nuclear weapons."

Archer, Clive.

Greenland and the Atlantic alliance. Aberdeen, Scotland, Centre for Defence Studies, 1985. 66, 3 p. (Centrepiece no. 7) (UA646.5.G83A73 1985)

"Examines the security importance of Greenland for the Western Alliance and the effect of the recent events on its position within NATO. The main point for consideration is whether strategic changes, regional developments and local political and economic aspects will place significant strains on Greenland's position within the Atlantic Alliance."

Art, Robert J.

Fixing Atlantic bridges. Foreign policy, no. 46, spring 1982: 67–85.

Examines disputes between the U.S. and its Western European allies over the nature of the Soviet threat and the level of defense spending required to meet it. Also examines disagreements regarding the modernization of NATO's intermediate range nuclear forces and the validity of the doctrine of flexible response.

— The Atlantic connection: report on a workshop on relations between the United States and its Atlantic Allies, held at Dartmouth College, July 27–29, 1984, with background papers presented by David Baldwin, Gene M. Lyons, and Jonathan L. Shrier. Hanover, N.H., John Sloan Dickey Endowment for International Understanding, Dartmouth College [1984?] 32 p. (An occasional paper from the Dickey Endowment) (D1065.U5A897 1984)

Reports on a conference which addressed such issues as the nature of the "Atlantic Connection;" what characterizes the Atlantic community; what is the quality of relations between the U.S. and its Atlantic allies; and other concerns.

Ball, Robert.

Getting our friends to flex their muscles. Fortune, v. 103, Feb. 9, 1981: 60–65.

Contends that the real rate of growth of defense spending over the past decade in every NATO country except Portugal exceeded that of the U.S., which showed a decline. Urges the Reagan Administration to seek a new consensus on who does what in the NATO alliance to convince European taxpayers that "what they are being asked to provide makes military sense and is not simply for symmetry of sacrifice."

Bare, C. Gordon.

Burden-sharing in NATO: the economics of alliance. Orbis, v. 20, summer 1976: 417–436.

"The question of costs and benefits of membership is central to the creation and maintenance of alliance systems . . . 'burden-sharing' has to do with the monetary costs associated with the military forces of an alliance."

Baum, Julian.

NATO cost-sharing: Europe worries US cuts will add to strains on manpower, money. Christian Science monitor, Feb. 29, 1988: 9–10.

"European members of NATO worry that cuts in US defense budget will force them to spend more on weapons and increase troop commitment."

Baum, Keith W.

Treating the allies properly: the Eisenhower Administration, NATO, and the multilateral force. Presidential studies quarterly, v. 13, winter 1983: 85–97.

"During the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower, the growth of Soviet strategic power . . . caused the European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to reassess the merits of relying on American nuclear arms. . . . This multiplicity of national interests and the various perceptions of nuclear arms within the alliance that accompanied those interests threatened to throw NATO into acute disarray."

Bayer, J. A.

Is there life after NATO? International perspectives, Sept.-Oct. 1987: 13-16.

"On balance, it can be argued that Canada's security, sovereignty and international influence would be better served by a non-aligned foreign and defence policy than by continued membership in the North Atlantic Alliance. . . . Below the surface the rationale for Canada's continued participation in NATO is not as compelling, convincing, or self-evident as assumed by alliance supporters."

Baylis, John.

Britain, the Brussels Pact and the continental commitment. International affairs (London), v. 60, autumn 1984: 615-629.

"The purpose of this article is to chart the process by which, after the experiences of the 1920s and 1930s, as well as the Second World War, Britain decided to reorient its traditional, essentially maritime, defence policy and to commit itself, in political and strategic terms, more closely to its West European allies. . . . Consideration is also given to the contribution made by Britain . . . to the formation of the West European security system."

Beaufre, Andre.

NATO and Europe. Translated from the French by Joseph Green. New York, Knopf, 1966. 70 p. (UA646.3.B383 1966)

Partial contents.—The birth of NATO.—Evolution of NATO strategy.—In what ways is the Atlantic Alliance still indispensable?—Possibilities for the future.—The reorganization of NATO seen as a first step toward European unity.

Beaver, Paul.

Gibraltar: pimple or pinnacle of power. Navy international, v. 86, July 1981: 400-403.

"Since 1704 Gibraltar has played a major part in the defense of the United Kingdom and her interests abroad. In recent years its strategic significance has been overlooked, but with the probable inclusion of Spain within NATO during the next twelve months, the Supreme Allied Command is again looking at Gibraltar's commanding position."

Bender, Peter.

The superpower squeeze. Foreign policy, no. 65, winter 1986-87: 98-113.

Examines the dilemma of Europe in the context of East-West relations and German reunification. "The situation for West Europeans is bewildering. The United States is on the one hand the protector and on the other, a source of danger as soon as its power struggle with the USSR intensifies. The same applies to the East Europeans with respect to the Soviet Union."

Birnbaum, Norman.

Europeanization of Europe. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 41, Jan. 1985: 20–21.

Discusses recent efforts to reevaluate the NATO alliance.

Blay Biosca, Vicente.

Defending the Strait of Gibraltar: Spain's role is vital. International defense review, v. 18, no. 9, 1985: 1399–1400, 1403–1405.

"A zone of such strategic importance cannot be guarded and defended from only one or two bases. Complete Western control of the Strait will require Spanish collaboration."

Bloemer, Klaus.

Freedom for Europe, East and West. Foreign policy, no. 50, spring 1983: 23–38.

The author suggests that "a series of bold proposals by the United States and the West European industrial countries to establish an autonomous Europe could provide the framework for a new global understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union." These proposals would entail: Western help in stabilizing the Soviet economy, withdrawal of U.S. and Soviet troops from Western and Eastern Europe, reorganization of the West European defense system, coordination of French and West German strategic doctrines, military adjustments within Eastern Europe, consolidation of the political and territorial situation in the German region, and reunification of Berlin.

Borosage, Robert L.

NATO: from containment to common security. In Winning America: ideas and leadership for the 1990s, edited by Marcus Raskin and Chester Hartman. Boston, South End Press, c1988. p. 363–370. (JK271.W655 1988)

Suggests that "our European allies must bear a greater share of the burden of their own conventional defense; . . . simultaneously, NATO must challenge the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact to draw down conventional forces in both alliances; . . . [and] the president must use the resources gradually freed by a lower commitment in Europe as part of a program to rebuild America and strengthen its economy."

Bouvard, Loic.

The legislative role of the French parliament in crisis management. Naval War College review, v. 37, Nov.–Dec. 1984: 80–85.

Examines the role of the French parliament in that country's decision to withdraw from NATO.

Boyle, Peter G.

Britain, America and the transition from economic to military assistance, 1948–51. Journal of contemporary history, v. 22, 1987: 521–538.

"Between 1948 and 1951 a transition took place in American foreign policy from containment in its economic form, particularly the Marshall Plan, to containment in its military form,

particularly NATO, the military assistance programme and Western rearmament. . . . Examines how far the British agreed with Kennan's criticism of the over-militarization of Western foreign policy in the years 1948–51."

Bull, Hedley.

European self-reliance and the reform of NATO. Foreign affairs, v. 61, spring 1983: 874–892.

Considers a Europeanist alternative to the present NATO relationship which would require "the transfer from North American to European hands of a greater share of the burden of European defense, and along with it of a greater share of responsibility for decisions."

Bundy, McGeorge.

The Americans and Europe: rhetoric and reality; the eighth foundation lecture, 18 July 1969. Oxford, Ditchley Foundation, 1969. 20 p. (Ditchley Foundation. Lecture 8) (D10.D56, no. 8)

Burden sharing. Atlantic Community quarterly, v. 24, spring 1986: 63–65, 67–79.

Three articles evaluate burden sharing and consider its effectiveness.

Contents.—Burden sharing: has the term outlived its usefulness? by Jack A. LeCuyer.—Burden sharing in NATO: myth and reality, by Jonathan Paul Yates.—Allied burden sharing: another view, by Leonard Sullivan, Jr.

Burden sharing. National interest, no. 12, summer 1988: 34–46.

Contents.—The view from London, by Michael Legge.—And from Washington, by Richard Perle.

Burden sharing of defense expenditures and commitments. Armed Forces journal international, v. 119, Oct. 1981: 56–58, 60, 62, 64–66, 68, 70, 72, 74, 90.

Contents.—The real long-range defense dilemma: burden sharing, by L. Sullivan, Jr.—NATO's two-way street: US changing direction and heading the wrong way? by D. Kyle.—Weinberger whitewashes allied burden sharing.—The trick is how to get it, by R. Komer.

Burt, Richard.

The Allies' fair share of defense. Washington post, Oct. 8, 1987: A23.

U.S. Ambassador to West Germany examines the issue of burden sharing.

Caligaris, Luigi.

Italy's role in the defense of Europe. International defense review, v. 21, Aug. 1988: 917–921.

The Southern Region remains a strategic void in NATO's strategy.

Campbell, Edwina S.

Consultation and consensus in NATO, implementing the Canadian article. Lanham, University Press of America, c1985. 209 p. (JX1393.N67C28 1985)

Canada and NATO. Canadian defence quarterly, v. 17, Feb. 1988: whole issue (9–72 p.)

Contents.—The Alliance and Canada, by Lord Carrington.—Canada on the Rhine: first line of defence, by Gordon Smith.—Consolidation in Europe: implementing the white paper, by Paul D. Manson.—Three ocean strategy: right for Canada, right for NATO, by Bruce Johnston.—Le Comite militaire de l'OTAN, by Francois Richard.—The strategy of flexible response.— Deterrence and dialogue: NATO strategy for perestroika, by B. A. Goetze.—NATO in Canadian Defence Policy, by Nicholas Tracy.

Canby, Steven.

Canada's role in NATO: the Laggard who can rescue the Alliance, by Steven Canby and Jean Edward Smith. Strategic review, v. 13, summer 1985: 47–59.

"The recognition has grown that Canada's dismal defense performance is incompatible not only with her elementary national interests, but also with her desired voice in the Alliance."

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Restructuring Canada's defense contribution: a possible key to western security, by Steven L. Canby and Jean Edward Smith. Political science quarterly, v. 102, fall 1987: 441–457.

The authors "focus on Canada's slim military contribution to NATO. They suggest that an enhanced Canadian presence in the Central Front in Germany may provide the keystone for a credible conventional defense strategy in Europe."

Carrington, Peter.

The Atlantic Alliance and European Security. RUSI [Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies], v. 130, Sept. 1985: 3–6.

"A lecture given at the Royal United Services Institute on 16 May 1985 by the Rt. Hon. the Lord Carrington, KG, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization."

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The defense of Europe. Atlantic Community quarterly, v. 23, spring 1985: 25–31.

In this April 10, 1985 speech at the Institut Francais des Relations Internationales, Lord Carrington, Secretary General of NATO, discusses Alliance unity, French cooperation, increased European arms production and procurement, and European response to the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative.

Clark, Joe.

Canada and NATO in the 1990s. NATO review, v. 34, June 1986: 1–6.

Canadian Minister for External Affairs discusses Canada's involvement with NATO. "The presence of Canada in NATO represents a two-fold act of faith: for the first time in its history, Canada joined a military alliance in peacetime and, moreover, agreed to station members of its forces outside its national territory . . . in an integrated inter-allied military structure. Thus did Canada twice over express its solidarity with Europe."

Codevilla, Angelo. Bouchey, L. Francis.

Bringing out the worst in European politics. Strategic review, v. 16, winter 1988: 14–23.

Argues that "more debilitating than any dislocations prompted by the INF Treaty in NATO's military defenses is the damage perpetrated on the political fabric of the Alliance, particularly its trans-Atlantic linkages. . . . Key propellants of this process have been contradictory U.S. policies that have cut the ground from under pro-American and pro-Alliance forces in Western Europe, while legitimizing the security agendas of their left-wing opponents."

Cohen, Eliot A.

Do we still need Europe? Commentary, v. 81, Jan. 1986: 28–35.

"For an American to suggest that we should investigate our strategic interest in Europe can sound positively subversive—tantamount to repudiating our commitment to Europe altogether, or denying Europe's value to American security. . . . And yet such a reappraisal is due, and overdue. For the world has changed in many ways since the victorious statesmen and generals of World War II, in a massive departure from American tradition, advanced the first arguments for the commitment of hundreds of thousands of American soldiers to the peacetime defense of Europe."

Controversy over NATO cost-sharing. Congressional digest, v. 63, Aug.-Sept. 1984: 193–224.

Contents.—Controversy over NATO cost-sharing.—Pros & cons: is the Nunn-Roth approach to the U.S. role in NATO sound?

Cordesman, Anthony H.

Defense burden sharing a brief scorecard on our major allies (and ourselves). Armed Forces journal international, v. 120, Oct. 1982: 64, 66, 68, 70, 72, 90.

Reviews defense spending, military forces, and military policies of NATO countries. Suggests that "there is little reason to add the burden-sharing game, threats of US withdrawals, and hints of neo-military isolationism to the factors that already divide the West."

Cowen, Gina.

German security thinking revisited. RUSI [Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies], v. 127, Sept. 1982: 33–38.

"Can the German security problems be solved? . . . Two major issues have been identified. One, the flexibility and credibility of NATO defence strategy and two, the German perception of security, constrained by a particularly German historic experience."

Cromwell, William C.

The Eurogroup and NATO. Philadelphia, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1974. 55 p. (Research monograph series, Foreign Policy Research Institute, no. 18) (UA646.3.C76)

"The purpose of this study is to examine the history and achievements of the Eurogroup, to identify and consider its premises and rationale, to appraise both its potential and its limitations, and to relate the Eurogroup effort to its wider contexts of NATO, U.S.-West European relations, and Europe's own continuing political evolution."

Dankbaar, Ben.

Alternative defense policies and the peace movement. Journal of peace research, v. 21, June 1984: 141–155.

"In recent years several alternative defense policies have been developed which promise to diminish or eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in the defense of Western Europe, thereby fulfilling a major demand of the peace movement. It is argued that these alternatives and the peace movement have a common political background in the changing relationship between the U.S. and Western Europe."

Dankert, Pieter.

Speaking up on defense. Europe, no. 234, Nov.-Dec. 1982: 30–32.

The President of the European Parliament discusses "strains between the U.S. and its European allies. He advocates that Europeans "develop a common approach to the requirements of Western security—an approach that would derive from European assessments and European perspectives."

De Montbrial, Thierry.

The European dimension. Foreign affairs, v. 64, no. 3, 1986: 499–514.

Details the state of transatlantic relations.

The Defence of Europe. Washington, Dept. of State [1983] 16 p.

"This booklet has set out in brief some of the facts and figures which demonstrate the European contribution. But it has also tried to describe some of the ways in which European allies, and specifically those who are members of the EUROGROUP, make an important and constructive contribution to stability and world peace. The defence of our freedom rests with NATO and NATO's strength lies not only in its military forces but in the unity of independent nations."

Degner, Juergen.

The security policy of the Federal Republic of Germany. Parameters, v. 15, summer 1985: 47–54.

"The German government states that the security requirements of the various nations may differ and that each country may react to certain problems from case to case in the light of national interests. . . . The underlying policy of the Federal Republic of Germany is thereby determined primarily by conditions that differ decisively from those of the other NATO members. This article will discuss these unique factors and show some areas of Germany's security policy that are as they are only because of these conditions."

Dettke, Dieter.

European options. NATO review, v. 29, Aug. 1981: 29–33.

Considers why proposals in Europe to form a political union with a military role have not worked and examines structural reasons which may prevent success in the future. Surveys Western European options, especially in the Middle East. Emphasizes that Europe needs more flexibility within the Atlantic Alliance to maximize its influence in the world.

Dezcallar, Rafael.

On West European defense cooperation: a Spanish view. Washington quarterly, v. 10, winter 1987: 153–169.

"The aim of this paper is to examine the underlying conditions for the present Atlantic security system. . . . Analyzes some factors that should be considered in the European security system: the policies of some West European nations, the interests of the superpowers, and the slow emergence of a West European political identity."

Dimitras, Panayote E.

Greece: a new danger. Foreign policy, no. 58, spring 1985: 134–150.

Claiming that Western optimism and confidence about Greece's pro-Western future is excessive, the author argues for immediate yet subtle Western response to the current tide of Greek anti-Westernism.

Domke, William K. Eichenberg, Richard C. Kelleher, Catherine M.

Consensus lost? Domestic politics and the "crisis" in NATO. World politics, v. 39, Apr. 1987: 382–407.

"The purpose of this essay is to present further data on the degree of domestic cleavage on security issues within NATO countries, and to attempt an explanation of these cleavages. The essay includes a summary of research on public and elite opinion in the United States, Britain, France, West Germany, and the Netherlands."

Donhoff, Marion.

Bonn and Washington: the strained relationship. Foreign affairs, v. 57, summer 1979: 1052–1064.

"Part of the mutual uneasiness that occasionally crops up stems from the fact that each country's idea of the other no longer corresponds to reality." . . . "But the certainty of each country depending on the other and of standing for the same

goals and convictions was always stronger than the irritations."

Dorfer, Ingemar.

Scandinavia and NATO: a la carte. Washington quarterly, v. 9, winter 1986: 15–30.

Examines Scandinavian policies regarding NATO membership, nuclear weapons, and other issues.

Dougherty, James E. Pfaltzgraff, Diane.

Eurocommunism and the Atlantic Alliance. Cambridge, Mass., Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1977. 66 p.

"The authors, focusing on Italy and France, assess the implications of Eurocommunism for democracy in these countries, the contention that West European communist parties have become autonomous of the Soviet Union, and the possible impact of Eurocommunism upon Eastern Europe, the movement toward European unity, and NATO. Finally, they set forth several options for consideration by U.S. policymakers in response to the challenge of Eurocommunism."

Drath, Viola Herms.

German-American relations in transition: from junior partner to competitor. Global affairs, v. 2, summer 1987: 119–131.

Looks at German-American relations from different perspectives: political, economic and military. Discusses changing preconditions for redefining German-American relations.

Drifting together or apart?: U.S.-European relations in the Paul-Henri Spaak lectures, Harvard University, 1981–1984. Edited by Richard C. Eichenberg. [Cambridge, Mass.] Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, Lanham, Md., University Press of America, c1986. 216 p. (JX1428.E8D75 1986)

The Dutch. Wilson quarterly, v. 11, spring 1987: 52–85.

Partial contents.—Beyond perfection, by Thomas R. Rochon.—The independent ally, by Stanley R. Sloan.

Eberwein, Wolf-Dieter.

Germany's security policy options from the elite perspective: some implications. Air University review, v. 34, Mar.–Apr. 1983: 17–22.

"This present discussion focuses on the question of the security policy options perceived by the German security policy elite: How does the German elite perceive its security needs and its present threats and evaluate the importance of the alliance? Furthermore, what options does this country have to enhance its security?"

Egilsson, Olafur.

An unarmed nation joins a defence alliance: Iceland as a founder member of NATO. NATO review, v. 31, Apr. 1983: 24–31.

"Iceland, which had only recently regained its independence, had long pursued a policy of neutrality. It had no armed forces

and had no intention of creating any. Yet by early 1949, it concluded that membership was the most logical option."

Eichenberg, Richard C.

The myth of Hollanditis. International security, v. 8, fall 1983: 143–159.

"Examines the balance among competing traditions in Dutch foreign and security policy by reviewing public opinion polls on a variety of important security issues. A review of opinion polls shows that the current Dutch consensus is more pragmatist than pacifist. What appears to be unique about the Dutch case is . . . the comparatively strong impact that opinions have had on Dutch governments."

Europe's futures, Europe's choices: models of Western Europe in the 1970s. Edited by Alastair Buchan. New York, Columbia University Press, 1969. 167 p. (D1060.E88 1969)

"The purpose of this study is threefold: first, to examine different structures of a future Western Europe, in order to see what their effects would be, especially on the Atlantic Alliance and on East-West relations; second, to assess the possibilities each of them offers for the solution of Europe's own problems; third, to bring out the choices which will confront policy-makers in the coming years."

Europe's peace movement: time bomb for U.S.? U.S. news & world report, v. 91, Nov. 9, 1981: 23–25.

A brief survey of a pacifist movement sweeping across Allied Europe.

"European/American relations: divergent attitudes?" Theme of 27th annual assembly of the Atlantic Treaty Association, London, Sept. 29–Oct. 2, 1981. Atlantic Community quarterly, v. 19, winter 1981–82: 395–428.

Contents.—Security vis-a-vis the USSR is not divisible, by H. Sonnenfeldt.—An American view of military relations, by R. Dougherty.—A European view of military relations, by N. Haagerup.

European co-operation today. Edited by Kenneth J. Twitchett. London, Europa Publications, c1980. 285 p. (D1053.E878)

Partial contents.—European regionalism in perspective, by Kenneth J. Twitchett.—NATO and the Eurogroup, by Phil Williams.—The EEC and European co-operation, by Carol Cosgrove Twitchett.—The European community and regional co-operation in the Third World, by Carol Cosgrove Twitchett.—EFTA and the Nordic Council, by Clive Archer.—Co-operation in socialist Europe: CMEA and the Warsaw Pact, by Ieuan John.—European monetary co-operation, by Geoffrey Dennis.—Britain and European region co-operation, by F. S. Northedge.

European security and the Atlantic system. Edited by William T. R. Fox and Warner R. Schilling. New York, Columbia University Press, 1973. 276 p. (D1053.E89)

This work addresses "aspects of the emerging Western European and North Atlantic environment—economic, technological, strategic, and domestic political—in which the twin goals of Atlantic security and strategic arms control are to be sought."

Partial contents.—Economic factors in future arrangements for European security, by Klaus Knorr.—Future technology and Western European security, by Victor Basiuk.—Britain and European security: issues and choices for the 1970s, by Andrew J. Pierre.—France and European security: De Gaulle and after, by Wilfrid L. Kohl.—Germany, European security, and arms control, by Catherine M. Kelleher and Donald J. Puchala.—Domestic pressures in North America to withdraw forces from Europe, by Annette Baker Fox.—NATO and the American nuclear deterrent, by Annette Baker Fox.

Evolving European defense policies. Edited by Catherine M. Kelleher and Gale A. Mattox. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, c1987. 340 p. (UA646.E95 1987)

The Federal Republic of Germany in the 1980s: foreign policies and domestic changes; a symposium, edited by Robert Gerald Livingston. New York, German Information Center, 1983. 60 p. (DD260.5.F43 1983)

Contents.—An introduction to the Federal Republic in the 1980s, by R. Livingston.—The Federal Republic and NATO: change and continuity, by C. Kelleher.—Intra-German relations: the view from Bonn, by G. Stent.—The new generation: protest and postmaterialism, by S. Szabo.

Folly, Martin H.

Britain and the issue of Italian membership in NATO, 1948–49. Review of international studies, v. 13, July 1987: 177–186.

The roots of British opposition to Italian inclusion in NATO were strategic, and derived from the disparity between resources and requirements. Even though there was not a great apprehension that war was imminent, the defence problem, which had been enlarged by the commitments created by the Brussels Treaty, caused civilian and military policy-makers to look critically at any prospect of increasing these problems prior to a definite US commitment, and to look at the North Atlantic Treaty in terms of practical co-operation and short-term military strategy."

Foot, Peter.

Defence burden-sharing in the Atlantic Community 1945–1954. Aberdeen, Scot., Centre for Defence Studies, University of Aberdeen, 1981. 60 p. (Aberdeen Studies in Defence Economics. ASIDES no. 20)

Problems of equity in alliance arrangements. Aberdeen, Centre for Defence Studies, 1982. 43 p. (Aberdeen studies in defence economics no. 23)

"This essay . . . is not simply an account of that intra-Allied wrangling about fair shares. . . . Rather it is an analysis . . . of the fundamental problem of equity in Alliance arrangements, which is what has given rise to all the disagreement."

Ford, Robert E.

The Spain-NATO-United States triangle: who controls the negotiations? Fletcher forum, v. 12, summer 1988: 321-339.

"Spain's role in NATO historically has been both ambiguous and heavily influenced by Spain's relations with the United States. Mutual defense agreements with the United States, multilateral negotiations with NATO and dramatic political changes in Spain have evolved along parallel tracks since the late 1940s. A triangular relationship has emerged recently, with each 'leg' of the negotiations depending on the events in the others.— Robert E. Ford analyzes how Spain-United States bilateral relations shape Spain's involvement with NATO."

Foreign Policy Research Institute.

The three per cent solution and the future of NATO, by the staff of the Foreign Policy Research Institute. Philadelphia, Pa., 1981. 118 p. (Western security studies program) (UA646.3.F67 1981)

"The 'three per cent solution' refers . . . to NATO's plan for financing the defense of the West in 'ordinary times.' When there is no obvious crisis." This work addresses such issues as how can the West defend itself under conditions of detente, was the three per cent solution an appropriate remedy for NATO's defense allocation problems, and other concerns.

Frank, Andre Gunder.

The European challenge: from Atlantic Alliance to Pan-European entente for peace and jobs. Westport, Conn., Lawrence Hill & Company, 1984. 104 p.

Contents.—The transformation in the balance of power between Europe and America.—West-West conflict.—Economic crisis and political conflict in Eastern Europe.—Political economic alternatives.

Freedman, Lawrence.

The Atlantic crisis. International affairs, v. 58, summer 1982: 395–412.

The author argues that NATO countries "must move beyond the recognition that the security problem involves more than the Soviet military threat to Central Europe. The economic dimensions to the problem must also be acknowledged. Otherwise there is a risk that attempts to deal with the dissatisfaction in Western Europe (and increasingly in the United States) with the nuclear bias in NATO strategy, or to develop an effective diplomacy towards the Third World will falter through a

lack of funds to support them or get caught up in the spillover from arguments on trade or monetary issues."

French security issues: a symposium. [Washington] American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research [1982] 48 p. (AEI foreign policy and defense review, v. 4, no. 1)

Partial contents.—The politics of defense and foreign policy in France, by D. Moisi.—The odd couple, by P. Lellouche.—Political and military background for France's intervention capability, by G. Wittman.—The new weaponry revolution and NATO, by P. Gallois.—The relationship of France with NATO, by F. de Rose.—The politics of French security policy, by A. DePorte and H. DeSantis.—Arms control and security in Europe: France's role, by J. Huntzinger.—Analysis and perspective: socialist France in East-West relations, by P. Fontaine.—French defense: an American appreciation, by J. Kelly.

The Future of European alliance systems: NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Edited by Arlene Idol Broadhurst. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1982. 316 p. (UA646.F87 1982)

Discusses four major subjects—European security perspectives, NATO, the Warsaw Pact, and resource allocations for defense—with the framework of comparative alliance approaches. Their detailed descriptions of current problems, diversities, and discussions within the two alliance systems offer insight into the differing ideas of what constitutes security."

The Future of German-American relations, Berlin, FRG, June 8–10, 1987. New York, International Security Council, c1987. 217 p.

Evolution of the Soviet threat: the impact of perception, by Robin Beard.—The course of U.S.-West German relations, 1945–1987, by David Gress-Wright.—The German-U.S. relationship: old problems and new, by Frederick S. Wyle.—The Atlantic alliance: conventional unity and nuclear security, by Hans Huyn.—The nature of the alliance: conventional unity and nuclear assurance, by Werner Kaltefleiter.—The future of security: arms control, strategic defense and deterrence, by Lothar Ruehl.—Trade and commerce: common goals and uncommon interests, by Ruediger Soltwedel and Peter Trapp.—The future of America's foreign security involvements, by Henry S. Rowen.

Gallis, Paul E.

Franco-German security cooperation: implications for the NATO Alliance. Jan. 5, 1989. Washington, Congressional Research Service, 1989. 29 p. (89–16 F)

This paper describes efforts by France and West German since 1945 to develop institutions intended to allow the expression and pursuit of often divergent foreign policy interests without jeopardy to their bilateral relations. The paper analyzes the issues that have led to greater Franco-German security cooperation in the 1980s. Specifically, it examines the causes for growing doubts in Paris and Bonn over the U.S. nuclear guarantee of Western Europe, and the subsequent efforts by

France to modify its security policy in order to develop a European alternative to that guarantee.

Galvin, John R.

Trans-Atlantic partnership for security: Canada in NATO. Canadian defence quarterly, v. 18, summer 1988: 9–10, 12–14, 16.

Warns that the euphoria following the signing of the INF Treaty must not be allowed to weaken the trans-Atlantic ties with Europe or lead to a premature drawdown of NATO forces. Includes brief references to the level of Canadian military commitment to NATO defense.

Garnham, David.

Extending deterrence with German nuclear weapons. International security, v. 10, summer 1985: 96–110.

"Because of its exposed geographical position and economic importance, West Germany is the principal territory that American deterrence must be extended to protect. . . . A German deterrent would reinforce European security while reducing threats to American security," argues the author.

Genscher, Hans-Dietrich.

Toward an overall Western strategy for peace, freedom and progress. Foreign affairs, v. 61, fall 1982: 42–66.

The Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany and leader of the Free Democratic Party discusses NATO's political and economic policies. He contends: "once we are aware of the difference between the European and American concepts of 'detente,' it should be possible, from this basic perception, to develop a long-term overall Alliance policy toward the East that draws common conclusions from the experience in the 1970s and provides a joint response to the challenges of the 1980s. Four fields are involved: arms control and disarmament, economic relations with the East, human rights and in this context especially the policy toward Eastern Europe, and policy toward the Third World."

George, Bruce. Lindsley, Ian.

The re-evaluation of Italian defence policy. RUSI [Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies], v. 130, Dec. 1985: 41–47.

"Since the mid-1970s Italy has been reviewing its defence policy in structural and strategic terms under the influence of heightened public interest in defence and changing threats to its national security. In the last ten years successive governments have attempted to depart from post-war political and public indifference to defence policy and foreign affairs, and enhance Italy's position within the Western Alliance."

Germany: keystone to European security: a symposium. AEI foreign policy and defense review, v. 4, no. 3–4, 1983: whole issue.

Goetz, Bernd A.

Security in Europe: a crisis of confidence: a study of military security and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in

Europe as a political instrument for enhancing confidence and stability in Europe. New York, Praeger, 1984. 225 p. (UA646.G57 1984)

Partial contents.—Quest for peace and security in Europe.—Military balance.—Security through arms control.—The CSCE: a European alternative?—A new CSBM regime: prerequisite for European security.

Golden, James R.

The dynamics of change in NATO: a burden-sharing perspective. New York, Praeger, 1983. 229 p. (UA646.3.G638 1983)

Partial contents.—NATO strategy and the dimensions of burden sharing.—NATO programs: efficiency and distribution.—Bilateral U.S.-FRG perspectives.—Economics, security, and burden sharing.

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NATO burden-sharing: risks and opportunities. New York, Praeger, 1983. 103 p. (Washington papers, v. 10, 96) (UA646.3.G64 1983)

Published with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.

Contents.—NATO: a period of readjustment.—The difficulty of measuring equity.—Dividing the NATO pie—or making it bigger.—Germany's role: the problems of change.—Defense and negotiation.

Goldsborough, James O.

The roots of Western disunity. New York times magazine, May 9, 1982: 48–50, 52, 54, 58–60, 62.

"The discord between America and Western Europe on the problems besetting NATO and the world may be traced to an ethical schism," contends the author.

Gole, Henry G.

Through European eyes: should NATO strategy be changed? Parameters, v. 11, Dec. 1981: 14–23.

Examines differences between U.S. and Western European perceptions of national security, NATO strategy, and foreign policy objectives. Reviews courses of action open to the U.S. in its relations with European members of NATO.

Gordon, Michael R.

NATO. Military logistics forum, v. 1, Mar. 1985: 21–34.

One article and an interview examine the impact of the Nunn Amendment on NATO burden-sharing.

Partial contents.—NATO strategy and the dimensions of burden sharing.—NATO programs: efficiency and distribution.—Bilateral U.S.-FRG perspectives.—Economics, security, and burden sharing.

Graebner, Norman A.

The United States and West Europe: an age of ambivalence. Current history, v. 85, Nov. 1986: 353–356, 387–389.

"Reviews United States-West European relations since the early 1980's. Disagreements during this period 'lead some Western observers to wonder whether the North Atlantic alliance had become obsolete."

Greenwood, David.

Allocating resources for Western Europe's defence. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 27, Oct.-Nov. 1982: 20, 22-23.

Contends, using U.S. Dept. of Defense statistics, that European members of NATO are shouldering at least their share of the NATO defense burden. Suggests, however, that emphasis should be on outputs rather than expenditures and advocates specialization based on a rational division of labor.

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NATO's three per cent solution. Survival, v. 23, Nov.-Dec. 1981: 252-260.

Describes the rationale underlying NATO members' goal of increasing defense budgets each year by three percent in real terms. Considers this goal a mixed blessing at best, and describes problems resulting from it.

Griffith, William E.

Bonn and Washington: from deterioration to crisis? Orbis, v. 26, spring 1982: 117-133.

The article focuses on the "problematic" U.S.-West German relationship.

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Superpower problems in Europe: a comparative assessment. Orbis, v. 29, winter 1986: 735-752.

"This article concentrates on Soviet problems in Eastern Europe and treats Western alliance problems more briefly, and primarily for comparative purposes. The involvement of the German question in both alliances highlights this interrelated treatment. The problems of both sides will be assessed for their effects on the Soviet-American correlation of forces."

Grimmett, Richard F. Laipson, Ellen B.

Turkey's problems and prospects: implications for U.S. interests. Prepared for the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, by the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Washington, G.P.O., 1980. 68 p. (E183.8.T8U53 1980)

At head of title: 96th Congress, 2nd session. Committee print.

"This report scrutinizes the strategic, political, and economic interests of the United States in Turkey and surveys the critical political, economic, and military changes the Turkish Government . . . confronts." Presents materials which assess "U.S. relations with an important NATO ally."

Groom, A. J. R.

An independent Britain in an interdependent world: thinking the unthinkable? Millenium, v. 11, autumn 1982: 242-254.

"According to the author, the time has come for Britain to rethink her role in a changing and dangerous world and to adopt a stance of 'concerned independence.'" Such a policy would entail loosening Britain's ties with the European Community and breaking its ties with NATO.

Haagerup, Niels J.

The European security identity. NATO's sixteen nations, v. 29, Sept.-Oct. 1984: 36, 38-40.

"The stirrings for a European security consciousness go back a long way and, although they have not yet fully borne fruit, they have been expressed in several groupings. Movement is slow and obstacles are manifold but Mr. Haagerup shows that it is taking shape in its various aspects in the different European organisations. He advocates a gradual and pragmatic approach."

Harbron, John D.

Spanish foreign policy since Franco. Toronto, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1984. 15 p. (Behind the headlines, 1984, v. 41, no. 4)

Harrison, Michael M.

The reluctant ally: France and Atlantic security. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, c1981. 304 p. (DC404.H35)

Hassner, Pierre.

France, deterrence and Europe: rationalizing the irrational. International defense review, no. 17, no. 2, 1984: 133-142.

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Frustrated but frozen: Europe and the Atlantic relationship. International journal, v. 39, spring 1984: 410-428.

"In the last analysis, whether encouraged by changes in Europe, in the Third World, or, above all, in their own societies, it is still only a change in the nature of the Soviet regime or in the staying power of the American commitment which can give birth to a structurally new Europe."

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The shifting foundation. Foreign policy, no. 48, fall 1982: 3-20.

Compares and contrasts U.S. and Western European, especially West German, perceptions of NATO and of East-West relations. Suggests that though the U.S. views NATO in terms of military threat, "the political struggle for the orientation of Europe, in particular Germany, is the very purpose of the two alliances."

Heer, Hagen.

Territorial defence: protecting the home base. NATO's sixteen nations, v. 28, Feb.-Mar. 1983: 50, 53-54.

The author, an assistant section chief on the Federal German Army staff, describes the West German Territorial Army "in the framework of German national military defence, taking into account in particular the employment of its combat

troops for the protection of rear areas," and cooperation with NATO land forces.

Heiberg, William L.

The sixteenth nation: Spain's role in NATO. Washington, National Defense University Press [for sale by the Supt. of Docs., G.P.O.] 1983. 78 p. (Monograph series no. 83-1) (UA646.5.S7H44 1983)

Contents.—The Alliance in 1982.—Spain's potential.—NATO and US objectives.—Spanish objectives.—Spain's role in NATO.—The impact of Spanish membership.

Heseltine, Michael.

Strengthening Europe's contribution to the common defence: the role of Eurogroup. NATO review, v. 32, Dec. 1984: 18-22.

British Secretary of State for Defense defines the Eurogroup and discusses its role in European defense. "One of the principal concerns of the Eurogroup has been to ensure not only that the Europeans play a full part in the strengthening of the Alliance's military capabilities, but that . . . [this] contribution is fully recognised and understood in North America."

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The United Kingdom's strategic interests and priorities, by Michael Heseltine and Harry Tuzo. RUSI [Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies], v. 128, Dec. 1983: 3-5.

The High cost of NATO: 'burden-sharing' becomes a hot U.S. political issue. Newsweek, v. 111, Mar. 7, 1988: 54, 56.

"A growing number of the American people feel abused by our allies. They feel that we spend a much greater portion of our wealth on the common defense; that we have too large a number of soldiers stationed on their territory; and that the allies use the money they save on defense to subsidize their trade, creating our enormous trade deficit. While these perceptions may be overdrawn, they reflect a real and profound public sentiment."

Hnatyshyn, Ray.

Canada: its recommitment to NATO. Atlantic Community quarterly, v. 22, fall 1984: 200-203.

Hoffmann, Stanley.

The crisis in the West. New York review of books, v. 27, July 17, 1980: 41-48.

Deals with the present crisis in the Atlantic Alliance, the reasons for the estrangement which exist on both sides of the Atlantic, and the prospects for better American-European cooperation.

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The U.S. and Western Europe: wait and worry. Foreign affairs, v. 63, no. 3, 1985: 631-652.

"The year brought no breakthroughs, no catastrophes. It did produce some progress on a variety of fronts—East-West, intra-European, NATO—but not enough to make of 1984 something more than a year of frustrations. These can best be discussed by examining the scene first from the viewpoint of the West Europeans, and then from that of the United States."

Hoffmann, Stanley.

Cries and whimpers: thoughts on West European-America relations in the 1980s. Daedalus, v. 113, summer 1984: 221–252.

The author looks at the West European situation and misgivings about America and tries to suggest some alternatives.

Holmes, John W.

The dumbbell won't do. Foreign policy, no. 50, spring 1983: 3–22.

The author, Assistant Undersecretary of State for External Affairs in the Canadian Government from 1953 to 1960, provides a Canadian perspective on the NATO alliance.

Holmes, Kim R.

Europeanizing NATO. Washington quarterly, v. 7, spring 1984: 59–68.

"The evolution of an independent European defense system, if it ever were to occur, may actually mark the beginning of a return to normalcy in U.S.-European relations as well as a new era of maturation of the NATO alliance."

Holst, Johan Jorgen.

The future of East-West relations: some policy perspectives. Naval War College review, v. 35, Sept.-Oct. 1982: 12–22.

An attempt to explore the future course of East-West relations from a policy perspective focusing on patterns of relationship, rather than on detailed analysis of specific issues.

Hommel, Nicolas.

Luxembourg: from neutrality to the Atlantic Alliance. NATO review, v. 30, no. 5, 1982: 29–33.

"Discusses Luxembourg's role, and in particular how the Grand Duchy came to replace a reliance on neutrality by a system of security based on mutual assistance, first through accession to the Brussels Treaty of 1948 and then the North Atlantic Treaty the following year."

Houwelingen, Jan, van.

The Independent European Programme Group (IEPG): the way ahead. NATO review, v. 32, Aug. 1984: 17–21.

The author, Chairman of the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) describes the group's origins and organization, delineates 3 main reasons why "closer European arms cooperation has become imperative," and concludes that "there is no doubt that European arms cooperation is of crucial importance to the future of the Alliance."

Howe, Geoffrey.

The Atlantic Alliance and the security of Europe. NATO review, v. 35, Apr. 1987: 1-9.

Stresses that "the Atlantic Alliance is, and must remain, the ultimate guarantor of European security. But if it is to remain in good shape it must adapt to changing circumstances. The management of differences of perception between the US and Europe will be crucial to this process. A better European defence effort, galvanised perhaps through the WEU Western European Union, can lead to a more substantial European pillar of the Alliance. It can help the United States to justify to skeptics the maintenance of its own contribution to European defence."

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The European pillar. Foreign affairs, v. 63, winter 1984-85: 330-343.

"No better image has even been found for the Atlantic Alliance than the arch supported by two pillars, one planted in North America, the other in Western Europe. . . . An arch so large cannot escape occasional stresses and strains. . . . The mutual dependence of America and Europe still justifies, the continuing presence of large U.S. forces on our continent."

Howorth, Jolyon.

The third way. Foreign policy, no. 65, winter 1986-87: 114-134.

"There have been only two coherent postwar scenarios for Europe. The first rests on . . . of 'Atlanticism,' that concept positing a community of purpose between the peoples of Western Europe and those of North America. The second scenario centers on a process of transcontinental reconciliation, implying gradual progress toward a regional security structure from, say, the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains."

Hunt, Kenneth.

NATO without France: the military implications. London, Institute for Strategic Studies, 1986. 26 p. (U162.A3, no. 32)

Jockel, Joseph T. Sokolsky, Joel J.

Canada and collective security: odd man out. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1986. 118 p. (Washington papers no. 121)

Partial contents.—Canadian defense policy: the setting.—Emphasizing the assets: the choice in defense policy.—Toward a new Canadian defense posture: imperatives for change and leadership.

Joffe, Josef.

The cost of abandoning Europe. National interest, no. 3, spring 1986: 30-42.

"What is the nature of Western Europe's contemporary order, and what role does the United States play in it?"

The limited partnership: Europe, the United States, and the burdens of alliance. Cambrdige, Mass., Ballinger Pub. Co., 1987. 225 p. (JX1393.N67U64 1987)

Partial contents.—Detente versus alliance.—NATO and nuclear weapons: no end of a lesson.—Conventional deterrence.—Alliance as order.

Jones, Christopher D.

Equality and equal security in Europe. Orbis, v. 26, fall 1982: 637–664.

Argues that "the mission of Soviet nuclear and conventional forces in Europe is to secure an unchallenged Soviet capability for military intervention in Eastern Europe . . . and that the objective of Soviet proposals for a balance of intermediate nuclear forces is to deny NATO a capability of deterring the Soviet Union from such interventions."

Kaplan, Lawrence S.

NATO and the United States: the enduring alliance. Boston, Twayne Publishers, c1988. 237 p. (Twayne's international history series; no. 1) (UA646.5.U5K37 1988)

Kaplan, Morton A.

The rationale for NATO: European collective security—past and future. Washington, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research [1973] 94 p. (UA646.3.K37)

Keel, Alton G., Jr.

Sharing the collective defence burden. US debate must not be ignored. NATO review, v. 36, Oct. 1988: 4–9.

"All of the Allies, including the US, must understand that they cannot have it both ways. We cannot be for nuclear deterrence, but be against new, more modern weapons. We cannot be for alliance cohesion, but against equity in burdensharing. More generally, we cannot be for defence, but against defence spending."

Kennedy, Gavin.

Burden sharing in NATO. New York, Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1979. 117 p. (UA646.3.K39 1979)

Kissinger, Henry.

Alliance cure: redeployment. Washington post, May 13, 1986: A19.

Former Secretary of State writes that "a larger European role in the defense of Europe is long overdue. This will require not only a more substantial material effort—where in fact progress is being made—but also an explicit European identity within NATO."

Knorr, Klaus Eugen.

Burden-sharing in NATO: aspects of U.S. policy. Orbis, v. 29, fall 1985: 517–536.

"The concept of burden-sharing in alliances is not simple, and its application encounters several serious difficulties. After clarifying concept, analysis, and measurement, this article will review the historical record and the present situation."

Kohl, Helmut.

Thirtieth anniversary of the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to the North Atlantic Alliance. NATO review, v. 33, June 1985: 1–8.

Chancellor Kohl reviews his country's 30 year NATO membership and outlines Germany's support for improved East-West relations.

Kolodziej, Edward A.

Europe: the partial partner. International security, v. 5, winter 1980–81: 104–131.

"The West European nations and the United States drift apart, growing division threatens alliance cohesion and weakens Western security as much from within as from without. Certainly mutual misunderstandings . . . impaired communications, and flawed consultation on both sides of the Atlantic contribute to the current malaise," concludes the author.

Kondracke, Morton M.

Make 'em pay. New republic, v. 197, Oct. 12, 1987: 15–17.

"The burden-sharing movement could lead to a stronger set of alliances and a stronger U.S. economy—if conventional forces are built up on our side or the Soviets can be induced to reduce theirs, and if Japan can be induced to spend its surpluses on economic development. This will require sophisticated diplomacy on the part of the United States."

Kosminsky, Jay P. Fisher, Richard D.

A ten-point program for increasing the allies' share of defense costs. Washington, Heritage Foundation, 1989. 15 p. (Backgrounder no. 686)

"President-elect Bush should call a Western summit early in his administration to insist that U.S. allies foot the bill for more of their defense costs."

Kourvetaris, Yorgos A.

The Southern Flank of NATO: political dimensions of the Greco-Turkish conflict since 1974. East European quarterly, v. 21, Jan. 1988: 431–446.

"NATO's Southern Flank covers central and eastern Mediterranean along with the three peninsular member countries of Italy, Greece, and Turkey. . . . The Southern Flank of NATO is as much a discussion in NATO military strategy as it is a story of continuous conflict and tension in civil-military relations between Greece and Turkey, the two antagonists."

Krause, Axel.

France: putting the Socialists to the test. Atlantic Community quarterly, v. 20, winter 1982–83: 364–368.

Examines the "recent, gradual shift rightward" by the French Socialist government of Francois Mitterand. Suggests that "the shift has been translated into adoption of a decidedly tough, pragmatic, and non-expansionary approach to reform, highlighted by last June's 1982 second franc devaluation and imposition of price and wage controls." Surveys domestic and international responses to the Socialist government's policies.

Kuniholm, Bruce R.

Turkey and NATO: past, present, and future. Orbis, v. 27, summer 1983: 421–445.

"Thirty years after Turkey joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, many of the geopolitical realities that provided the context for its accession still hold. . . . New developments, meanwhile, have given Turkey added geopolitical importance. . . . this essay will explore the range of geopolitical and other factors that have contributed to these developments and examine their implications for the future of Turkey's relationship with NATO."

Laqueur, Walter.

Euro-neutralism. Commentary, v. 69, June 1980: 21–27.

The article considers "self-Finlandization, the voluntary subordination of the European political order to the interests and wishes of the Soviet Union which has made considerable advances in recent years. The process goes on sometimes quite openly, without any attempt to embellish the true state of affairs, while at other times it assumes the guise of an 'independent policy' or a 'third way.' . . . The question now is how far it is likely to go." The author examines individual European states: France, Britain, West Germany, Turkey, etc.

Layne, Christopher.

Atlanticism without NATO. Foreign policy, no. 67, summer 1987: 22–45.

"America's response to NATO's deepening crisis hinges on a judgment of the seriousness of the alliance's problems. Reform will not force any meaningful change in alliance relations, and NATO's troubles will continue to fester. If things are as bad as the reformers say, then reform is not enough and a radical restructuring of the Atlantic relationship in essential."

Lellouche, Pierre.

Does NATO have a future? A European view. Washington quarterly, v. 5, summer 1982: 40–52.

The author, director of studies at the Institut Francais des Relations Internationales, contends: "pressure is mounting from various quarters for a major reappraisal of the Atlantic system that may well lead to substantial modifications to the alliance. Three related questions emerge as central to this task: the growing trends aimed at bringing change to the alliance, European views and possible initiatives in this regard, and the long-term consequences of these views on the future of the alliance and of Europe itself."

The Limits of the Alliance. Harvard international review, v. 9, Nov.-Dec. 1986: 6-7, 9-12, 14-16, 18-27, 30-45, 47.

Partial contents.—The Alliance and extra-European challenges, by David Allen.—The future of the Alliance and German-American relations, by Helmut Kohl.—European and American objectives in the Third World, by W. Scott Thompson and Philip A. Heywood.—The Alliance and the Arab-Israeli conflict, by Daniel Oduber Quiros.—The prospects of NATO and US-European relations, by Wilfried Martens.

Lord, Winston.

Western security: what has changed? What should be done? Atlantic Community quarterly, v. 19, summer 1981: 168-172.

Lunn, Simon.

Burden-sharing in NATO. London; Boston, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983. 88 p.

Contents.—Introduction.—The historical background.—The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.—The alliance dilemma.—The Reagan administration.—Burden- sharing.—Problems and prospects.

Manwaring, Max G.

Defending Europe: the Iberian connection. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1989. (UA780.M36 1989)

This book will be available in March 1990.

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Iberia's role in NATO's future: strategic reserve, reinforcement, and redoubt, by Max G. Manwaring and Alan Ned Sabrosky. Parameters, v. 16, spring 1986: 43-54.

"In order to help determine where Spain and Portugal stand in the European power equation, we begin by examining one of several possible indicators—armed forces strength. . . . However, numbers alone cannot show a complete picture. It is also necessary to comprehend how these armed forces are organized and equipped for operations. Thus, we begin by examining the missions, organization, and major weapons systems of the Spanish and Portuguese armed forces, in conjunction with their numbers, in order to appraise Iberian military capabilities."

Markham, James M.

The new NATO; a pronounced German accent. New York times, Aug. 1, 1988: A4.

Examines directions for NATO under the leadership of Manfred Worner, new Secretary General.

Maroni, Alice. Ulrich, John.

The U.S. commitment to Europe's defense: a review of cost issues and estimates. Nov. 7, 1985. Washington, Congressional Research Service, 1985. 18 p. (85-211 F)

Marquina Barrio, Antonio.

NATO, the EEC, Gibraltar, North Africa: overlapping issues for Spain. International spectator, v. 21, Jan.-Mar. 1986: 43-46.

The issues of NATO Gibraltar, the EEC and North Africa are crucial to the "understanding of the Spanish defence position in a European and Western framework."

Matthews, R. G.

Europe's coming-of-age within NATO. Army quarterly and defence journal, v. 115, Oct. 1985: 391-398.

Discusses the notion of "a more militarily independent Europe" within as well as outside of the NATO context.

Morrison, David C.

Sharing NATO's burden. National journal, v. 19, May 30, 1987: 1394-1398.

"Spurred by frustration over the allies' huge trade surpluses with the United States, some Members of Congress are threatening cutbacks in U.S. troops overseas."

Mujal-Leon, Eusebio.

Rei(g)ning in Spain. Foreign policy, no. 51, summer 1983: 101-117.

"By remaining firm in its support for Spain at a time when the country is in political and economic transition, the United States can strengthen its relationship with a country whose strategic and political importance will only increase during the 1980s and whose democratic institutions can set a powerful, new example in the Mediterranean and Latin America."

Murdoch, James C. Sandler, Todd.

Complementarity, free riding, and the military expenditures of NATO allies. Journal of Public economics, v. 25, Nov. 1984: 83-101.

"This paper examines the major influences of an ally's demand for military expenditures. Demand equations are estimated for a sample of NATO nations using the iterative, seemingly unrelated regressions technique. Evidence is presented indicating that structural changes occurred in these equations in the early 1970s. This instability is the predicted effect of the doctrine of flexible response, adopted by NATO during this time period. The statistical tests show that the medium-sized nuclear powers' military expenditures responded identically to income and defense spending; the same held true for the lowland allies."

NATO's northern allies: the national security policies of Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway. Edited by Gregory Flynn. Totowa, N.J., Rowman & Allanheld London, Croom Helm, 1985. 294 p. (An Atlantic Institute for International Affairs research volume) (UA0646.85.N37 1985)

Partial contents.—The passive constrained: Belgian security policy in the 1980s, by Luc Reychler.—Denmark's quest for security: constraints and opportunities with the Alliance, by

Martin Heisler.—The Netherlands depillarized: security policy in a new domestic context, by Jan G. Siccama.—Norwegian security policy: defense and nonprovocation in a changing context, by Arne Olav Brundtland.—Lillputs and Gulliver: small states in a great-power alliance, by Johan J. Holst.

Nelson, Daniel N. Lepgold, Joseph.

Alliances and burden-sharing: a NATO-Warsaw Pact comparison. Defense analysis, v. 2, Sept. 1986: 205–224.

Compares "national defense efforts within the two superpower alliances across two distinct sets of measures between 1972 and 1982."

Nuechterlein, Donald E.

Convergence and divergence in the North Atlantic relationship. World today, v. 39, May 1983: 164–170.

"The year 1982 produced a serious re-evaluation by all NATO member states of their national interests—of military and economic ties between Western Europe and North America, on the one hand, and relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe on the other."

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The widening Atlantic. Foreign Service journal, v. 61, Sept. 1984: 37–41.

"Rough seas are ahead for NATO as the European allies leave the United States' wake and set a more independent course. . . . The divergence in U.S. and Western European views over NATO policies results from differing perceptions of their interests."

Nunn, Sam.

NATO challenges and opportunities: a three-track approach. NATO review, v. 35, June 1987: 1–8.

U.S. Senator and Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee states that "for nearly four decades, NATO has kept the peace in Europe. The United States has played a vital role in this peacekeeping effort, and has also been a principal beneficiary. . . . We cannot, however, take NATO or the deterrence of war for granted. If we are to preserve peace into the next century and beyond, NATO must make hard decisions about the essential elements of its security policy."

O'Leary, James P.

Can NATO survive Eurocommunism? International security review, v. 5, spring 1980: 73–90.

An attempt to assess "the extent to which Eurocommunism has departed from traditional Marxism-Leninism and what its rise portends for the Atlantic Alliance."

Olson, Eric T.

NATO burden-$haring: a new look needed. Military review, v. 63, Nov. 1983: 12–20.

"The development of an equitable method for determining shares of NATO Alliance costs is a complex task. The author

predicts that a variety of factors will focus future attention on this area and bring about changes. He sees an 'output-oriented' system as the best means for meeting the needs of all parties concerned."

Olson, Mancur, Jr. Zeckhauser, Richard.

An economic theory of alliances. Santa Monica, Calif., Rand Corp., 1966. 38 p. (Memorandum RM-4297-ISA) (Q180.A1R36, no. 4297)

"Research . . . sponsored by the Department of Defense."

Ott, George.

Geopolitics for an uncertain era. Air University review, v. 33, Sept.-Oct. 1982: 29-35.

Reviews the widening rift between the U.S. and its allies in Western Europe and Japan, resulting from the relative decline in U.S. economic and political strength, and the increasing fragmentation of the international economy along regional lines. Considers the prospects for and advantages of regional economic integration in the Western Hemisphere. Examines the alliance system in the Western Hemisphere, formalized by the creation of the Organization of American States, and explores the possibility of developing that alliance into a security arrangement similar to NATO. Contends: "Should circumstances dictate that the United States withdraw from its transoceanic positions, Washington would have almost no other alternative than to sponsor a similar security arrangement in the Americas."

Owen, David.

A new defence dynamic for Europe in NATO. NATO's sixteen nations, v. 29, Sept.-Oct. 1984: 19-20, 23-24.

"Dr. Owen argues the case for a strong European defence identity within the NATO framework based on powerful conventional defences and real industrial cooperation. Europe's greater weight in defence councils will, however, have to be backed by meeting its full conventional and nuclear obligations."

Palmer, John.

Europe without America?: the crisis in Atlantic relations. Oxford; New York, Oxford University Press, 1987. 217 p. (D1058.P338 1987)

Pannenberg, Wolfhart.

A perplexed ally. Worldview, v. 23, Dec. 1980: 21-23.

"Now more than ever Western Europe remains dependent on American leadership. Success or failure of U.S. foreign policy inevitably becomes Europe's own," argues the author in conclusion.

Perle, Richard.

NATO's southern flank. Defense issues, v. 2, no. 24, 1987: 1-4.

In this Apr. 1, 1987 statement before the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations As-

sistant Secretary of Defense for International Security examines the U.S.-security relationship with Spain, Portugal, Turkey and Greece.

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US security assistance for Turkey and the challenge of and for the Southern Flank, by Richard N. Perle and Michael J. McNamara. NATO's sixteen nations, v. 32, Apr. 1987: 94–97.

"Turkey's value and commitment to the Alliance, and her ability to preserve stability in a potentially volatile region, make her defense modernization requirements of key importance to NATO. The past efforts of the United States to provide security assistance have been effective and extensive."

Poettering, Hans-Gert.

Germany's and France's interest in a European security policy. Aussenpolitik, v. 37, no. 2, 176–186.

"Potential developments in Western Europe have resulted in numerous calls for a thoroughly planned European security and defence policy—not in opposition to but in close coordination with America—which would make Western Europe the second pillar, alongside America, of the Western Alliance."

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A new European security policy? Aussenpolitik, v. 36, 1985: 147–156.

The author contends that the emancipation of Europe "gnaws at the foundations of the Alliance" and that "only a meshing of America's strategic, tactical nuclear and conventional forces in Europe can ensure West European security."

Politics and security in the southern region of the Atlantic alliance. Edited by Douglas T. Stuart. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988. 209 p. (JX1393.N67P65 1988)

Portugal, Spain and transatlantic relations: summary of a transatlantic dialogue. Cambridge, Mass., Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1983. 18 p.

Contents.—Spanish and Portuguese armed forces.—Spain and the Alliance: current issues.—Portugal and the Alliance: current issues.

Prestor, Paul.

Spain, the EEC, and NATO. London, Boston, Routledge & K. Paul [for] the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1984. 96 p. (Chatham House papers, 22) (HC241.25.S6P73 1984)

Radway, Laurence.

Let Europe be Europe. World policy journal, v. 1, fall 1983: 23–43.

Discusses the question of U.S. involvement in European defense, explores Soviet intentions, and argues for the gradual withdrawal of American forces from Europe.

Raj, Christopher S.

American military in Europe: controversy over NATO burden sharing. New Delhi, ABC Pub. House, 1983. 380 p. (UA646.5.U5R34 1983)

Record, Jeffrey.

The Europeanization of NATO: a restructured commitment for the 1980s. Air University review, v. 33, Sept.–Oct. 1982: 23–28.

Proposes "the eventual application of the Nixon Doctrine to Europe, whereby our allies would assume full responsibility for their own defense on the ground amidst the continued presence of robust American naval, air, and, of course, theater nuclear forces."

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Should America pay for Europe's security? Washington quarterly, v. 5, winter 1982: 19–23.

"The fundamental issue is whether NATO is still prepared to meet the military challenges that gave birth to the alliance, challenges as ominous today as they were in 1949. If not, the United States is likely to be compelled, by the dictates of sound strategy and domestic political pressures, to undertake fundamental alterations in the nature of its postwar military engagement in Europe."

Reid, Escott.

The miraculous birth of the North Atlantic Alliance. NATO review, v. 28, Dec. 1980: 12–18.

Ambassador Reid's account of the negotiations of the North Atlantic Treaty as seen from Canada.

Reychler, L. Rudney, R.

Towards a more efficient organization of European security and defense thinking. Studia diplomatica, v. 36, no. 3, 1983: 289–310.

Examines the increasing need for more coordinated research on European security in Western Europe to improve the defense decisionmaking process, and the need for more defense research centers.

Rigby, Vincent C.

Conference: "Canada, the United States and the Atlantic Alliance", Ryerson Polytechnical Institute, Toronto, Ontario 20–23 May, 1987. Canadian defence quarterly, v. 17, summer 1987: 48–49, 52.

Reports on a conference "to examine some of the issues that have confronted the North Atlantic Treaty Organization from its origins nearly 40 years ago to the present day."

Roth, William V.

After the Nunn-Roth Amendment. NATO's sixteen countries, v. 30, June–July 1985: 15–16, 18, 20–21, 23.

"After years of cohesion, it is natural to consider the evolution of the North Atlantic Alliance. Last year's Nunn-Roth Amendment did much to shake up thinking on both sides of

the Atlantic. As one of the co-authors, Senator William Roth shows how its present problems are seen in the United States and gives a serious assessment of its needs."

Rupp, Rainer.

Assistance for Greece, Portugal and Turkey—a form of burden-sharing. NATO's sixteen nations, v. 30, Dec. 1985: 49–52, 54–55, 57–58.

"Burden sharing means a bigger weight for the stronger. It is imperative, as Mr. Rainer Rupp explains, that the better-off allied nations make greater efforts to assist their economically weaker fellows who, in reality, carry a heavier defence burden."

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Sharing the defence burden. NATO review, v. 30, Dec. 1982: 24–28.

"The nature and structure of the Alliance . . . therefore, prevents the production of a mechanical formula for calculating an equitable distribution of the defence burden. Efforts to do so are regularly based on narrow and selective criteria which not only fail to reflect the complexity of the NATO Alliance but also distort the relationships implied in membership."

Russell, Cosmo.

Europe in the new decade. Contemporary review, v. 236, Feb. 1980: 57–63.

"Looking ahead in Europe is obscured by a fog of imponderables: . . . acute military problem . . . of the Nato alliance . . . disillusion with the Community due to patterns of spending, grave concern over the problem of energy, an economic recession and finally the disturbing factor of continuing violence in everyday life."

Schlauch, Wolfgang.

West Germany: reliable partner? Perspectives on recent German-American relations. German studies review, v. 8, Feb. 1985: 107–125.

"The United States has considered the Federal Republic of Germany as one of its closest and most dependable allies within the Western Alliance. Since the late nineteen seventies, however, questions began to arise on both sides about the future nature of the NATO alliance and the West German role within it."

Schneider, William.

Europeans have their doubts about reliability of U.S. political leadership. National journal, v. 15, July 23, 1983: 1566–1567.

"The Atlantic Alliance faces a major test this year, and it comes at a time when public opinion in Europe and in America is sharply divided over nuclear defense policy and the reliability of U.S. political leadership."

Schoch, Bruno.

Eurocommunism and defence: do Western European communists feel threatened by the Soviet Union? The case of Italy. Bulletin of peace proposals, v. 15, no. 1, 1984: 25–36.

"The CPI has . . . fought Italy's incorporation into NATO from the very beginning. . . . It is not only for historic and ideological reasons that CPI has not made a clear choice as far as security and defence policy beyond acceptance of NATO are concerned."

Schroeder, Pat.

Our allies must pay more for defense. Washington post, Oct. 13, 1987: A19.

Members of the U.S. Congress contends that "of the $300 billion the United States spends on defense, something over half—say, $150 billion—goes for NATO obligations. Our trade deficit is running at about $175 billion a year. What we are spending to protect our allies is nearly the same amount by which we are losing the trade war."

Schwartz, Thomas.

The case of German rearmament: Alliance crisis in the "golden age." Fletcher forum, v. 8, summer 1984: 295–309.

The author reveals "the divisions and delays that marked NATO's first security crisis—the 1950 decision to rearm Germany. Making use of recently released governmental sources, personal papers and memoirs, both European and American . . . Mr. Schwartz argues that particular solutions can best be understood by looking at the relative strength of the cross-national bureaucratic coalitions that form around them. Mr. Schwartz concludes that NATO's history reveals a recurrent pattern in the origin, development and resolution of security crises. This pattern of historical resiliency, he suggests, should caution against the tendency to view present discord as a threat to the future viability of the Alliance."

Schweigler, Gebhard.

West German foreign policy: the domestic setting. New York, Praeger, 1984. 124 p. (Washington papers/106)

Contents.—German-American relations: concerns and expectations.—Historical setting: external and internalized constraints.—Attitudinal setting: identity and detente.—Military setting: alliance, arms, and angst.—Economic setting: from wirtschaftswunder to wondering.—Political setting: the primacy of stability.—Conclusion: stability and predictability.

Securing Europe's future. Edited by Stephen J. Flanagan and Fen Osler Hampson. London, Croom Helm, Dover, Mass., Auburn House, c1986. 334 p. (UA646.S38 1986)

Simonet, Henri.

The state of the Alliance—a European view. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 27, Oct.-Nov. 1982: 16–18.

Discusses the conviction of some Europeans that the security of the United States can no longer be identified with that of

Europe, and considers U.S. policies which may have contributed to such a conviction.

Sloan, Stanley R.

Defense burdensharing: U.S. relations with NATO allies and Japan. Revised June 24, 1988. Washington, Congressional Research Service, 1988. 164 p. (88-449 F)

U.S. relations with its major allies, the NATO countries and Japan, have in the last decade been troubled by differences over what constitutes an appropriate sharing of the burdens and benefits of alliance. The current issues are: how contributions to Western security are most accurately perceived; whether U.S. allies should be expected to support a greater share of the Western defense effort; if so, what U.S. policy approaches could be employed to encourage increased allied efforts; what options are open to the U.S. Congress to influence U.S. policy in this area.

Revision of Report no. 85-101 F.

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East-West relations in Europe. New York, Foreign Policy Association, 1986. 64 p. (Headline series no. 278)

Partial contents.—How and why is Europe divided?—Divided Germany: the heart of a divided Europe.—Overcoming the division.—Future issues and implications.

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European co-operation and the future of NATO: in search of a new transatlantic bargain. Survival, v. 26, Nov.-Dec. 1984: 242-251.

This article examines such issues as "What lessons can be derived from the ill-fated EDC [European Defense Community] initiative for the current troubles of the Alliance? Can the structural flaw be remedied?"

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Managing the NATO alliance: Congress and burdensharing. Journal of policy analysis and management, v. 4, spring 1985: 396-406.

"Congressional perspectives have been substantially influenced by the desire to limit the U.S. share of the NATO burden. . . . Whether the recent focus on burdensharing will recede or grow in the next few years will depend on how the administration and the allies respond to the congressional pressure."

Smith, Michael.

Western Europe and the United States: the uncertain alliance. London; Boston, George Allen & Unwin, 1984. 152 p. (Studies in contemporary Europe, no. 6)

Contents.—An uncertain alliance.—Continuity and change in European-American relations.—Interpreting European-American relations: political and academic puzzles.—The architecture of uncertainty.—Settings: the environment of European-American relations.— Issues: the substance of European-

American relations.—Processes: the conduct of European-American relations.

Sommer, Theo.

Through German eyes. National interest, no. 11, spring 1988: 3–17.

Editor of the West German weekly, Die Zeit, presents a highly critical appraisal of U.S. policies toward Europe and U.S. foreign policy in general. Calls for a resuscitation of the West European Union as a framework of European defense cooperation that would lessen the influence of the U.S. on West European defense policy. Includes rebuttals by Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Irving Kristol and Helmut Sonnenfeldt.

Steinberg, James B.

Rethinking the debate on burden-sharing. Survival, v. 29, Jan.–Feb. 1987: 56–78.

"The burden-sharing debate has been an endemic controversy within the Atlantic Alliance since its inception. From the earliest days of the US Senate deliberation over ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty, vocal and influential segments of the American political leadership have questioned the "fairness" of the burden the United States bore for the defence of Western Europe."

Stoppa-Liebl, Paolo.

Europe's youth and western values: from revolution to apathy. Atlantic Community quarterly, v. 24, summer 1986: 111–118.

"Two generations of Europeans have grown with the alliance. It is easy, therefore, to accept it uncritically as a permanent fixture of the political landscape. But NATO needs more than passive acceptance in order to remain viable."

Strausz-Hupe, Robert.

Will West Germany stay in step? Policy review, no. 11, winter 1980: 37–49.

"The issue of Germany's partition has slanted the internal politics of West Germany ever since its founding; its implications have never been absent from the consideration of the West German foreign and security policies. It has always loomed large in Bonn's relationship with its Western allies. Now, it confronts NATO with a crucial test of alliance solidarity."

Sullivan, Leonard, Jr.

A new approach to burden sharing. Foreign policy, no. 60, fall 1985: 91–110.

"More important than the size of defense budgets, however, is the overriding necessity for all members of the Consortium to participate equally in assuring their own future prosperity. To the extent that prosperity is guaranteed by standing military forces, it will behoove all collectively to minimize the unnecessary and unequal burdens, if not from the ideological standpoint of 'share and share alike,' then from the common

objective of improving overall political and economic prosperity."

Trezise, Philip H.

The Atlantic connection: prospects, problems, and policies. Washington, Brookings Institution, 1975. 100 p. (D1065.U5T73)

Tritten, James John.

Meeting the challenge of Eurocommunism on NATO's southern shores. Army quarterly and defense journal, v. 110, Jan. 1980: 38–47.

"An overview of the foreign policy options regarding Eurocommunism available to American and NATO decision makers will be made with a brief analysis of each."

The "Two-way street" works even better than advertised. Armed Forces journal international, v. 122, Dec. 1984: 62, 64, 68, 70, 74, 76, 80.

"When European and American defense experts gather, things are usually cordial—until someone brings up the defense trade balance between the US and its Allies. The mere mention of the common shorthand for that trade balance—the 'Two-Way Street'—nearly always elicits verbal salvos from those who reside east of the Atlantic.

U.S. Congress. Committee on Armed Services. Defense Burdensharing Panel.

Report of the defense burdensharing panel. Washington, G.P.O., 1988. 114 p. (Print, House, 100th Congress, 2nd session, committee print no. 23)

"The bottom line to the burdensharing debate in 1988 is how to guarantee the economic and military security of the United States and its allies in the 21st century and ensure that developed countries with mutual defense interests share the cost of that defense on a more equitable basis and contribute more equitably to the security, economic and political well-being of less developed countries."

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East.

Roundtable discussion on United States policy toward Europe. Hearing, 100th Congress, 1st session. Dec. 2, 1987. Washington, G.P.O., 1988. 42 p. (KF27.F64214 1987g)

"United States-European relations emerging from the conclusion of a United States-Soviet arms control agreement on Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces, INF, and from recent political, economic and financial developments."

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Roundtable discussion on United States policy toward Europe. Hearing, 99th Congress, 2nd session. July 22, 1986. Washington, G.P.O., 1986. 28 p. (KF27.F64214 1986e)

Focuses on "the main themes of United States foreign policy problems in United States-European relations during the next decade."

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations.

Turkey, Greece, and NATO: the strained alliance; a staff report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. Washington, G.P.O., 1980. 64 p. (UA646.5.T8U53 1980)

At head of title: 96th Congress, 2nd session. Committee print.

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U.S. security assistance to NATO's southern flank; a report. Washington, G.P.O., 1983. 8 p. (Print, Senate, 98th Congress, 1st session, committee print S. Prt. 98–32) (UA46.55.U17 1983)

U.S. Dept. of Defense.

Report on allied contributions to the common defense; a report to the United States Congress by Frank C. Carlucci, Secretary of Defense. Washington, The Department, 1988. 134 p.

"This report responds to Congress' interest in the extent to which our principal allies are contributing their fair share of the effort to provide for our common defense. It analyzes various burdensharing indices and factors for the United States, our NATO allies and Japan, offers some conclusions as to recent and current performance, and describes what is being done to encourage the allies to do more."

Vandevanter, Elliot.

Common funding in NATO. Santa Monica, Calif., Rand Corp., 1967. 122 p. (Rand Corporation. Memorandum, RM–5282–PR) (Q180.A1R36, no. 5282)

"Research is sponsored by the United States Air Force under Project RAND-contract no. F44620–67–C–0045."

Vasconcelos, Alvaro.

Portugal and NATO. NATO review, v. 34, Apr. 1986: 8–14.

"Three categories of events—political democracy, the end of the colonial empire and, finally, membership of the European Community since the beginning of this year—have concurred to reinforce . . . [Portugal's] NATO option and its commitment to the common Western defence effort."

Vinocur, John.

Europe's intellectuals and American power. New York times magazine, Apr. 29, 1984: 60, 62, 64, 68, 71, 73–74, 76, 78.

Focusing on French and West German intellectuals, the author discusses current attitudes to the U.S., especially attitudes towards deployment of immediate range nuclear weapons.

VonStaden, Berndt.

Perspectives of German foreign policy. Aussenpolitik, v. 36, no. 1, 1985: 11–24.

"Detente as a policy aimed at continuing with the course of cooperation between West and East and with that of arms control . . . a vital precept of German policy. Alliance solidarity requires our allies to acknowledge and respect this German policy prerequisite," argues former German state secretary.

Wallace, William.

European defense co-operation: the reopening debate. Survival, v. 26, Nov.-Dec. 1984: 251-262.

Weiss, Seymour. Adelman, Kenneth.

A critical phase in trans-Atlantic relations. Strategic review, v. 9, spring 1981: 24-34.

"The current trans-Atlantic stresses in NATO are the accumulation of hardening differences in political, economic and security perceptions, with growing emphasis on such problem areas as East-West detente, the shifting balance of power and the defense of common interests beyond the NATO region."

Western defense: the European role in NATO. Washington, Dept. of State, 1988. 32 p.

"This booklet explains from a European perspective why the Alliance and its strategy for assuring peace in freedom remain as central as ever to the West's security and what the European Allies are doing to make their contribution to the common defense effort stronger and more cohesive. The booklet has been produced by the Eurogroup, an organization of twelve of the European members of the Alliance."

Western Europe: security in the balance. International journal, v. 40, winter 1984-85: whole issue (206 p.)

Contents.—The United States and NATO: the new agenda, by A. Pierre.—Soviet perspectives on European security, by J. Hough.—The INF negotiations and the prospects for nuclear arms control in Europe, by P. Buteux.—Germany and the Euromissile debate, by H. Haftendorn.—France: its defence and European security, by M. Smouts.—West European security collaboration: driving forces and prospects, by S. May.—European economic security: How can we master the modern economy? by J. Pinder.—Consensus, compromise, and crusades: the domestic politics of European security, by R. Jackson.

Wettern, Desmond.

The new peace movement in Germany. Aussenpolitik, v. 33, no. 3, 1982: 219-233.

"Analyses a movement that distances itself from the values of our performance-oriented industrial society and turns towards the new values of self-realisation."

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Sharing the burden: the European Members' naval contribution to NATO. Sea power, v. 26, Nov. 1983: 20-21, 23-24, 26-28, 31.

Surveys the navies of the Western European Members of NATO, and discusses how those navies contribute to the defense of the Alliance.

Wettig, Gerhard.

The mix of interests in East-West relations. Aussenpolitik, v. 33, Jan. 1982: 74-86.

"Even if it were to continue the policy aimed at preventing a war in the European-Atlantic region, the Kremlin has . . . created a long-term global threat to the West that could, among other things, affect the Western world's energy and raw materials supplies."

Whitehurst, Clinton H., Jr.

Portugal's strategic importance in NATO defense planning. [Clemson, S.C.] Strom Thurmond Institute, Clemson University, 1986. 17 p. (Thurmond Institute lectures)

"Successful defense depends upon an effective line of communications through which support flows, both forward and retrograde. The most effective, efficient, and viable line of support to Europe extends from the Iberian Peninsula. . . . Portugal is one of the major anchors of that line of communications."

Wigg, Richard.

Neighbors with their backs to each other. NATO's sixteen nations, v. 28, no. 6, 1983: 44–45, 48.

Examines relations between Spain and Portugal, especially friction regarding the implications of Spain's membership in NATO.

Williams, Geoffrey Lee.

The European defence initiative: Europe's bid for equality. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1986. 242 p. (UA646.W53 1986)

Williams, Phil.

Arms control and European security: competing conceptions for the 1980s. Arms control, v. 4, Sept. 1983: 75–96.

"What often appear to be arguments over arms control are really arguments over the nature of the 'real' threats to European security."

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The Nunn Amendment, burdensharing and US troops in Europe. Survival, v. 27, Jan.–Feb. 1985: 2–10.

"The Nunn Amendment was a carefully crafted proposal mandating US troop reductions in Europe unless the Allies met certain specific requirements." Examines this proposal and considers its implications on burden sharing.

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The United States' commitment to Western Europe: strategic ambiguity and political disintegration? International affairs, v. 59, spring 1983: 195–209.

The author's objective is to "analyse the American commitment to Western Europe in an attempt both to identify its strengths and weaknesses and to assess its durability and resilience."

Williams, Philip.

West European security after Reykjavik. Washington quarterly, v. 10, spring 1987: 37–47.

"The summit raised familiar European fears about the propensity of U.S. leaders to overlook European interests in negotiating with the USSR. . . . This paper traces varying European reactions on the questions raised by the Reykjavik summit. It reveals an alliance in greater flux than ever before."

Windsor, Philip.

Germany and the Western Alliance: lessons from the 1980 crises. London, International Institute for Strategic Studies [1981] 30 p. (Adelphi papers, no. 170)

Contents.—The context of the Alliance.—The German background.—The crises.—The Federal Republic and the future of the Alliance.—Conclusions.

Worner, Manfred.

Current prospects for European security. Atlantic Community quarterly, v. 21, fall 1983: 226–232.

The West German Minister of Defense contends: "the case of insecurity here in Europe is not to be found in arms or the level of military confrontation, but in the political conflict, and this conflict is not animated—as some pretend—by competitive armaments but by Soviet policies of suppression in Eastern Europe and by expansive Soviet policy."

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The "peace movement" and NATO: an alternative view from Bonn. Strategic review, v. 10, winter 1982: 15–21.

The author contends that the most disturbing symptom of the antinuclear peace movement in West Germany is "a spreading 'neutralism of values' that conceivably could be given nationalist-neutralist directions."

Yost, David S.

Franco-German defense cooperation. Washington quarterly, v. 11, spring 1988: 173–195.

"Many Frenchmen have interpreted the U.S.-Soviet (INF) treaty as a confirmation of the need to strengthen Western Europe's defense capabilities and to work more closely with the Federal Republic of Germany. . . . Bonn has generally welcomed the French initiatives for enhanced bilateral defense cooperation and has taken some of its own."

Zanone, Valerio.

Europe's role in NATO. NATO review, v. 36, Apr. 1988: 7–11.

"It is, above all, the responsibility of the Europeans . . . to ensure that conditions permit the coexistence, economic exchanges and human contacts throughout the European continent."

Zoppo, Ciro Elliott.

The Left and European security: France, Italy, and Spain. Orbis, v. 24, summer 1980: 289–310.

Zucconi, Mario.

The 'Americanization' of American foreign policy. International spectator, v. 22, July-Sept. 1987: 177-185.

"The United States and Western Europe seem to be moving more and more autonomously, each distancing itself from the other and from common policies. In recent years, Washington's policies have appeared, more and more narrowly 'American', while the policies of the countries of Western Europe are seen to have undergone a process of 'Europeanization'."

IX. POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF THE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN NATO

Boyer, Yves.

The U.S. military presence in Europe and French security policy. Washington quarterly, v. 11, spring 1988: 197–207.

Under the budgetary pressures the United States might be leaning toward the withdrawal, even a partial one, of military forces in Europe. The French consensus on defense policy is Paris' decisive role in preserving peace in Europe, assessing French security no longer on national interest but in terms of European security.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew.

Choosing where to put our forces. Washington times, Feb. 6, 1987: 1E–2E.

Former National Security advisor examines the deployment of U.S. troops in Europe. Argues that it does not "make sense to continue to devote roughly half of the American defense budget exclusively to Europe. This is especially true given the persisting anemic defense efforts of the West Europeans. . . . We should not underestimate Western Europe's capacity to provide for its own defense."

Carpenter, Ted Galen.

Standing guard over Europe. Reason, v. 16, Aug. 1984: 43–47.

Contends that "American troops in Europe were never meant to be a part of NATO—but they've been there for 33 years."

Chace, James.

Ike was right. Atlantic monthly, v. 260, Aug. 1987: 39–41.

"One way to help redress the balance between America's economic power and its military obligations would be to reduce U.S. troop strength in Europe."

Codevilla, Angelo M.

U.S. forces in Europe: why and whether? International security review, v. 6, winter 1981–1982: 465–476.

"American forces in Europe can perform a useful political function only if they can perform the military function for which they were retained in Europe in the 1940's. Yet the relative decline of American military power in the world has made it more necessary than ever that American troops in Europe, together with those of the allies, be able to actually fight, protect European civilians, and win. Today, they cannot be expected to do that successfully."

Congressional Research Service. Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division.

United States foreign policy objectives and overseas military installations. Washington, G.P.O., 1979. 207 p. (UA26.U5L5 1979)

At head of title: 96th Congress, 1st session. Committee print.

Dean, Jonathan.

Military security in Europe. Foreign affairs, v. 66, fall 1987: 22–40.

"In the longer run, the military confrontation in Europe seems as likely to shrink through independent actions on both sides. . . . NATO should develop a plan for exploiting fully the potential entailed in current Soviet proposals for lowering, in an orderly and verifiable way, the level of the NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation in Europe."

Dodd, Norman L.

Allied Forces Southern Europe. Army quarterly and defense journal, v. 114, Apr. 1984: 178–187.

Describes the military structure and posture of NATO's Allied Forces Southern Region (AFSOUTH) pinpointing major problems and stating that "for too long the focus of attention has been on the Central Front of NATO whereas it is more likely that a situation which can lead to war will take place far away from there."

Foster, Charles R.

Political-military factors in the Atlantic relationship: outlook under Reagan. Atlantic Community quarterly, v. 19, fall 1981: 304–311.

Reviews U.S. and Western European perspectives on strategic deterrence, detente, arms control, and defense postures. Briefly surveys political problems facing the NATO alliance.

Goldstein, Walter.

The opportunity costs of acting as a super power: U.S. military strategy in the 1980s. Journal of peace research, v. 18, no. 3, 1981: 241–260.

Considers the economic effects of a U.S. military build up in the 1980s, as well as constraints on effective use of military power.

Gole, Henry G.

The emerging campaign for US troop reductions in Europe: siren call to disaster. Carlisle Barracks, Pa., U.S. Army War College, 1981. 19 p.

"The author of this memorandum contends that reduction of US troop strength in Europe in the near future would be a mistake. He argues that the reasons for having a US presence there is as valid for the 1980's as it was in the 1950's and 1960's: to deter Soviet aggression and to prop up Europe—because it is in the interest of the United States to do so."

Grier, Peter.

US considers cutting NATO funds and manpower. Christian Science monitor, Dec. 12, 1986: 3–4.

Examines proposals supporting "major shifts in the US contribution to NATO's military structure."

Grimmett, Richard F.

Current issues with the "base-rights" countries and their implications. Dec. 5, 1988. Washington, Congressional Research Service, 1988. 39 p. (88–726 F)

This report focuses on central problems confronting the United States in maintaining overseas military installations in five nations commonly referred to as the "base-rights" countries: Portugal, Spain, Greece, Turkey, and the Philippines. The base rights countries concerns have centered on three basic issues: sovereignty and "out-of area" use bases; nuclear weapons storage, transit, and possible deployment; and levels of U.S. foreign assistance they receive.

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U.S. military installations in NATO's southern region; report. Prepared for the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, by the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Washington, G.P.O., 1986. 415 p. (UA26.M43G75 1986)

At head of title: 99th Congress, 2nd session. Committee print.

"This report discusses the military installations used by the United States in five nations in NATO's southern region—Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, and Turkey. It briefly reviews the U.S. political-military relationship with each country and each nation's relationship with NATO."

Halperin, Morton H.

Keeping our troops in Europe. New York times magazine, Oct. 17, 1982: 82–84, 86, 88, 93–97.

"An ex-Defense Department official argues that, should the U.S. withdraw its troops from Europe, it will give up an arrangement that offers us a great deal of security for a small amount of money."

Hillier, Pat.

U.S. ground forces: design and cost alternatives for NATO and non-NATO contingencies ' the Congress of the United States, Congressional Budget Office. Washington, The Office, 1980. 87 p. (A CBO study) (UA23.H513)

Kennedy, Thomas J., Jr.

NATO politico-military consultation: shaping Alliance decisions. Washington, National Defense University Press, 1984. 86 p. (National security affairs monograph series 84–3)

Contents.—NATO politico-military consultation.—US participation in the consultative process.—Other European consulta-

tive bodies.—Improving US consultative procedures.—Consultation outside the formal NATO process.

Maroni, Alice. Ulrich, John.

The U.S. commitment to Europe's defense: a review of cost issues and estimates. Nov. 7, 1985. Washington, Congressional Research Service, 1985. 18 p. (85-211 F)

Report no. 85-211 F

"This paper reviews various ways of measuring the cost of the U.S. commitment to Europe's defense and considers why it is difficult to provide a simple and direct answer to the question of how much the U.S. spends on its European defense commitment."

The U.S. & NATO: should the troops stay? Edited by W. Bruce Weinrod. Washington, Heritage Foundation, 1987. 37 p. (Heritage lectures 118)

Contents.—Panel I: Political consideration.—Panel II: Military and security considerations.

Thomas, William V.

American military strength abroad. [Washington] Editorial Research Reports, 1980. 107-124 p. (Editorial research reports, 1980, v. 1, no. 6)

Contents.—New emphasis on defense.—Evolving commitment overseas.—Future military challenges.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs.

United States political-military relations with allies in Southern Europe; report of a staff study mission to Portugal, Spain, Greece, and Turkey, October 15-30, 1986. Washington, G.P.O., 1987. 44 p. (D1065.U5U58 1987)

At head of title: 100th Congress, 1st session, Committee print.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East.

Political and military issues in the Atlantic Alliance. Hearings, 98th Congress, 2nd session. Aug. 1; Oct. 1, 1984. Washington, G.P.O., 1984. 131 p. (KF27.F64214i)

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations.

NATO troop withdrawals. Hearing, 97th Congress, 2nd session. Nov. 30, 1982. Washington, G.P.O., 1982. 88 p. (KF26.F6 1982)

U.S. General Accounting Office.

Future NATO funding at collocated operating bases should focus on key needs; Comptroller General's report to the Chairman, House Committee on Appropriations. Washington, G.A.O., 1983. 5 p.

"GAO/C-ID-83-1, Jan. 14, 1983"

"This is an unclassified digest furnished in lieu of a report containing classified security information."

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U.S. participation in the NATO infrastructure program; report to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the United States. Washington, G.A.O., 1983. 54 p.
"GAO/ID-83-3, Jan. 27, 1983"

What is ours to defend? Harper's magazine, v. 277, July 1988: 39-50.

The debate over defense spending is trying to answer two fundamental questions: "What are we trying to defend, and what do we need, specifically, to defend it?" Leading article by Admiral Gene R. LaRocque; comments by Kenneth Adelman, E. R. Zumwalt, Jr., Gerard C. Smith, R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr., Ted Galen Carpenter, Thomas H. Moorer, and Gwynne Dyer.

Williams, Phil.

American troops in Europe: a new great debate? World today, v. 43, Dec. 1987: 215-218.

"The American military presence in western Europe seems to have become a permanent feature of the political and strategic landscape. . . . Supporters of the status quo contend that . . . the presence of American troops in Europe is one of the major pillars of Atlantic security and should not be tampered with. The policy of keeping such a large contingent of American troops in Europe, however, has not gone unchallenged. . . . This article examines the reasons which led to the upsurge of 1960s and early 1970s. It then examines the current pressures for change."

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The Senate and U.S. troops in Europe. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1985. 315 p. (UA646.5.U5W55 1985)

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U.S. troops in Europe. London, Royal Institute of International Affairs. London, Boston, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984. 87 p. (Chatham house papers 0143-5-195; no. 23) (UA23.W44 1984)

"Analyzes the contribution of the American military presence to the security of Western Europe; examines the advantages and shortcomings of proposals for strengthening NATO's conventional capacity; and considers the consequences of a reduction in the American troop contingent. . . . Concludes that reforms are essential if the cohesion of the Alliance is not to be severely strained."

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West European security and American troop withdrawals. Political quarterly, v. 59, July-Sept. 1988: 321-333.

Considers "the implications for Western Europe of a lower level of American commitment. Particular attention is given to the prospects for greater West European defence co-operation—as well as the forms such co-operation might take." Reviews the changing U.S. military role in Europe since the end of World War II and examines the possible European responses

to a possible lessening of the U.S. commitment to Europe considering the INF treaty and the pressure in the U.S. to reduce defense spending.

X. ECONOMIC ISSUES AMONG ALLIES

Ball, Mary Margaret.

NATO and the European union movement. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press [1974, c1959] 486 p. (JN15.B3 1974)

This work traces "the evolution of the movement to unite Europe and the development of NATO. It outlines the origins, aims, structure, principal activities and problems of the organisations of the European and Atlantic Areas. It poses a number of questions concerning the relationship between the European organisations and NATO, and ventures to make certain suggestions with respect to them. It does not offer a blueprint for either Atlantic or European union."

Beer, Francis A.

The political economy of alliances: benefits, costs, and institutions in NATO. Beverly Hills, Calif., Sage Publications [1972] 37 p. (Sage professional papers in international studies series, ser. no. 02–008) (JX4005.B43)

Burns, Arthur F.

Economic health of the Western Alliance. Atlantic Community quarterly, v. 21, spring 1983: 24–32.

U.S. Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany, Arthur Burns, discusses economic issues that have been recent sources of friction between the United States and her European allies.

Constraints on strategy: the economics of Western security. Edited by David B.H. Denoon. Washington, Pargamon-Brassey's, c1986. 254 p. (UA646.3.C64 1986)

This work addresses such issues as the likely economic performance for the United States and its principal allies; generalizations about the relationship between economic performance and defense spending; and how economic factors will shape defense options.

Frost, Ellen L. Stent, Angela E.

NATO's troubles with East-West trade. International security, v. 8, summer 1983: 179–200.

Argues the NATO "alliance should thus move toward a two-track East-West trade policy, combining long-term predictability with short-term flexibility, so that the West can agree on continuity in the major security-related aspects of trade while reserving some instruments of commerce to respond to short-term political developments."

Hardt, John P.

East-West economic relations: alternative scenarios for the Atlantic Alliance. Cologne, Bundesinstitut fur Ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien, 1983. 44 p.

Partial contents.—Diversity in East-West.—Alternative alliance scenarios.—Outcomes of alliance deliberations: implications for Western relations with the East.

Hogan, Michael J.

American Marshall planners and the search for a European neocapitalism. American historical review, v. 90, Feb. 1985: 44–72.

Contends that "through the Marshall Plan, American leaders sought to recast Europe in the image of American neocapitalism. They envisioned a Western European system in which class conflict would give way to cooperative collaboration, economic self-sufficiency to economic interdependence, international rivalry to rapprochement and cooperation, and arbitrary national controls to the integrating powers of supranational authorities and natural market forces."

Hussain, Farooq.

Emerging technology: economic and military implications for the Alliance. [In RUSI and Brassey's Defence Yearbook] 1985. London, Washington, Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1985. p. 163–176.

"Inadequacies in the Alliance's force posture have traditionally been framed in a manner that permits superior technology to provide the fix. Technology has been, and largely continues to be seen as the 'force multipler', the means by which smaller forces can deter larger forces by possessing qualitative advantages in performance of weapon systems."

Jay, Peter.

Europe and America: Europe's ostrich and America's eagle. Economist, v. 274, Mar. 8, 1980: 19–22, 25–26, 28–29.

An "outspoken essay on the mismanagement of Europe's relations with America."

Kennedy, Paul.

The (Relative) decline of America. Atlantic monthly, v. 260, Aug. 1987: 29–34, 36–38.

"In 1945 the United Sates commanded a 40 percent share of the world economy; today its shares is half that, and yet our military commitments have grown dramatically. This imbalance, which conforms to a classic historical patterns, threatens our security, both military and economic."

Krasner, Stephen D.

Trade conflicts and the common defense: the United States and Japan. Political science quarterly, v. 101, no. 5, 1986: 787–806.

Concludes that the international economic policies of the U.S. after World War II were guided more by concerns for the common defense rather than by narrow considerations of eco-

nomic self-interest. Argues that these policies have encouraged a shift in the dynamic center of international economic and political life toward Japan and East Asia.

Nau, Henry R.

Trade & deterrence. National interest, no. 7, spring 1987: 48–60.

Argues that a sharp swing toward a more open U.S. East-West trade policy "would not only be ill-advised, but would almost certainly occasion new misunderstandings and conflicts with the allies." Calls for a "more discriminating policy, based on the logic of deterrence. Such a policy would consistently deny strategic trade with the Soviet Union to protect Western defense assets, while permitting non-subsidized, market-determined levels of non-strategic trade to foster communications and dialogue with the Soviet Union."

O'Leary, James P.

Rethinking NATO's economic strategy. Journal of contemporary studies, v. 6, winter 1983: 51–64.

"This article outlines several areas of potential cooperation and consultation among the Allies that do not presuppose complete harmony of views as to the nature of the Soviet problems or tactical measures to deal with that problem. Emphasis will be placed on informal consultation and collaboration, often outside the formal NATO framework, rather than on grandiose designs for formally revitalizing NATO or expanding the Alliance commitment to include new economic concerns."

Quayle, Dan.

NATO and the economic recession; report of Senator Dan Quayle to the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate. Washington, G.P.O., 1982. 18 p.

Ritter, Klaus.

The critical issue of the transfer of technology. NATO's sixteen nations, v. 30, June–July 1985: 39–40, 42, 44–45.

Notes that Western European countries and Japan rely to a considerable degree on the Soviet Union to sell their technologies while high technology trade between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. is irrelevant. Points out that the tightening system of export controls tends to restrict Western access to American high technologies.

Robinson, Roger W., Jr.

East-West trade and national security. Washington, Heritage Foundation, 1986. 7 p. (Heritage lectures 50)

Presents policy recommendations which address the elements of East-West economic and commercial relations which may be providing "windfall contributions to Soviet military-related innovation, the USSR's hard currency earnings structure, and the Soviet Union's ability to maintain and expand its costly global commitments."

Rupp, Rainer.

Economic co-operation and assistance within the Alliance. NATO review, v. 33, Feb. 1985: 27–32.

Provides background information and current status reports on Allied economic affairs involving Portugal, Turkey and Greece.

Sullivan, Leonard, Jr. LeCuyer, Jack A.

Comprehensive security and Western prosperity. Lanham, Md., University Press of America, c1988. 227 p. (UA646.3.S797 1988)

Partial contents.—The West and its goals.—Political and "ideological" posture of the West.—Economic posture of the West.—Military posture of the West.—Assessment of the correlation of forces.—Challenges for the West.

Taylor, Humphrey.

Nine nations assess economic and security issues. Public opinion, v. 6, Aug.-Sept. 1983: 16–17, 54–55.

"It's too simplistic to interpret the German and British elections as endorsements of pro-NATO and pro-American policies. The data from the nine-country survey reveal economic as well as security tensions." This survey of eligible voters in France, Germany, Great Britain, Norway, Spain, Netherlands, Italy and the U.S. was conducted in the fall of 1982 and the spring of 1983.

Treverton, Gregory F.

Economics and security in the Atlantic Alliance. Survival, v. 26, Nov.-Dec. 1984: 269–279.

"To judge by recent writings, if the Atlantic Alliance does not break apart irrevocably over nuclear issues, or policy towards the Soviet Union, or security issues outside Europe, it will divide over 'West-West' economic issues. Growing protectionism to the point of trade wars, increasingly divisive debates over national economic policies, and the collapse of international financial institutions: these are the stock-in-trade of popular commentaries. At some point, it seems, these disputes must spill over to pose a threat to basic Alliance arrangements, including those in the realm of security."

U.S. Dept. of State. Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

Trade of NATO countries with European CEMA countries, 1977–1980. [Washington] 1981. 18 l. (Report 284–AR)

"The tables in this report, one of a series analyzing the trade patterns of Western countries, show values and percentages of trade of NATO countries with European CEMA countries."

U.S. General Accounting Office.

No easy choice: NATO collaboration and the U.S. arms export control issue; report to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the United States. [Washington] 1981. 84 p.

"ID–81–18, Jan. 19, 1981"

"Discusses the conflict between U.S. policy of controlling exports of the military equipment containing U.S. technology and

the desire to increase development and production agreements with North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies. The report analyzes the impact U.S. export control policy is having on collaboration and the willingness of the executive branch to modify this policy to increase the amount of collaboration taking place."

Vogel, Heinrich.

Western security and the Eastern bloc economy. Washington quarterly, v. 7, spring 1984: 42–50.

"The coherent formulation of Western security concerns and economic policies in Eastern Europe is feasible only in an environment of carefully designed cooperation with the Soviet Union."

XI .OUT OF AREA ISSUES AND TERRORISM

Acharya, Amitav.

NATO and 'out-of-area' contingencies: the Gulf experience. International defense review, v. 20, no. 5, 1987: 569–576.

"NATO, over recent years, has been involved in serious debate concerning its approach to threats arising outside the European theatre. . . . The most controversial aspect, involves US efforts to secure the participation of its NATO allies. . . . In broad terms, the debate on Europe's contribution to the US Gulf strategy has centered on two alternatives, the extension of NATO's operational perimeter or a 'division of labour' within the Alliance."

Aliboni, Roberto.

European security and out of NATO area crises. International spectator, v. 23, Apr.–June 1988: 90–97.

"Since the end of the seventies, Western European nations have, either alone or together with the US, repeatedly intervened in crises outside of the NATO area. . . . What do the present interventions mean? Is European foreign policy about to take on more global elements?"

Bentinck, Marc.

NATO's out-of-area problem. London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1986. 84 p. (Adelphi paper no. 211)

Contents.—The historical experience.—Global dimensions of western security: interests and vulnerabilities.—Managing out-of-area challenges inside and outside NATO.

Chichester, Michael.

Allied navies & Gulf war: strategic implications. Navy international, v. 93, June 1988: 318–321.

Discusses the strategic lessons to be learned from the history of the allied naval deployment in the Persian Gulf from August 1987 to spring 1988. Argues that the "tanker war" exposed the weakness of NATO cooperation outside the NATO Treaty area, given that in the Gulf the nations all acted unilaterally, each under its own national rules of engagement, protecting their own flag merchant ships.

Coker, Christoper.

The Western Alliance and Africa 1949–81. African affairs, v. 81, July 1982: 319–335.

"Compared to Soviet intervention in Angola and the Horn which had the broad support of the majority of OAU members NATO's alleged intervention in Zaire appeared much more threatening. . . . Yet, it may well be asked whether Africa has

ever fitted into NATO contingency planning or whether contrary to popular belief the Atlantic Alliance has been much more sensitive to African opinion and attentive to African aspirations than its critics have given it credit."

Conant, Melvin A.

The allies as petro-partners. Washington quarterly, v. 4, autumn 1981: 101–106.

Reviews Western Europe's energy dependence and differing U.S. and European perspectives on relations with the U.S.S.R. and the Middle East, in light of differing energy needs.

Lunn, Simon.

NATO after Afghanistan; report prepared for the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, by Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research, Library of Congress. Washington, G.P.O., 1980. 64 p. (UA646.3.85)

At head of title: 96th Congress, 2nd session. Committee print.

"Analyzes West European and American reactions to the invasion of Afghanistan, the United States and Western European contributions to NATO, particularly in the defense area, and the nature of the alliance response to the Afghanistan crisis.

Cremasco, Maurizio.

Do it yourself: the national approach to the out-of-area question. International spectator, v. 22, July–Sept. 1987: 130–151.

"The European countries have today larger common interests and are affected more than in the past by international crises. . . . The threats to their security stem less from the traditional scenario of a Soviet aggression and more from crises in areas outside NATO's boundaries. . . . Nothing is more divisive in the Atlantic Alliance than out-of-area issues. . . . Examines the specific positions of the European countries on the out-of-area question. . . . Several case studies of real out-of-area crises are schematically outlined in search of thread of common attitudes and responses."

Delmas, Claude.

Terrorism and the open society. NATO review, v. 30, no. 5, 1982: 12–17.

"The Atlantic Alliance, Mr. Delmas suggests, is more concerned by the problem of terrorism than may at first seem the case because the fight against it is a fight for the survival of the open society, the existence of which has been safeguarded by the Alliance since its creation."

Dodd, Norman L.

NATO looks outwards. Navy international, v. 86, Oct. 1981: 608–612.

Emphasizes the need for NATO countries to show their solidarity and provide some deterrent outside the strictly defined NATO area. Surveys the origins, objectives, and capabilities of the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force; the Standing Naval

Force, Atlantic; the Standing Naval Force, Channel; and the Oncall Naval Force, Mediterranean. Reviews plans for the NATO Early Warning Force. Suggests that all these standing forces have applications outside the strictly defined NATO area.

Fitz-Simons, Daniel.

Soviet interest in the Caribbean: looking for more than fun in the sun. Journal of defense & diplomacy, v. 5, no. 7, 1987: 42–47.

"The growing Soviet presence in Nicaragua, the guerrilla insurrection in El Salvador and the potential for instability in Panama, Guatemala and Mexico have already forced the United States to divert military resources to Central America. Thus the North Atlantic Treaty Organization can no longer operate on the assumption that its southern flank is safely anchored."

Gallis, Paul E.

Combatting state-supported terrorism: differing U.S. and West European perspectives, by Paul E. Gallis and James P. Wootten. Apr. 21, 1988. Washington, Congressional Research Service, 1988. 43 p. (88–313 F)

The United States has undertaken vigorous efforts to seek coordination with West European nations in combatting state-supported terrorism. Progress is evident in the sharing of information on terrorist groups and in shaping political objectives. Nonetheless, important differences remain over the efficacy of retaliatory measures against nations supporting terrorism and whether such measures should be economic or military.

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The NATO allies, Japan and the Persian Gulf. Congressional Research Service review, v. 6, Feb. 1985: 5–6.

"Most of the United States' NATO allies heavily depend upon the Persian Gulf for petroleum supplies. A number have also developed extensive trade contacts with Iran or Iraq, as well as with other states in the region. In addition, Japan imports a significant amount of its petroleum from the Gulf. A disruption of the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf could pose a serious economic and strategic threat to members of the alliance and to Japan. The United States and its allies, however, differ in important ways over how to respond to such a threat."

Hess, H. Jurgen.

The Central American dilemma: West German perceptions and options. Fletcher forum, v. 10, summer 1986: 297–315.

"In the case of West Germany these historically strong economic ties, often in opposition to United States policy, are complicated by equally strong present-day security ties with the United States. The West German government must strengthen NATO and at the same time respond effectively to strong do-

mestic opposition to United States policy in Central America. [The author] surveys the historical relationship between West Germany and Central America and the current policies of the four West German political parties represented in Parliament toward the region. He argues that policy options are limited, given overwhelming U.S. influence in the region."

Hyland, William G.

The Atlantic crisis. Daedalus, v. 110, winter 1981: 41–51.

Reviews strains in relations between the U.S. and its European NATO allies resulting from divergences over policies toward the Middle East, Afghanistan, and Iran, as well as from differing attitudes toward military deployments in Europe, European security needs, and arms control negotiations.

Kapstein, Ethan B.

Alliance energy security: 1945–1983. Fletcher forum, v. 8, winter 1984: 91–116.

"Traces the history of the Atlantic Alliance's efforts to develop a collective, viable policy for energy security from 1945 to 1983. . . . Characterizes the present rules and norms governing Alliance energy policy as an insurance regime, rather than a control regime, and concludes that the past achievements of Alliance energy policy encourage hope for the future."

Kupchan, Charles A.

NATO and the Persian Gulf: examining intra-alliance behavior. International organization, v. 42, spring 1988: 317–346.

This essay examines the determinants of intra-alliance behavior focusing on a single case: "the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) efforts to address security problems in the Persian Gulf since 1979. . . . The presence of oil reserves in the Gulf area has made regional security in Southwest Asia a collective concern of the Western allies. As a result, NATO partners have repeatedly attempted to coordinate policies towards the region."

Neuman, H. J.

Nuclear forces in Europe and their implication for Northeast Asia. In Northeast Asian and European relations: new dimensions and strategies. Taipei, Taiwan, Asia and World Institute, 1984. p. 62–74.

Discusses the US/NATO policies of nuclear forces modernization and arms control negotiations concentrating on "the geographical scope of the negotiations and the inclusion (or exclusion) of 'Third Country' nuclear forces."

Pattie, Geoffrey E.

Western security beyond the NATO area. Strategic review, v. 12, spring 1984: 39–43.

"There has been a reluctance on the part of the Alliance members to consider the collectivity of their interests beyond the narrowly defined NATO Treaty Area. . . . The least that is encumbent upon the Alliance is a greatly improved consulta-

tive process—one that also features tightened interaction among the relevant components of the members governments."

Pisano, Vittorfranco S.

Euroterrorism and NATO. [S.l.] International Association of Chiefs of Police [1985] 6 p.

"The term 'Euroterrorism' has been coined to describe . . . the ostensible pooling of resources and joint selection of target clusters by West European terrorist formations of the Marxist-Leninist left." Addresses the nature, degree of cohesion, and potential viability of Euroterrorism.

Snyder, Jed C.

Defending the fringe: NATO, the Mediterranean, and the Persian Gulf. Boulder, Westview Press with the Foreign Policy Institute, School of Advanced International Studies, the Johns Hopkins University, 1987. 149 p. (SAIS papers in international affairs; no. 11) (UA646.3.S64 1987)

Strauss, Franz Josef.

After Afghanistan. Policy review, no. 12, spring 1980: 109–114.

"Afghanistan is nothing but a preliminary objective in the long-term planning of the Kremlin on its way to communist world ascendancy. With this action, however, Moscow has put the Atlantic Alliance to the test."

Terrorism. American Legion magazine, v. 120, June 1986: 15, 49, 16–17, 56–57, 18–19, 54, 20, 21, 47–48.

Partial contents.—'We'll protect our citizens,' by George Bush.—How NATO became impotent, by Brian Crozier.

The Third dimension: NATO in space. NATO's sixteen nations, v. 29, Nov. 1984: whole issue (13–46 p.)

Contents.—Space and defense in the NATO alliance, by E. Teller.—NATO and the Strategic Defence Initiative, by L. Freedman.—Antiballistic missile defense, by R. DeLauer.—Space logistics, by B. Smernoff.—Military SATCOMs, by N. West.—View from Copenhagen, by N. Haagerup.—World surveillance from space, by D. Rekenthaler.

Tow, William T.

Asian-Pacific alliance systems and transregional linkages. Naval War College review, v. 34, Sept.-Oct. 1981: 32–54.

Reviews Soviet strategic penetration of Asia and the Pacific and responses of Asian and Pacific nations. Considers Japanese moves toward defense cooperation with the U.S. and its NATO and ANZUS allies. Surveys the emerging interests of other Asian-Pacific states in expanding their security ties with NATO and ANZUS states into a wider forum for consultation and policy coordination.

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NATO's out-of-region challenges and extended containment. Orbis, v. 28, winter 1985: 829–855.

"Reviews some key components that historically have played a role in obviating NATO's assumption of a global security identity. More recent diverse perspectives about how best to address current NATO strategic problems that originate from outside the treaty area are also be briefly assessed."

Treverton, Gregory F.

Global threats and trans-Atlantic allies. International security, v. 5, fall 1980: 142–158.

Examines three issues which might change security relations between Western Europe and the United States: (1) debate on nuclear and conventional defense strategy and deployment, (2) threats outside Europe, and (3) shocks from outside the realm of 'security' as usually defined, such as oil embargos, or political developments within individual NATO countries.

Will Europe fight for oil?: energy relations in the Atlantic area. Edited by Robert J. Lieber. New York, N.Y., Praeger, 1983. 230 p. (HD9502.A2W53 1983)

Williams, James H.

NATO: out-of-sector interests in the Middle East. Military review, v. 65, Oct. 1985: 54–63.

"Although the United States and its NATO partners continue to focus on the possibility of war in Central Europe, some observers think they may be looking in the wrong direction. This article contends that NATO's most likely threat comes from the Middle East and options should be examined to deal with contingencies in the area."

Wohlstetter, Albert.

Meeting the threat in the Persian Gulf. Survey, v. 25, spring 1981: 128–188.

Reviews NATO and Soviet interests in the Persian Gulf. Outlines suggestions for improving U.S. policies and power projection capabilities in the region, including contributions which extraregional allies could make toward defending the Gulf. Charts indicate Western consumption of Persian Gulf oil, the utility of various bases for defending the upper Gulf from Soviet attack, and Turkish based aircraft radii.

Zakheim, Dov. S.

Towards a western approach to the Indian Ocean. Survival, v. 22, Jan.–Feb. 1981: 7–14.

Describes objectives to be served by a western naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Suggests that NATO allies should work together to provide such a force, in response to a problem they all share: maintaining access to supplies of raw materials from the Indian Ocean region.

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